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Before turning to the introduction, I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to those people who 
have been key to the successful parts of the dissertation and of course did their best to prevent me 
from my stubborn resistance to keep making mistakes. The unavoidable shortcomings in this 
dissertation are exclusively caused by my part-time reluctance to accept those advices.   
There are two scientific mentors whose impact on my dissertation is substantial and definitely 
causal. A couple of years ago my supervisor André Kaiser asked me to return to the University of 
Cologne to write a dissertation instead of doing impact evaluation of electrification projects in 
Rwanda. It was not difficult to convince me because some aspects of the political economy in 
established democracies deeply concerned me and they still do. What made the move even more 
worth wile was his commitment to establish a flourishing research environment where I was given 
the opportunity to follow my interests, exchange with brilliant colleagues and turn my thoughts 
into something scientific. André Kaiser’s approach was to maximize my degrees of freedom and 
to convey a high amount of trust, even though my first proposal in written English, and probably 
also my late proposals, were hard to read. At the same time, he minimized my administrative 
burdens and other obligations to a degree that I have to admit, I was really given the opportunity 
to plunge into the things I was interested in. I was encouraged to participate in international 
exchange and conferences from which I benefitted a lot. The ‘high freedom low burden approach’ 
was probably picture-perfect for me and turned the dissertation period, which many consider to 
be a terrible stressful time, into a terrible stressful time which I actually enjoyed. Additionally, his 
analytical clarity, broad oversight of research developments and his ‘coolness’ to care only about 
things which are really pressing, are helpful qualities. Useful qualities to keep focussed on the 
necessary in a hectic international scenery of researchers. Hence, I am deeply grateful to André 
Kaiser for the opportunity he has given to me, his advices, the scientific collaboration and the 
seemingly endless degrees of freedom.  
vi 
 
My second supervisor, Ingo Rohlfing, always seemed to tweet more than he talked. I was in the 
lucky position to be his teaching assistant for case study and mixed method courses in several 
summer and winter schools. In circumstances where he was obliged to talk (the teaching hours) he 
said so many useful things that my whole approach to social science is still heavily shaped by his 
mind. What still strikes me is his overwhelming integrity towards science and people. I never had 
the chance to catch him making things up. He always delivered his degrees of uncertainty 
voluntarily. In fact, I think he is the most honest scientist I ever met. This in turn was creating such 
a pile of trust in his approach and advices that I will always come back to him when it comes to 
the core questions of methodology, methods or science in general. 
The research environment I was exposed to was inspiring and full of coffee. It happens that 
many people crossed and shared my ways at whatever place where coffee was available. Many of 
them I consider today my friends. The most enduring exchange of ideas and trivia was reserved to 
Jörg Peters, Julian Garritzmann, Holger Reinermann and Christina Zuber. Jörg send me to Ruanda 
before I moved back to the University of Cologne and he was so well socialized into modern 
econometric identification that I never ever considered talking to him before having thoughtfully 
applied counterfactual reasoning and ruled out self-selection into treatment. Counterfactually, it 
proved to be very inspiring to have the same drive for the abstract well-being of societies while at 
the same time often very different views on how to get there. I consider him a true friend that he 
will always remain, because even ideological differences – often a very important source of social 
deterioration – does not refute any of my sympathy for him and I hope vice versa.  
Julian Garritzmann is a good friend and scientist with a weakness for weird sports such as 
playing with shuttlecocks or flow balls. However, hanging out, talking and working with him is 
always a pleasure. He is goal oriented in any scientific discussion or collaboration. At the same 
time, he always comes with a good portion of motivating humour and encouragement. He is a role 
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model in keeping the balance between the necessary sharp mindedness and the pleasure to enjoy 
other aspects of life.  
Holger Reinermann is my most faithful conference travel partner. The ingenuity of our 
conference and post-conference travel symbiosis is rooted in the way we approach things. He is 
like a parking brake telling you jokes while he is preventing you from crashing into things. A parking 
brake is may be not the most appreciated characterization of a friend, but a deeply sarcastic and 
humorous parking brake with the tendency to cast into doubt everything I propose should come 
in serial-production for people like me. So, I enjoyed your company a lot and one day we will see 
you dancing.  
Christina Zuber wrote her dissertation in time and made a position at the Chair of André Kaiser 
available. More importantly, she influenced me a lot in the time we shared the same working place 
and she is still influencing me. Even though I developed some of the mayor ideas of my PHD 
throughout our conversations, combined with the fact that our research focus is very similar in 
some aspects, surprisingly we never wrote something together. This is a pity, because the way she 
works seemed always pretty ideal to me. She is one of the best and sharpest commenters I ever 
encountered and she is so focussed and efficient at work that I often felt ashamed with my windy 
attention span. Additionally, she is getting things done with a remarkable balance between working, 
climbing, hiking and skiing.  
There are so many others which deserve a brighter spotlight in these acknowledgements and I 
know I cannot do justice to them by listing them as those who helped me to make my dissertation 
an exciting episode. However, I will still do it and thank those who kept my mood high on a daily 
basis: Sarah Berens, Paul Beckmann, Florian Fastenrath Simon Franzmann, Philip Gross, Nawid 
Hoshmand, Leon Kanthak, Hannah Pflanzelt, Stephan Vogel, Saskia Ruth, Jan Sauermann, 
Michael Schwan, Valeria Smirnova, Dennis Spies and Gregor Zons.  
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As it turned out that besides my genuine dissertation I was supposed to help managing a DFG 
funded research grant, some student assistants were in the unlucky position to help me getting 
skilled in what we call human resource management these days. To be honest, in the beginning I 
was overstrained and I apologize for the weeks and months where I struggled to keep up with the 
management of myself and giving you advices and tasks at the same time. However, at least from 
my side it felt like turning into something which was one of the best experiences throughout the 
last years. Observing how quickly you learned and how engaged you fulfilled the tasks was 
impressive and also scary because it gave me a glimpse of how extraordinary the next generation 
of researchers will be. With some of the assistants I still work together, others are unfortunately no 
more part of the team. I am deeply grateful for the work you have done and the experiences with 
all of you. Many thanks to Lea Kaftan, Çağan Varol, Kristina Orphey, Kristina Kittel, Daniel 
Gonzatti Saldivia, Benedict Stefani, Marcel Buchwald and Keno Röller-Siedenburg. 
Others rarely visited my office and I am very happy about it. A list of true friends realized that 
writing a PHD can work detrimental to the time spend in a bar. I request all those for forgiveness 
who were subject of disregard or those which realized that my mind was sometimes hardly 
accessible because a whole day of statistics turned me into an emotional zombie. I even feel guiltier 
towards those I always promised improvement after the next article but what came was another 
article and no improvement.  
The same experience was probably shared by my family which is key to me. My lovely patchwork 
family is scattered all over the place and never stops moving, splitting and reuniting. That’s how 
many families are these days and I think we manged well to make the best out of it. It sounds like 
a conservative core claim, but my family proofed to be an emotional anchor throughout the last 
years. Less conservative is my opinion, that emotional anchorage is independent of core or patchy 
families. My parents, the partners of my parents, my sisters and brothers as well as my nephew and 
my niece enriched my perspective and my emotional well-being a lot through all these years.   
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The best for the last. The one who supported me in every aspect during the entire dissertation 
project was my partner Sally Müller. She experienced the time constraints and obvious alienation 
of long working hours in such close detail that I was happy for every day she decided to stay with 
me. I think without her I would have developed a rather strange relation to the world I study. I 
owe her an immeasurable amount of gratitude to shallowly turn me into a person with a sustainable 
balance between different elements of life. We also shared many of my thoughts and it was pure 
enrichment to observe her curatorial perspective on projects and reply to her ongoing interest in 
my ideas. There remain plenty of thoughts to be developed and discussed for us in the years to 
come. However, these thoughts are at best secondary since we turned into parents. The last words 
and corrections on this thesis were written when I faced a lovely distraction. Carrying my son Jón 
around became my favourite occupation. I am deeply grateful to my little family to give me a 
supersonic boost of orientation to care about the essential. I mean it seriously, parents should stop 
reading here and spend time with their children, supervisor-parents excluded. 
 
Collaboration with co-authors 
Chapters of this dissertation are based on articles originated in collaboration with co-authors. 
Before I precisely describe their impact on the pieces, I would like to thank them. In many 
departments, collaborative work as a part of dissertations is not encouraged. My experience leads 
me to advice the contrary. Working with more experienced colleagues helped me a lot to develop 
key skills like framing, writing, strategic decisions of journal selection or determining and addressing 
specific audiences.  
Some of these collaborations made it into this dissertation. Chapter 3.4 is based on an article 
co-authored with Dennis Spies and Alexandre Afonso which is published in European Political Science 
Review (2017). I proposed the research design of a mixed-method approach and mainly dealt with 
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the quantitative section as well as the intersection of case selection for the qualitative part. Dennis 
Spies predominantly wrote the theoretical part in collaboration with Alexandre Afonso. 
Additionally, Alexandre was in charge of the case studies.  
Çağan Varol played an indispensable part in coding the Kurdish party manifestos, in the 
provision of case material and important sources. Uğur Sadioğlu complemented the study with a 
fine-grained coding of Turkish party manifestos. He added as well an important sense for 
sensibilities concerning language and the meaning of concepts in the Turkish context. The paper 
is published in Swiss Political Science Review (2016). The argument exemplified in the Turkish contexts 
travelled well to many other constellation where territorially concentrated minorities claimed 
political self-determination.  
In a third article, André Kaiser and I proved the generalizability of the argument. The article 
depicts our general findings on asymmetric decentralization from the first project phase 
“decentralization and electoral geographies” funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(GZ: KA 1741/10-1). André Kaiser was key to the revision of different versions of the article and 
the specification and refinement of the arguments in the theoretical section. Additionally, we 
benefitted from excellent feedback in the review process of the American Political Science Review and 
American Journal of Political Science.  This article closely resembles Chapter 4.2. I am thankful for all 
these collaborations, any remaining errors and obscurities in the co-authored and single authored 






Modern societies are market societies – a social order where “a whole society [is] embedded in the 
mechanisms of its own economy” (Polanyi 1977, 9). Markets became the most prominent, maybe 
already the only assertive, response to questions of social coordination (Crouch 2013; Kriesi et al 
2006, 924). “Imagining alternatives can be difficult given the density and obviousness of an 
apparently endless market present” (Slater and Tonkiss 2001, 4). Market societies have been 
extensively studied by various disciplines. Anthropologists, sociologists and historians have 
expounded on the different origins and processes of the market idea and its triumph to become a 
structuring principle of modern societies (Polanyi 1957; Wilson and Skinner 1976; Braudel 1982; 
Jameson 1991; Carrier 1997; Slater and Tonkiss 2001; Lindblom 2002; Aldrich 2005; Foucault et 
al. 2008; Aspers 2009; Herzog 2013). The discourse about the interpretation of the market society 
is often highly normative as the different disciplines usually take market embracing or dismissive 
stances. Markets as institutions of social coordination are indeed politically divisive because they 
became an image of society, adjusting the timeless balance between individual and collective 
economic responsibility as well as legitimizing individual and economic rational practices (Simmel 
2008 [1900]). Though, shifting responsibility from the community to the individual always came 
with a promise. Proponents of the free market have since Adam Smith persistently made the pledge 
of wealth. To keep this pledge in perspective is the aim of this thesis.  
One of the most effective actors deciding upon the role of markets in societies are governments. 
In democracies, people usually select either market embracing or more market sceptical political 
majorities, and thereby the pledge of wealth transforms into a chain of accountability between 
governments and citizens. Governments consist of political parties and of course these parties have 
a highly normative and ideologically biased perspective on their achievements too. Their policies 
are always presented as an improvement to wealth whereas the legacies of opponents are portrayed 
as deteriorations. Additionally, opponents or sceptics of market mechanisms have early on based 
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their caveat on more communitarian ideals and usually highlighted the distributional consequences 
of the market order. Claims for equality in its various conceptual peculiarities have accompanied 
market sceptic demands for intervention since the beginning of this political debate. These claims 
relate directly to the distribution of chances for different groups in society and naturally they have 
an emotive character too. Since many scholars, politicians and citizens have a very emotional 
perspective on the relation between ideology and wealth, this thesis fulfils a genuine scientific task: 
To ask a very simple question in a sober manner.  
Do market liberal governments augment or simply redistribute the wealth of societies by effectively empowering 
markets as means of social coordination? 
There are two arguments shared by many scholars which are, for different reasons, very sceptical 
that ideologies of governments can induce any systematic effect on wealth related policies. The 
first type of scepticism shares the conviction that policy change and performance is predominantly 
subject to structural trends. For a subgroup of those, the social order itself creates tendencies with 
inevitable consequences for political actors. The market society is such an order, and often is 
referred to as capitalism. The Marxist and Neo-Marxist traditions of thought have brought forward 
a broad array of arguments why governments are in fact mediators in the reproduction of market 
societies independent of their ideological signals. Marxism lacked a theory of the state but Neo-
Marxists filled the gap with a list of ideas. Governments always form varying power blocks of 
different classes in order to reproduce the market order (Poulantzas 1973), provide an ideological 
superstructure (Gramsci 1971) and always struggle with the resulting fiscal contradictions 
(O’Connor 1973; Streeck 2014). Ignoring the important differences of the arguments above, 
governments are portrayed as epiphenomenal to the underlying class-structure and finally sustain 
capital interests in market societies (Hacker and Pierson 2010). Some constellations of power 
blocks might have achieved the installation of market cushioning institutions like the welfare state 
(Hicks and Misra 1993; Korpi and Palme 2003; Korpi 2006) or regulatory frameworks with a 
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curbing character on business power (Panitch and Konings 2009; Mizruchi 2013), however, even 
policies intending to limit market mechanism will drift towards capital interest in the long run 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010).  
It is a slippery slope from this first set of arguments highlighting the inevitable structural 
constraints of governments in market societies to those who argue for ideational shifts, the second 
rationale of scepticism. The ideational shift argument basically states that hegemonic ideas about 
the role of markets have changed. The predominant narrative in this perspective is to portray 
history as a disruptive shift from legitimized state-intervention until the late 1960s to a succeeding 
legitimization phase of the free-market (Ruggie 1982; Somers and Block 2005; Harvey 2007; 
Prechel and Harms 2007; Swank and Steinmo 2002; Pierson 1996). Market societies have always 
been portrayed as traversing different phases with rising or falling market approval. From free 
market fundamentalism in the era of Manchester capitalism and the backslash through the 
empowerment of the working class over the early 20th century dominance of controlled 
economies, and the retreat of market liberalism in the Second World War to the Keynesian 
consensus as the dominant post-war order and finally to the era of neoliberalism. These master 
narratives are highly attractive because they facilitate the understanding of historical processes. 
They are as well the foundation of many dominant political science perspectives on the interplay 
of ideology, policies and performance (for the general perspective Blyth 2013; Swank and Steinmo 
2002 on taxation; Blyth 2001 on economic regulation or  Pierson 1996 on the welfare state).  
However, there exists a mayor difference between arguments of inevitable capitalist tendencies 
and the ideational shift arguments. The latter allows for governments to make a difference. 
However, the dominant reading of the ideational shift argument is that government ideology has 
mattered until the latest ideational shift to neoliberalism and fades to matter thereafter. There is an 
increasing number of studies supporting the thesis of fading partisan impacts whereas still others 
present evidence for persistent partisan effects. A meta-study of Imbeau et al. (2001) compares 
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both types of studies with a sobering summary. Overall, partisan differences cannot be ruled out 
to be different from null-findings. 
Whereas the political economy literature and the political science literature leave a disappointing 
impression on governments’ abilities to make a difference in market societies, economists have 
been more optimistic. Economists predominantly believe that market liberal governments have a 
better economic performance at least in the long run. However, there is hardly any systematic prove 
to back that optimism because the existing empirical attempts relating government ideology to 
growth are highly problematic (see Chapter 3.3.1 for a discussion of the most influential studies). 
Despite the alleged inability of governments to systematically influence performance, the economic 
voting literature indicates that voters clearly reward the economic performance of governments 
nonetheless (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007 for an overview). 
Here, we arrive at a confusing summary of the literature. The political economy literature has 
usually not paid much attention to government ideology and highlights structural tendencies and 
class-based power blocks. The political science literature has predominantly given up the faith that 
parties matter besides very contextual consteallations and has collected an impressive empirical 
body of literature to back that claim. Economists more believe than empirically prove that market 
liberal governments are superior in terms of economic performance. Political parties themselves 
persistently argue to make a difference and thereby establish a chain of accountability. Voters seem 
to take up this accountability invitation and reward differences in performance from which we 
should evidently assume that they are beyond control of governments.  
Acknowledging the confusing state of the art, I think there are important gaps in the academic 
discourse and empirical assessment of the impact of governments in modern market societies. The 
first gap is the omission of an appropriate ideology and its measurement in the discourse of market 
societies, policies and performance. Markets do not establish themselves but are in part dependent 
on political actors to legitimize their mechanisms and outcomes and thereby increase their 
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importance. I deem the concept of market liberalism to precisely capture the willingness of political 
actors to enlarge the effectiveness of market mechanisms in societies. Surprisingly, none of the 
standard textbooks of ideologies include a concept like market liberalism and none of the existent 
data-sets includes a valid measure of the government ideology of market liberalism. At the same 
time, conventionally used ideologies of political parties such as left and right, libertarianism or 
neoliberalism are deeply dissatisfying because they are not precisely capturing the positions of 
political actors’ intentions to increase or curb the effectiveness of market processes. The first two 
parts of this thesis are simply the consequence of this unfortunate omission.  
In Part I, I present the architecture and anatomy of the ideology of market liberalism. 
Architecture and anatomy are terms borrowed by Michael Freeden and his morphological approach 
to ideologies (2013). I consider this approach very helpful because it delineates between 
philosophical, scholarly and such discourses with ubiquitous political value for political parties. 
Accordingly, I distinguish between the core elements of market liberalism, centred around the 
prerequisites of a market as such and the post-fix liberalism, indicating the degree to which actors 
deem markets as appreciable and self-sustaining institutions (Chapter 1.1). The main lesson from 
the core elements is that the definition of a market as such is very clear and in turn creates 
denotational anchorage. This anchorage is of great value and the main advantage in comparison to 
many other conventionally applied political ideologies because stability in meaning creates 
comparability.  
The second layer, or adjacent elements of the ideology of market liberalism are defined by a set 
of behavioural assumptions (Chapter 1.2). Based on the extension of negative rights of freedom 
and individual property right, market people can follow an individualistic and economic rational 
pursuit in order to exert exchanges. The legitimation of such a behaviour incentivises competition 
and increase the amount of choice which in turn further increase the likelihood of individuals to 
be motivated by an economic calculus. The behaviours on markets are strongly self-reinforcing and 
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this is the main reason why markets became a politically divisive institution. Markets have the 
tendency to undermine alternative norms and values. The majority of existing political ideologies 
like Marxism, socialism, Christian political approaches, liberalism, neoliberalism and libertarianism 
all gravitate around the approval or repudiation of this set of behaviours. Acknowledging that the 
listed ideologies all include different factions with very different approaches to economic questions, 
the ideology of market liberalism helps to sort these as well as the factions of these ideologies into 
a comparable dimension.  
The straight forward way to achieve such a positioning is looking at the peripheral elements of 
market liberalism (see Chapter 1.5), the peripheral elements as concrete policy positions, signalled 
in daily political discourses. The most revealing policy positions for the ideology of market 
liberalism are stances towards the regulation of the economy, the welfare state and the tax system. 
However, Chapter 1.5, in the conceptual part is admittedly short since policy proposals and their 
relation to the ideology of market liberalism is discussed at great detail in Part II.  
To relate signalled policy preferences into ideological dimensions has a long tradition in political 
science. Accordingly, Part II initially provides a review of existing approaches guiding through 
various measurement decisions and ultimately formulates a generalized framework for the 
measurement of partisan ideology. Applying the generalized framework on the ideology of market 
liberalism leads to valid party positions. Several alternative measurement approaches are 
demonstrated to have limitations capturing socio-economic preferences of political parties.  
Besides the genuine importance of the measure of market liberalism to answer the question of 
this thesis, the conceptual part indicates a remarkable stability in meaning for market liberalism. 
This property is a valuable attribute in order to compare preferences across time and countries. 
This claim is empirically validated in Chapter 2.9 and 2.10. In the language of statistics, 
comparability means measurement invariance or equivalence. Applying standards of equivalence 
from disciplines like psychology yield mixed results. The existing indicators of political ideology 
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are far away from appropriate benchmarks of equivalence. In fact, a huge body of literature from 
political science, drawing inferences on party position shifts, stand on vary shaky ground because 
based on applied measurements they cannot rule out that partisan moves are simply based on 
varying item functions. However, since equivalence is a matter of degree it is worthwhile to 
acknowledge relative improvements. Accordingly, I discuss the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
benchmarks for equivalence on the market liberalism indicator in comparison to the conventional 
left-right approaches.  
Part II concludes with a discussion of the link between party and government ideology. Chapter 
2.11 recaps existing approaches, discusses important analytical distinctions and concludes by 
pointing to the observation that the progress made in the party position measurement literature 
has not yet trickled down to the measurement of government positions. In order to build a reliable 
foundation for the core assessment of the thesis it is, however, important to construct valid 
positions of government ideology. I contrast various approaches and select four typical applications 
of government preferences, subsequently tested in Part III.  
Part III examines the impact of government ideology on three selected policy areas. In line with 
the conceptual part, government positions on regulation the welfare state and tax policies are 
portrayed as straight forward derivatives of the ideology of market liberalism. To analyse these 
three policy domains serves as a bridge before arriving at the initial question of the thesis. 
Economic performance is an abstract concept and the causal chain between ideology and the 
creation of wealth is still very unclear. Therefore, the three policy domains fulfil two purposes. 
First, to test how the different government indicators perform on indicators with a more simple 
causal chain. Basically, a validation of the government ideology indicator of market liberalism in 
comparison to other approaches. Second, the selected policy domains are also the most prominent 
causal mechanism between ideology and performance. Specific tax regimes, lower government 
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spending and less regulation are all prominent pathways seen to improve the productivity and 
wealth of nations.  
Accordingly, a necessary condition for the link between ideology and wealth to be effective is 
the existence of systematic policy differences on those supposed mediators. That leads to the 
familiar territory of standard partisan theory. However, as mentioned above, standard partisan 
theory is not in fashion and different scholars have brought forward plausible arguments why the 
ideology of governments has never made a difference, faded to make a difference or only make a 
difference in very peculiar circumstances. In Chapter 3.1, I review this debate and conclude that 
structural tendencies, changing international environments and the empirical findings of meta-
analysts do not rule out systematic partisan differences. The structural and ideational shift 
arguments are encountered with an argument of complementarity. Discourses and alleged 
consensuses are evidently existent which does not exclude ideologies of governments to be 
effective as well. The results of meta-analysts are encountered with a measurement argument. Using 
dichotomous distinctions of left and right as proxies for government ideology in comparative 
studies necessarily create a lot of null-findings. On theoretical grounds alone, left and right has a 
very low reach in terms of comparability. Accordingly, the longer the time frame and the more 
countries included, the lower the likelihood of partisan findings using left-right indicators. As time 
progresses and data availability improves, studies have increased their observations and thereby 
overstretched the travelling capacities of the left-right dichotomy.  
This should not to be confused with null-findings being an artefact of measurement. Left and 
right only matters contextually because the concept means different things in different places. 
However, finding that a left-right dimension does not systematically matter does not mean that 
partisan ideology is not of importance. Left-right is simply not the most revealing dimension in 
terms of preferences on socio-economic issues. Market liberalism in contrast is a meaningful 
dimension for ideological differences across long time frames and multiple countries. This is 
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demonstrated in Chapter 3.2 comparing more than 1.500 government years and the impact of 
different government ideology measures within the three selected policy domains.  
As mentioned above, only systematic policy differences of government ideologies can claim 
effective differences in performance. The effective policy chains are identified in Chapter 3.2 and 
are related via path modelling to the indicators of performance in the succeeding part. Performance 
is measured as the level of wealth as well as its distribution in terms of top income shares. I 
distinguish between short term and long term effects in order to do justice to a widespread 
argument of market liberals: short-term pain for long-term gain. Since a long time, market liberals 
have argued that reforms of austerity might be painful in the short term but pay off in the long run.  
The causal identification of the short and long-term effects of ideology on performance are 
difficult and for good reason readers should remain sceptical about findings between indicators of 
government ideology and aggregated measures such as growth or inequality. However, 
methodologically I strictly rely on the generalized framework of causal identification laid out by 
Judea Pearl (2009). The analyses on policy domains, and the path models linking ideology over 
policy to performance are all estimated with the aim to close causal back-door paths. In Chapter 
3.2.0, I provide a general discussion of this procedure. This procedure ultimately helps to efficiently 
focus on useful controls and avoids statistical models overburdened with useless and potentially 
harmful control variables. Remaining doubts on causal identification have to be addressed on the 
grounds of omitted variables alone. Admittedly, there might be several plausible omitted variables. 
However, the most wide-spread arguments from the literature are either ruled out ex-ante or they 
are incorporated as controls if necessary.  
The results appear surprisingly systematically. On the policy level, I find that market liberals 
substantially deregulate the economy, reduce public and welfare spending as well as the generosity 
of welfare entitlements and reduce the progressivity as well as the level of taxation. As these are in 
line with the theoretical expectations, I can conclude that the degree of market liberalism is a very 
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effective way to explain socio-economic policy differences. In comparison, there are predominantly 
null-findings in the same models when government ideology is measured in categorical distinctions 
of left and right and substantially weaker when government ideology is measured with continuous 
left and right indicators.  
The policy differences are related to the indicators of performance in structural equation 
models. Evidently, some of the policies preferred by market liberals have positive and others have 
negative growth effects. The overall short-term effect on growth and productivity are negative. 
However, short term deterioration seem to be succeeded by long term wealth. Growth trajectories 
of market liberal governments are significantly higher than the ones of their interventionist 
counterparts in the long run. Interestingly, these growth trajectories are not explained by 
productivity growth but only by the amount of economic activity. Accordingly, only a subset of 
the market liberal wealth promise is materialized. Societies under market liberal rule become not 
necessarily more efficient but they create an environment for increased economic activity. 
In contrast to the mixed evidence for growth inducing effects, the policies of market liberals 
have consistent effects on the distribution of wealth. Some policies have no effect on inequality 
but the majority of them has a positive and substantial impact on inequality. The top one percent 
of income earners, and to a lesser degree the top ten percent, earn substantially and significantly 
more after the legacies of market liberals in short as well as in the long run. Whereas distributional 
consequences are substantial in a sense that a significant part of the changing income distribution 
can be associated with policies of market liberal governments, the association of ideology and 
growth comes with a lot of uncertainty. The growth effects of market liberals in the long run have 
huge confidence intervals and turn insignificant after three government periods. Additionally, only 
a small amount of growth in relation to the average growth rates can be explained by government 
ideology. In line with these findings, the growth effects of regulative, welfare as well as tax policies 
are rather marginal. Overall, the ideology of market liberalism, once carried into state-wide 
11 
 
governments via market liberal parties with sufficient majorities, has a lasting and substantial impact 
on the distribution of income. In contrast, the pledge of wealth is only marginally fulfilled in the 
long term.  
The thesis might have ended here. However, I add two aspects which are closely related to the 
impacts of market liberal governments. The first is the analysis of a special government 
configuration which has increased with an unpredicted pace. At least unpredicted following Max 
Weber’s thesis of the rationalization of modern societies (Weber 1930). The rationalization thesis 
is seen to be massively under attack by the rise of the radical right. The radical right evidently 
mobilize their voters over nativist identity issues, which, following Weber, should have been extinct 
by now. The rise of the radical right, however, challenges not only the expectations of Max Weber 
about the economic rationality of voters but also the general importance of the market dimension 
for party competition. This resonates with more recent arguments in the literature describing a 
decline of importance for the market dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006, Kriesi 2010). There is evidence 
for a rather moderate increase of non-economic issues on the partisan level, but the market 
dimension has and still dominates the party competition in Western European democracies (Stoll 
2010).  
In Chapter 3.4, I present a co-authored1 analysis of the socio-economic policy implication of 
governments with formal or informal radical right party coalition partners. The added value of such 
an analysis is to take the peculiar position of radical right parties towards the market into account. 
A market liberal faction, based on the various populist anti-state actors within these parties, have 
to deal with a growing voter base of workers and pensioners with an interventionist attitude. The 
result is a kind of selective market liberalism which will predominantly put pressure on public 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Dennis Spies and Alexandre Afonso for this appreciated collaboration. The chapter almost 
entirely resembles an article we published together in European Political Science Review (2017).  
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budgets by combining fiscal austerity with a defence of costly and traditional welfare compensation 
schemes for natives.  
Finally, this thesis entails a Part IV. This part is the results of a DFG funded research project 
(GZ: KA 1741/10-1) headed by André Kaiser. I was in the fortunate position to work on this 
project and research in the intersection of ideology and territorial politics. The project was 
informed by the question of partisan preferences on the territorial distribution of authority. 
Together, we developed an approach which put ideology at the centre stage. According to this 
approach, territorial preferences are highly entrenched in the ideological position on major 
dimensions, such as the market dimension. Only in cases where majorities with proximate 
ideological positions prevail in specific sub-national areas, state-wide governments are willing to 
extend the authority of this area. Chapter 4.1 almost entirely resembles a co-authored article we 
published in the Swiss Political Science Review (2016).2 This chapter introduces the general theory 
of ideological authority insulation by elaborating on the conflict between Turkish parties in the 
centre and the Kurdish minority parties in the periphery. Chapter 4.2 is an article co-authored by 
André Kaiser and puts the core argument from Chapter 4.1 to a broader test.3 Building on a sample 
of around 4300 yearly relationships between state-wide governments and regions, we demonstrate 
that market liberalism systematically superimposes genuine territorial concerns. Accordingly, 
centralization and decentralization in democracies hinges to a great extent on the calculus of state-
wide governments to increase the powerbase of the ideologically like-minded and impedes the 
prospects of authority for minorities with deviant ideological positions.  
  
                                                 
2 I am grateful to André Kaiser, Çağan Varol and Uğur Sadioğlu for this collaboration. 
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PART I | THE CONCEPT OF MARKET LIBERALISM 
 
 
1. The conceptual foundation – political parties and the ideology of market liberalism 
Market liberalism is missing in the standard textbooks of modern ideologies. This omission 
demands rectification since market liberalism fulfils every criterion to be met with a kind reception 
in those lists. This chapter starts by defining market liberalism and subsequently provides a 
discussion of why it deserves to be considered an ideology. An ideology which early started to 
subsume variegated political issues and proposed to solve them with market solutions. This 
ideology became so powerful because the market turned into a symbol for one of the most 
fundamental question of societies; the timeless adjustment between economic individual freedom 
and collective responsibility (Simmel 2008 [1900], 509–529). This correspondence to a core 
question of social coordination sustains the market’s ability to mobilize as well as divide the people 
politically for more than 250 years.4  
Such a long time can have many effects on the meaning and the ways of contestation of a 
concept. Some studies have highlighted the ambiguity of market liberalism in the political practice 
(Jabko 2006) and as well within the scholarly debate (Carrier 1997). However, the majority of 
scholars accredit the market a remarkable stability in meaning. Even representatives of the 
constructivist and post-modern approaches, usually inclined to highlight the fugacity of meaning, 
define market liberalism as a conceptual constant in the 20th century (Jameson 1991, Foucault et 
al. 2008). If post-modernist thinkers argue for the denotational stability of market liberalism, we 
should take it as an incident which is not likely to occur. Or the other way around, market liberalism 
is likely to be a concept with a high stability in meaning over time and space. This is noteworthy in 
                                                 
4 I roughly determine the 9th March of 1776 as the starting point when Adam Smith published the Wealth of Nations. 
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particular in comparison to other concepts, conventionally applied to carry political preferences. 
The meaning of left and right has always been contested (Bobbio 1996; Laponce 1981; Franzmann 
2009). Equivalently, the cultural dimension of political conflict received dozens of different 
definitions (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Kriesi et al. 2006; 2008; Hooghe et al. 2004) and 
evidently combines issues across countries very differently (Marks et al. 2006).  Without a shared 
meaning of a concept for political preferences various problems of comparability arise. We simply 
cannot assume that preferences on these dimensions describe the same ideological background or 
more concrete policy intentions. Thus, the denotational stability of market liberalism is a valuable 
attribute because it allows us to arrive at comparable political preferences across long time-frames 
and cultural contexts.  
The meaning of concepts is typically discussed and defined on different analytical levels. 
Concepts are debated by citizens, political actors, intellectuals or philosophers. Usually, the 
discourses about the same concept across those groups differ enormously. Whereas in the political 
domain market liberalism is typically discussed in reference to concrete policies such as a leaner 
state, taxation or deregulation. Intellectuals discuss the virtues of competition, economic 
rationalism or individualism. Philosophers in turn focus on the consistency of elements within the 
core of ideologies.  
In the following chapters, I borrow the morphological approach to analyse the ideology of 
market liberalism. The morphological approach takes the discourses on different levels into 
account (Freeden 1996). The approach demands to distinguish core, adjacent and peripheral 
elements in order to define the architecture of an ideology. The threefold distinction proves to be 
helpful. It shows that the indispensable core concepts of market liberalism build indeed a very 
stable web of relations. I argue, property rights, concentration of supply and demand, negative rights of freedom 
and scarcity to be necessary conditions for a market to be existent (Chapter 1.1). Although these 
core concepts are sometimes contested in terms of political or normative disapproval, they are 
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hardly ever challenged as constituent parts of the market and they are hardly ever challenged in 
terms of their meaning. Consistency and stability in meaning decline by moving on with the 
adjacent concepts such as individualism or economic rationality. Adjacent concepts are typically the 
domain of scholarly debates about market liberalism (Chapter 1.2). Discourses about adjacent 
elements of ideologies are also closely connected to the well-known political ideologies like 
liberalism, conservatism or Marxism. These ideologies are the building blocks of party families and 
party families still dominate the debate about political preferences.  
In Chapter 1.3, I relate market liberalism to the ideologies of party families. The historical 
development is instructive as it sets the ground for fundamental differences in approaching the 
market as a means to solve problems of social coordination. So far, market liberalism is an ideal 
type of social coordination and political actors could be conceptualized as approaching to this ideal. 
Political actors would gravitate around this ideal type as long as we do not define a conceptual 
opposite. This conceptual opposite is conventionally the intervening state.  
In Chapter 1.4, I illustrate the tensions within the camp of supporters and those who disapprove 
the market. The major problem with a state-market dimension is that political actors can approve 
as well as reject both principles of social order. Drawing on this observation, I borrow the 
distinction of Oakeshott between the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism (1996). The 
distinction helps to relate the policies of market liberals and their counterparts to a polity 
dimension. Faith refers to the trust in the human abilities to ascertain the good whereas scepticism 
connects to the trust in civil associations. Trust in the state is a form of scepticism whereas politics 
of faith resonates with the more autonomous pursuit of coordination in the market. Such a glance 
on the politics dimension dissolves the contradictions within the camp of market supporters and 
advocates of the state by sorting parties into a two-dimensional space of market liberalism. The 
two-dimensional perspective clarifies the role of the new right as well as the new left parties in the 
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more recent constellations of party competition on a market dimension (see also Chapter 3.4 for 
the implications of the new right parties). 
Finally, the more concrete policy positions are presented as peripheral elements, the most visible 
manifestations of market liberalism in the political arena (Chapter 1.5). Specific preferences on 
policy areas such as regulation, the welfare state or tax policies are tangible manifestations of the 
abstract notions of market liberalism in the level of core and adjacent elements. The peripheral 
elements are ideal and observable indicators for the measurement of party positions on a market 
dimension. In order to avoid a twofold discussion of peripheral elements or policy position, I only 
briefly discuss them in the conceptual part and deliver a more profound discussion in Part II.  
Chapter 1.6 recaps the conceptualization of market liberalism and simplifies the way the concept 
was taken up by political parties. Those who believe in the general capacity of the state can combine 
their politics of faith with a market making approach, drawing on the liberal tradition of political 
thought. Those who believe in the state and distrust the market follow the socialist and Marxist 
tradition to different degrees. Those who distrust the state and believe in markets follow the 
conservative and the new right line of thought. Finally, those who distrust the state as well as the 
market follow the grassroots approach of the new left.  
To situate party families on a market dimension reveals another important strength of the 
concept of market liberalism. The ideologies like conservatism, liberalism as well as neoliberalism 
or socialism, they all have substantial internal differences over economic preferences. For example, 
variants of neoliberalism can be found in modern social democracy, in conservative parties and of 
course in liberal parties. Equivalently, Marxists in all their manifold expressions occupy a broad 
range on a market dimension too. In fact, the conventional political ideologies or party families do 
not provide a precise description of preferences towards the economic coordination of societies. 
The ambiguity becomes even more evident in comparisons over time (see Figure 1). Neither 
conservatives nor social democrats are pinned to positions they had in the 1940s. In fact, none of 
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the party families have kept a stable position towards the market over time. The concept of market 
liberalism helps to reveal these changing positions and accordingly, market liberalism is not only 
an ideology in itself, it is a meta-ideology, situating the manifold ideologies of political parties in a 
consistent and comparable way.   
 
1.1 The core elements of market liberalism 
The morphological approach to ideologies starts with a description of the conceptual architecture 
of an ideology. This architecture has two axes. The first is vertical and distinguishes three tiers: the 
micro-components, the macro-components and the conceptual components in the middle (see 
Freeden 2013). Ideologies can have different architectures on the macro- and micro level. The 
middle part refers to the scholarly and conceptual level of analysis. This is where a deductive 
approach to ideologies starts and this is where the discussion of the concept of market liberalism 
begins.  
Within every level of the analysis of ideologies there is a second axis. An axis which puts the 
arrangement of concepts as well as their relationship at the centre. This is what Freeden calls the 
anatomy of an ideology and he distinguishes between core, adjacent and peripheral concepts 
(Freeden 2013, 124-5). The core concepts are indispensable to holding the ideology together. Core 
concepts should be present in all known cases of the ideology. Market liberalism entails two terms, 
a reference to the market and the post-fix term liberalism. First, the anatomy of the market is 
exemplified before the market is related to the post-fix liberalism.  
What is actually a market? The functioning of markets relies on the acceptance of certain rules 
which is usually referred to as the legal framework. This framework entails two basic ingredients: 
negative rights of freedom and the protection of individual property rights (Carruthers and Ariovich 2004, 30). 
Once both ingredients being present, individuals can set out exchange of legally owned things. 
However, legal exchange as such does not constitute a market. Inherited from the market as a 
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bound place, the market always refers to a concentration of sellers and buyers. This concentration 
allows the comparative assessment of offers and demands and leads to the actor constellation of 
competition under the assumption of scarcity (Simmel, 2010 [1922]). Without scarcity there is no 
need for comparative assessments on a market and the mechanism of competition. Competition 
ensures a specific matching of supply and demand and is seen to broaden the supply as well as to 
drive the supply side to efficiency via innovation. The mentioned properties are reflected in the 
definition of Patrick Aspers: “A market is a social structure for the exchange of rights in which 
offers are evaluated and priced, and compete with one another, which is shorthand for the fact that 
actors – individuals and [corporate actors] – compete with one another via offers” (Aspers, 2011, 
4).5 
A market entails four indispensable concepts: negative rights of freedom, individual property 
rights, the spatial 6 concentration of supply and demand as well as scarcity. Given, all necessary 
conditions are present, a market is expected to fulfil at least two functions: increase in supply and 
increase in efficiency via innovation. The mechanism which relates conditions and the two 
envisaged functions is competition. The advantages of such a simple coordination principle are 
obvious. Markets broaden the overall supply and increase the match of desires from the demand 
side and the variety of offers. Efficiency reduces scarcity and further increases the overall capacities 
of supply. The most straight forward impact of markets should be an overall increase in the amount 
of choice. This might further lead to an increase in the overall amount of welfare (Smith, 1991 
[1776], 264). Classical liberals, as early supporters of the market order have primarily stressed the 
efficiency aspect and explained the raise in efficiency by the division of labour. Interestingly, 
                                                 
5 I replaced firms with corporate actors in the definition because firms are only a special case of corporate actors engaging 
in market exchange. 
6 Sellers and buyers need to be a plurality as well as accessible. For a long time accessibility was a spatial phenomenon. 




neoliberals as a later manifestation of market supporters, have stressed the efficiency of markets to 
relate dispersed desire and knowledge to a supply-side (Hayek 1945).   
Indispensability is a requirement of core elements of an ideology. Indeed, it is very difficult to 
defend the existence of a market in case where one of the four elements are absent. Indispensability 
includes the post-fix of market liberalism. Liberalism is one of the most multifaceted and 
controversially discussed ideologies (see for example Freeden 1986; Vincent 2009, 23-56). For the 
concept of market liberalism, liberalism simply refers to the degree to which the market is left to 
its own device. The faith in the self-preservation of markets or the idea of the free market. Market 
liberals strive for the liberation of market exchange from any sort of restriction. To summarize, 
market liberalism has four core and necessary elements related to the faith in how far these four 
concepts build an appreciable interplay which left to its own device, work for the good of 
individuals and societies.  
 
1.2 Adjacent elements of market liberalism 
Increased choice is the first adjacent element and a direct result of market exchange. The concept of 
choice is contested. Contested for example because choice on markets is related to purchasing 
power and hence unequally distributed. Additionally, marketing is often seen to influence our 
desires and choices. In this spirit some authors portray markets less as a choice improving 
institutions but in contrast as a coercive structure (Bourdieu 1998; 2003; see also Lindblom 1982 
for a view, portraying the market as a prison).  
As choice is an immediate consequence of the market as such, the way to deal with choices is 
strongly connected to the core element of negative rights of freedom. Individualism is the second 
adjacent element. Individualism exceeds the meaning of negative rights of freedom as it exceeds 
the meaning of a negative right. It is an ontological assumption and also seen as an effect of market 
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interactions which in turn triggered extensive discussions on its own (for example Beck 2002; 
Schwartz 1994; Macpherson 1962; Hayek 1948). Individualism is a specific way of exercising 
negative rights on choices.  
A subset of an individualized choice to exert negative rights of freedom is economic rationalism, 
the third adjacent element. Economic rationalism is contested in terms of meaning and 
endorsement. Some argue that economic rationalism resembles the homo economics with a self-
fish orientation, the maximization of utility. To challenge this assumption is a frequently chosen 
path to prove or disprove the benefits or foundations of market liberalism. Various studies have 
empirically evaluated the degree of economic rationalism, often showing that solidarity and fairness 
norms interfere with a purely economic calculi (Sauermann and Kaiser 2010; Nozick 1994). Market 
liberals embrace an economic pursuit in behaviour whereas market sceptics have for a long time 
now discredited purely economic rationales, in the words of Marx and Engels “the icy water of 
egoistical calculation” (2009 [1848], 43).  
Competition is the result of the actors exerting their choices in individual and economic rational 
ways. Competition is closely linked to the core elements of scarcity as well as to the concentration 
of supply and demand. Without scarcity and the concentration of sellers and buyers there would 
be no need to compete on markets via offers of exchange. Competition on the demand and even 
more so on the supply-side is seen to have two important effects. As discussed already in the 
chapter 1.1 of the core elements, efficiency should increase the amount of choice due to a better 
matching of supply and demand. This is not the freedom of choice which the Friedmanns (1990) 
described. Freedom of choice and market liberalism are a tautology, because negative rights of 
freedom are a prerequisite of markets and equivalent to the freedom to exert choices. The second 
effect of competition is to increase efficiency via various forms of innovation and thereby 
increasing the amount of choice even further. As we will later see, it is important to keep both 
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effects separate. Societies can increase their amount of choice without increasing efficiency and 
societies can reduce their amount of choice while increasing efficiency.  
However, competition is contested at least for two reasons. First, the free market might have 
accumulative tendencies and undermine competition over time (De Angelis 2001; 2000). Second, 
at a certain point competition can be seen as decreasing efficiency because it undermines stability 
or planning reliability and thereby blocks individual motivations and the engagement in long-term 
endeavours. Efficiency is not only substantially contested, it is also contested in meaning. There is 
for example macro-efficiency which describes the overall input-output ratio irrespective of the 
distribution of benefits. Alternatively, Pareto-efficiency describes efficiency gains under 
circumstances where nobody is in a worse position than in a counterfactual world where the 
exchange would have been omitted.  
The first three adjacent elements can be perceived as derivatives from the core element of 
negative rights of freedom and individual property rights. Based on these core elements, market 
participants are legitimized to exert their choices in an individualistic and economic rational way. 
Thereby, the unhampered market triggers the legitimation of an important set of behaviours. Under 
conditions of scarcity and the concentration of supply and demand, these behaviours turn into 
competition and create an increased amount of choice which in turn triggers even further 
individualistic and economic rational pursuits. The free market not only legitimizes individualistic 
behaviour but creates also strong feedback effects which might lock-in this set of behavioural 
norms. Thereby, the orientation of market participants is withdrawn from communitarian 
concerns.  
Since market liberals promote individualistic and economic rational attitudes, it is not surprising 
that the justification of markets early tended to gravitate around the consequentialist tradition of 
moral philosophy – the promise of the common good by selfishness (Fourcade and Healy 2007). 
In contrast, market sceptics early based their caveat against the market on a deontological 
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foundation – the notion of collective orientations which encourage emphatic and solidarity norms 
(Hirschmann 1997). Early socialists usually guided by Christian morals, conservative 
communitarians or romantic traditionalist, all of them focused on the fundamental difference 
between economic rationalism and the proper orientation on the community. The critics of early 
socialists like Saint-Simon, communists like Marx or many sociologists like Weber or Habermas 
share a basic plea – the necessity to adjust common aims, common values, or more abstract, 
common claims to validity (Habermas 1981). The market became the symbol of individuality and 
the state the symbol of collectivism. The latter symbol was seen to preserve and encourage values 
which are not associated to the market - norms such as equality.  
All these debates about adjacent elements of market liberalism are at best superficially 
reproduced in this chapter. However, my aim is to illustrate that scholars start to the challenge the 
meaning and normative implications of market liberalism primarily on the adjacent elements and 
rarely attack the core. Debates about the consistency of the anatomy of market liberalism as well 
as about the nature of its effects. There are countless publications and treatises discussing these 
adjacent concepts in close detail. Those publications are the foundation of a more scholarly 
discourse about market liberalism. A debate trying to overthrow or enforce the very first pillars 
around the core of the ideology of market liberalism. This is a typical role of adjacent elements as 
Freeden describes them as “second-ranking in the pervasiveness and breadth of meanings they 
impart to the core concepts which they surround” (Freeden 2013, 125). 
 
1.3 Party families and market liberalism 
Before I turn to peripheral elements, I shortly discuss the role of party families because party 
families form a link between the adjacent and peripheral elements. Party families reflect the conflict 
over the normative embracement of the adjacent concepts as well as more concrete policy 
proposals as discussed in the part on peripheral elements. The major existing political ideologies 
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like liberalism, conservatism or Marxism are the analytical basis for the conception of party families. 
It is instructive to reveal the relationship between party families and the concept of market 
liberalism because market liberalism is an ideal concept to compare and sort party families over 
time and countries.   
For example, actors’ capacities to exert choices based on their negative rights of freedom follow 
a simple weighting scheme. On the demand side, desires are weighted by purchasing power and on 
the supply side by market share. Purchasing power is not the main problem of the historically 
bourgeois supporters of the market mechanism, it is rather the concentration of supply. What Marx 
and Engels tried to scientifically proof as the laws of accumulation was for many liberals the reason 
to approve a certain degree of regulation, to ensure the beneficial constellation of competition. 
Within the camp of the strongest advocates of this coordination principle, we observe a 
fundamental disagreement about the self-sustaining properties of markets. This liberal plea points 
to the post-fix of the concept of market liberalism. In this context liberalism refers to the self-
sustaining capacities of markets.  
The following example from Germany exemplifies the difference between liberals and 
conservatives. During the Wilhelminic Germany and Weimar Republic, the German social liberals 
like Friedrich Naumann or Walter Rathenau attempted to integrate the Social Democrats into the 
ruling structure of the political system in order to broaden the support of the social liberal vision 
of a Gemeinwirtschaft (Ptak 2015, 108-109). From a Rokkanian perspective, Liberals where closely 
linked to an emerging and competitive chemical and electronics industrial sector. In contrast, steel 
and coal industries, mainly monopolistically organized, was the power base of the reactionary right-
wing parties. Accordingly, political battles at that time brought liberals in a position to demand 
price control and regulation for the big trusts, whereas reactionary right-wing parties defended an 
unregulated market (Opitz 1973).  
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Other supporters of the free market were so called Ricardians, such as Hand Gestrich or Otto Veit 
that were representatives of the Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten (VDMA), an export-
oriented engineering industry (Ptak 2015, 109). In the aftermath of the great depression, Eucken, 
Rüstow, Röpke and Müller-Armack wrote several essays about the importance of the economic 
crisis as a turning point for economic liberalism in Germany and the quest for a new liberalism 
(Rüstow 1932, 172). These proponents of Ordoliberalism had a rather aggressive element in the 
beginning. In opposition to Maxists and the major economic and political ideas of their time but 
also against the Keynesian economic theory, they were ready to suspend democracy in defence of 
the legitimacy of competition and the market (Ptak 2015, 112). However, these scholars developed 
a core argument of the new liberalism: “Approaching a state of full competition was made possible 
by relying on an economic policy formulated by the state to destroy economic concentrations of 
power and the resulting dysplasia of the free economy” (Ptak 2015, 114; Ptak 2004). This proposed 
role of the state in the provision of order for full competition would lead to serious conflicts among 
neoliberals with regard to the question of monopoly until today. Positions to anti-trust policies are 
still one of the most effective ways to separate free-marketers from neoliberals in favour of 
regulation.  
This liberal plea was differently pronounced by classical liberals. Authors like John Stuart Mill 
or Adam Ferguson not only had genuine efficiency concerns arising from the unhampered market 
but also referred to other norms potentially in conflict with the market. Norms beside efficiency 
are seen to be quite necessary to preserve interactions on the market itself. In the tradition of 
Durkheim, Polanyi and the Frankfurt School, various intellectuals highlighted the social 
foundations of the legal framework which ensures markets’ proper functioning. The markets 
functioning is not only reliant on various forms of social trust, the function of markets is also 
mediated by various contexts of social embeddedness (Polanyi 1973 [1944]; Granovetter and 
Swedberg 2001; Beckert 2009). To highlight a plurality of moral benchmarks beside efficiency has 
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a long tradition and is reflected in the philosophy from Durkheim over Hegel up to the more 
practical applications in the General Theory of John Maynard Keynes (see Herzog and Honnet 
2014 for a great summary). The moderate Socialist approach either aims for a synthesis of market 
advantages with social values or strives for a dialectic revocation with labels such as the third way 
(Giddens 2013; Bastow and Martin 2003).  To highlight and defend the embeddedness of markets 
is a delineation towards advocates of the free market and also to new liberals, but as well a 
commitment to markets in general. The manifold specifications of these reservations describe the 
typical stance of almost all political applied ideologies from moderate socialists and social 
democrats to moderate versions of neoliberalism.  
Neoliberals have emancipated themselves from their classical ancestors by simplifying the 
question of morality which has forced classical liberals into complex discourses about values beside 
efficiency (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). The market is a quasi-sacred institution for 
neoliberals (Mudge 2008) whereas classical liberals kept worshipping other gods. As neoliberals 
believe to have proven the superiority of the market mechanism in comparison to other forms of 
social coordination, their ad-hoc approach to social problems is market making. This means strong 
preferences for individual property rights and negative rights of freedom, a strong emphasis on the 
constraints of scarcity and also state intervention in order to ensure the plurality of supply and 
demand. The ideological foundation of this tradition is a merger of different traditions of economic 
thought in Germany, Austria, France and the United Kingdom (see Mirowski and Plewe 2015 for 
the different origins of neoliberalism). Instructive are the ideas of Mises and Hayek, two of the 
most visible advocates representing a view which defends the market as the only form of 
coordination, able to cope with the complexity of modern societies (Hayek 1945; 1991; Mises 
1981).  
Whereas, the early socialists as well as the modern social democrats tried to integrate equality 
norms into the market system, the entire renunciation of the market mechanism is a phenomenon 
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strongly associated to Marxism. Marxism advocates a strong control of markets as well as central 
steering of allocative and distributional mechanisms (Marx 1971[1867]). Marxism is the greatest 
enemy to market liberalism because Marxists contest almost every core and adjacent concept of 
market liberals. The nationalization of the means of production challenge individual rights to 
property, the laws of accumulation challenge the self-sustaining property of sellers and buyers to 
remain a plurality and negative rights of freedom are negated because people live in a state of 
dependency determined by their economic conditions. Markets alienate people from their real self-
fulfilment and markets expropriate people without capital from their real share of surplus. Finally, 
scarcity is argued to be overcome in a world of collective production. The debate continues on the 
level of adjacent concepts. Individualism is contested, economic rationalism is challenged, the 
mode of competition rejected and efficiency impeached. Marxism is a fundamental opposition to 
market liberalism because there is very little overlap between values attached to the core and 
adjacent concepts of market liberalism.  Consequently, even the modern varieties of Marxism such 
as analytical Marxism defend their place on the most market hostile end of the continuum until 
today (Tarrit 2006).  
Coalitions between parties and interest groups organized around social cleavages had a lasting 
impact on the formation of party systems (Rokkan 1999; Mair 2001). In the formation phase of 
party system, party families arose out of the cleavage constellations in the 19th and early 20th 
century (Rokkan 1999). Based on the experience of the interwar and war periods until 1945, 
communists and social democrats remained very sceptical about the market order which at that 
time was seen to be responsible for the greatest disaster in modern history (Polanyi 1973[1944]). 
Conservatives, although already very market liberal, had difficulties to communicate their true 
intentions in such a climate where interventionism and electoral majorities for workers dominated 
the political discourse. For example, the pretext of the ‘Ahlener Programm’ – the basic program 
from 1947 of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) in Germany - serves as an emblematic 
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example. One of the first statements of the program emphasized that Capitalism as well as Marxism 
have failed to serve the need of the German people (CDU 1947).  
It describes the defensiveness of the proponents of the market very well which is typical for the 
time between 1945 and the early 1980s. As described above, the attempt of traditional liberals, like 
Naumann in Germany to move social democracy to more market embracing positions in order to 
form a coalition against the conservatives, often failed and instead social democrats kept embracing 
socialism for many of the following decades. I foreclose several chapters of careful measurement 
and discussion of party positions at that point and provide a broad overview of how party families 
have developed in terms of relative market advocacy or repudiation. Figure 1 depicts the mean 
positions of party families from the 1940s until 2017 using a selection of 5019 party platforms (see 
Chapter 2 for a precise description of the measurement approach).  
On average, every party family was more to the left in the 1940s. At that time, Social democrats 
were closer to communists on the market dimension than to traditional liberals. Nationalists or 
radical right parties were initially interventionist before they turned to the free market since the 
1970s (Kitschelt 1997). Due to their growing clientele of workers and pensioners they selectively 
abandoned neoliberal positions and turned slightly back to interventionism (Röth et al. 2017). 
Conservatives were always market embracing but moved to more market liberal positions with 
their open embracement of neoliberalism within the 1970s. Agrarians moved constantly to the left, 
just in line with their declining economic power of their constituencies. A general shift of the major 
party families towards market liberalism began with the oil crisis and the related renunciation of 
economic steering in general (Singer 1997; Dean 1980). The hegemony of economic intervention 
had lost its assertive appeal and moved to a position of defensiveness (Crouch 2013).  
Neoliberal thinking finally established itself in conservative parties were it was fermenting for 
quite a while already. Surprisingly, it became accepted in many social democratic parties as well 
(Amable 2010). Liberals and Christian democrats and the radical right also caught the wave and 
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every party family, with the exception of the newly emerging green parties, moved to more market 
embracing positions, a major ideational sea change (Swank and Steinmo 2002; Ruggie 1982). The 
patterns in Figure 1 confirm this shift but also point to a more hesitant conclusion in terms of 
partisan differences. The majority of party families have moved their ideological appeal to more 
interventionist positions since the 2000s. To a certain extend the figure leaves the impression that 
the attested non-death of neoliberalism (Crouch 2011) has nonetheless already started. However, 
social democracy is still considerably closer to market embracing positions as they traditionally have 
been. Conservatives are already more interventionist on average as they were in the 1950s and 
1960s.  
 
Figure 1: Mean policy positions of party families towards market liberalism (0 = interventionist to 1= market liberal) 
Notes: Own calculations on the basis of CMP (n=5019). Parties with a vote share below two percent are excluded. 
Classification of party families adopted from CMP coding. Ethnic, regional or special issue parties are not pictured. 





The most important point to infer from Figure 1 is not the major move of party families across 
time but the stubborn distance they keep to each other. This persistent distance is important to 
consider because the narrative of the major ideational shift often neglects partisan difference by 
couching historical tendencies in master narratives like the Keynesian Consensus and the 
succeeding neoliberal era. These master narratives are largely confirmed by the figure above but 
persistent differences of parties within these phases of ideational dominance are also visible. This 
in turn has implications for the role we attribute to partisan ideology in different phases. As far as 
democracies are about competing policy signals and their legal manifestation via office, partisan 
ideology should have always made a difference in democracies, independent of supposedly 
consensual eras of economic policy making.  
I argue in Chapter 3.1 that the wider political climate has forced political parties into postures 
of assertiveness and defensiveness. Interventionists were assertive within the era of embedded 
liberalism and became a defensive role afterwards. Market liberals experienced just the inverse 
roles. They have been very defensive within the era of embedded liberalism and turned into an 
assertive force afterwards. Assertiveness and defensiveness, however, does implicate that parties 
still have major differences and intent to turn them into different policies via electoral competition 
in democracies. Before I move to Part III, where I demonstrate that the ideology of parties, once 
they enter government, have substantial impact on various policy dimensions, I demonstrate in 
Chapter 2 that the positions of parties, used in Figure 1, survive a sceptical assessment on validity 




1.4 Intervention without states   
Most of the political ideologies were formed in the 19th century. Based on the ideological 
constellation at that time, ideological conflicts are often reduced to a binary distinction of 
communism versus the market society. As communist are for good reason equated with a statist 
approach, many scholars reduced the debate to a political choice between state and markets.   
The market sceptic end of the continuum, which is usually labelled with pro state attitudes, entails 
a conceptual limitation. The market sceptic actors not advocating for the state neither. Those actors 
are not well represented on a state-market dimension. Michael Albert, an influential author for the 
new left, proclaims a “life after capitalism” which is built on more decentralized units for 
communitarian ideas than the state (Albert 2004). Political actors in this tradition should be 
described as hostile towards the market as well as state.  
Political actors can approve as well as reject both conceptual poles of a state-market dimension. 
Drawing on this observations, I borrow the distinction of Oakeshott between politics of faith and 
politics of scepticism (1996). Faith refers to the trust in the abilities of humans to ascertain the 
good whereas scepticism connects to the trust in civil associations to change humans towards the 
good. Trust in the state is a politics of scepticism whereas politics of faith resonate with the more 
autonomous pursuit of coordination in the market. Such a glance on the politics dimension 
dissolves the contradictions within the camp of market supporters and advocates of the state by 
adding a polity dimension to the policy dimension of the market.  
The difference between state-based market advocacy and free market advocacy as well as state-
based interventionism as well as decentralization-based interventionism becomes increasingly 
important. Important because it shapes the political constellation of potential political coalitions in 
the domain of socio-economic policies. For example, the rise of the new right challenges the 
regulative impetus of liberal parties because they increasingly act as coalition partners for 
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conservative parties. Conservative and new right parties both follow the politics of faith. In terms 
of deregulation, privatization, a lean state and tax policies the new right has much more in common 
with conservatives than with traditional liberal parties. It is probably not a coincidence that new 
right parties often evolved out of former liberal parties when their economic clientele became less 
dependent on a market-making approach. The constellation is more difficult for the political left. 
The new left does not show the same trust in state institutions in comparison to their communist 
and socialist ancestors. They rather believe in decentralized policies of intervention. Accordingly, 
cooperation between the traditional camp of interventionists and new left actors in socio-economic 
policies should be more difficult than for the different actors on the pro-market side.  
 
1.5 The peripheral elements  
The morphological approach to ideologies put the ubiquitous social and political practice at the 
centre stage. Complementing the conventional exploration of political philosophy which 
predominantly involves narratives of outstanding thinkers (Freeden 2013, 115).  The peripheral 
elements of an ideology evoke associations to the social and political practice. The core and 
adjacent elements of market liberalism have illustrated that market liberalism is about legitimizing 
more individual practices of economic life and delegitimizes communitarian orientations. Three 
policy domains are explicit derivatives from that claim. First, tax policies directly manifest the 
willingness of political actors to influence as well as redistribute market outcomes.  
The Second World War left many countries with comparable high tax rates in order to finance 
the war economies. However, a simple comparison of some major economies reveal huge 
differences in taxation several years after the war. The German pro-market coalitions with Christian 
Democratic dominance decreased the top marginal income tax from around 90 percent to about 
50 percent in ten years. In the same period, social democratic governments in Sweden doubled the 
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progressivity of the income tax to rates with a margin of about 70 percent (Du Rietz et al. 2013). 
As these marginal income taxes replaced an equally progressive defence tax, social democrats 
basically defended the status quo of high marginal income taxation. The same holds true for the 
democratic presidency of Truman in the United States. Top marginal tax rates maintained around 
90 percent of the high incomes. The first republican president after the war (Eisenhower) lowered 
them to rates of about 70 percent (Piketty 2013). I discuss in Chapter 2 why policy positions on 
taxes are theoretically an ideal indicator to distinguish market liberals from interventionists. In 
Chapter 3.2.3, I examine in the relationship between market liberalism and tax regimes in closer 
detail and test the theoretical implications on a sample of 38 countries over more than 100 years. 
Even if international tax competition has weakened the link between ideology and and tax policies, 
I find that market liberals reduce the progressivity and levels of tax systems systematically.   
The welfare state is the most powerful institution to shelter people from pure market-exposure. 
This is reflected in the compensation literature which highlights compensation in welfare risks due 
to international market exposure (Katzenstein 1985). Complementary, the power resource 
approach sheds light on the domestic processes of unequal exposure to markets. In this perspective 
welfare systems simply compensate for higher labour market risks (Korpi and Palme 1998, Esping-
Andersen 1989). The importance of the welfare state as a discriminatory signal between market 
liberals and interventionists is discussed in Chapter 2. The welfare state is a popular institution and 
even market liberals tend to avoid negative signals against the welfare state. The more revealing is 
a negative stance towards welfare entitlements where it appears. However, the hesitant 
commitment to retrenchment as a genuine derivative of a market liberal ideology plays out more 
in concrete policies than in political rhetoric. In chapter 3.3.2, I demonstrate that market liberal 
governments substantially and systematically retrench the welfare state despite their rare signals for 
such policies.  
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Finally, the deregulation of the economy should be of a core concern of market liberals. In the 
policy field of market regulation, the position towards trusts can be seen a revealing stance to 
distinguish between market supporters with a state-based market making approach and free market 
advocates. Left neoliberals use the state to formulate a liberal order where permanent competition 
is ensured. Favouring the regulation of the economy is necessarily a market sceptic stance and it 
reveals a fundamental distinction between liberal and conservative attitudes towards the market. 
Liberals believe in the capacity and necessity of political elites to construct a competitive market 
order, whereas conservatives believe in the market as a self-sustaining or natural order better left 
to its own device (Vanberg 1999, Amable 2010). Other aspects of economic regulation, like 
consumer protection or environmental standards, can be seen as a more fundamental opposition 
to the acceptance of market outcomes. The willingness to regulate in the name of consumers or 
the environment is a good indicator for moderate interventionism. An even stronger objection of 
market outcomes is to deprive certain areas of the economy from any influence of market 
processes. The control of prices or the nationalization of economic sectors, as proposed by 
communists, socialist or interventionist social democrats is a hard indication of a fundamental 
distrust to market outcomes. I demonstrate the discriminatory power of different regulation signals 
from political parties in Chapter 2 and show in Chapter 3.2.1 the empirical effect of market liberal 
governments on deregulation policies. Overall, policy signals and policy reforms in the domain of 
regulation turn out to be very consistently related to the conceptual claims made about market 




1.6 Summary of Part I 
The conceptual part lays out what market liberalism is. Market liberalism is an ideology whose 
proponents use the heuristic of the market as a simple short-cut for their preferred coordination 
of societies. The market as a bound place has escaped its initial meaning as a place to exchange 
goods. It developed into an image of society and thereby became a powerful metaphor for the 
distribution of responsibility between the individual and the community. The market itself provides 
a stable conceptual anchor over time and space. Negative rights of freedom, individual property rights, 
concentration of supply and demand as well as scarcity build the indispensable core of the ideology of 
market liberalism. This set of institutional prerequisites is complemented by the idea of laissez-faire 
and informs the postfix of market liberalism. The contestation over these core elements is the 
domain of philosophers.  
The adjacent elements choice, individualism and economic rationalism surround the core and 
create a legitimized chain of behavioral options. Humans exert their choices on markets with an 
individualistic appeal and succeed with an attitude of economic rationalism. This behavior creates 
competition and competition ideally leads to increased efficiency which adds to the raising amount 
of choice through the improved match of demand and supply. The legitimation of this set of 
behavioral options should create strong feedback effects because the available and increasing 
options reinforce the behavioral elements of individualism and economic rationalism (compare 
Figure 2). Unsurprisingly, the unleashing of such a chain of behavioral motives triggered harsh and 
controversial debates on the scholarly and political level. These debates are the starting point for 
the major differences of the conventional political ideologies like Marxism, socialism, social 
democracy, liberalism, Christian democrats and conservatives. Initially, they all looked into the 
behavioral aspect of market liberalism, denoted as something between “economic freedom, in and 
of itself, [as] an extremely important part of total freedom” (Friedmann 2009, 9) and “the icy water 
of egoistic calculation” (Marx and Engels 2009 [1848], 43).  
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Figure 2: The concept of market liberalism  
 
Note: Own conceptualization. 
The peripheral elements, derivatives of the core and the adjacent elements, reach into the political 
realm of voters and parties. Preferences for concrete policies are driven by the idea that the market 
as a self-sustaining entity and its outcomes are legitimized by individual and free choices. 
Additionally, any intervention is perceived to hamper the embraced mechanism of competition. 
Accordingly, deregulation of markets, and low redistributive transfers in terms of taxes and social 
security benefits should be of predominant concern for market liberals.  
A much more frequently applied conflict dimension is organized around the concepts of left 
and right. The broader left-right dimension is deeply entrenched in the concept of equality (Bobbio 
1996, Laponce 1981). The concept of equality, however, is a much more contested term and even 
if scholars find temporal agreement over what kind of equality they talk about, the implications for 
scholarly debates and policies are very different in different contexts. Accordingly a leftist or a 
rightist can be many things. This abstract metaphor fulfils a useful ad-hoc purpose for people to 
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politically situate themselves and others. However, it is a poor analytical category in terms of 
comparability. The same holds true for the so called cultural dimension of political conflict. The most 
abstract way to conceptualize such a cultural dimension is to sort monists from pluralists. Monists 
aspire a homogenous culture whereas pluralists aspire the equal acceptance of various concepts of 
life. The analytical problem with such a dimension is that monism can be applied to infinite 
conceptions of a homogenous cultures. Two equally monist political actors can strive for very 
different social orders. The limitations of an overall left and right or cultural dimension of political 
conflict are only problematic for broad claims to generalizability.  
The problem is that many researches behave as if these concepts could be used in comparisons 
with a broader reach and generalizability. Even worse, left and right is often not perceived or 
measured in difference in degree but as a binary black and white dichotomy. In uncountable 
comparisons over long time series and spatial units, dichotomous distinctions are included in order 
to assess the role of ideology on whatever political or economic policy and outcome. On theoretical 
grounds alone, it is clear that this leads to wrong inferences on the role of ideologies. The more 
spaces and time points are included, the higher the likelihood that concepts which have different 
meanings over these spaces and time points do not systematically correspond to anything. The 
persistent usage of such a concept should therefore systematically bias against the role of ideology 
the more cases are compared. As time moves forward and data availability increases, comparisons 
include more and more observations and the supposedly logical conclusion with such a concept is 
that ideology fades to matter (Imbeau et al. 2001).  
I demonstrate in the following chapters that this conclusion is hard to defend. Once we use a 
comparable concept such as market liberalism, we find a lasting impact of political actor’s ideology 
independent of a changing world which is often argued to constrain the room of maneuver for the 
manifestation of partisan preferences. Some widespread arguments supposedly contradict the role 
of ideology. The most prominent being those, arguing for structural tendencies in market societies 
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of whom no political actor is able to escape. Others highlight the ideational environment which 
leaves political actors in changing climates of hegemonic ideas. In these perspectives, partisan 
ideology is either described as unimportant or the convergence of political ideologies is accentuated 
(compare Chapter 3.1 for a discussion of the different arguments). However, structural constraints 
and ideational shifts can exist simultaneously besides the importance of ideological differences. 
Different ideologies are simply assigned to different roles in different phases of ideational 
hegemony, namely, into the roles of assertiveness and defensiveness (Kriesi et al. 2006, 924; Crouch 
2013).   
The ideology of market liberalism is an excellent example. I demonstrate in Chapter 1.3 how 
conservatives and liberals struggled in the after-war period dealing with their market liberal 
preferences in times where economic planning and redistribution was embraced by majorities. The 
concept of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft in Germany can be seen as a typical expression of the attempt 
to establish market liberal ideas with a label signaling the opposite. This defensive posture was later 
passed to social democracy. Equally hard, social democracy struggled to save redistributive 
elements via inventing a third way by equally signaling the commitment to the dogma of the day, 
neoliberalism.  
The concept of market liberalism helps to shed light on these fine grained differences because 
it sorts existing ideologies on a continuous dimension. Neoliberalism, for example, has various 
expressions. Some neoliberals are market proponents putting a strong notion on market regulation 
and redistribution while other neoliberals are outright libertarians. The ladder, simply believe in the 
free markets. Similarly, various shades of Marxism are equally scattered along a huge part of the 
market dimension. Accordingly, ideological labels such as social democracy, liberalism or Marxism 
come with a lot of uncertainty, but the degree to which political actors believe in the beneficial 
attributes of markets left to its own device, generates a dimension where nuanced differences of 
the ideologies and their factions become visible. Additionally, the existing political ideologies place 
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themselves along this dimension on average. However, to measure these nuances is a complex 
matter and is addressed in Chapter 2.  
Constructing a dimension of market liberalism demands to identify a conceptual opposite. 
Conventionally, the conceptual opposite is the state. The state-market dimension is a prominent 
conflict dimension and unfortunately often equated with left and right. The problem is, some 
market liberals embrace the state and some market sceptics do refute the state. On the more market 
leaning side of the dimension this problem exists for a long time now. Many liberals have always 
been selective proponents of state-intervention and with the rise of neoliberalism the state is a key 
provider of a competitive market order. Polanyi has called this observation famously “laissez-faire 
was planned; planning was not” (Polanyi 1973[1944]). He points to the utopia of a free-market 
because he observed the busy attempts of politicians to regulate around the manifold problems of 
market processes. This description is a description of the liberals and their approach to markets 
and it delineates them from the conservatives who have always seen market outcomes with an 
attitude of nonchalance. The various ideologies on the political left are usually described by pro-state 
attitudes, historically for good reason. However, more recent tendencies in the political left create 
some doubts on state leaning positions. The new left is often full of skepticism towards state-
centered political approaches and embraces a more communitarian social order rooted in 
decentralized systems of intervention (see Albert 2004 for an example). Interventionism is 
therefore the logical conceptual opposite to market liberalism. Admittedly, this time 
interventionism can mean many things.  
These many things are the most important gatherable information for the identification of 
political actors on a market dimension. As politicians are rarely surveyed about their degree of 
approval to the free market7 the preferences towards forms of intervention are the most valuable 
                                                 
7 I conducted 12 Interviews with parliamentarians in Sweden and Portugal. It was easy to convey the meaning of a 
market dimension. However, it was very difficult to arrive at a scalable party-assessment. The position on a scale 
becomes only meaningful with an appropriate reference point and these reference points are concrete policies or 
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information at hand. They are so valuable because they disclose the relative willingness to intervene. 
The most important task for the identification of an ideological position is accordingly, to sort the 
many deviances from the ideal of the free market into degrees of market refusal.  
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PART II | MEASURING MARKET LIBERALISM 
 
 
2. How to choose the right party position? A systematic review of measurement 
decisions 
 
Positional and continuous measurements of partisan ideology are included in countless 
comparative studies. There is a proliferation of different procedures to measure party positions 
(Bartolini and Mair 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Gabel and Huber 2000; Laver and Garry 2000; 
Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; McDonald et al. 2001; 2007; Pennings and Keman 2002; 
Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Benoit and Laver 2007; Marks et al. 2007; King and Wand 2007; 
Lowe et al. 2011; Helbling and Tresch 2011; Elff 2013; Bakker et al. 2014a, 2014b; Hare et al. 2014; 
Saiegh 2015; Baker et al. 2015). Many of those have improved the measurement of party positions 
from simple procedures of aggregation to sophisticated statistical models. Recently, they have 
incorporated the ideas of indirect observability with latent measurement approaches (Slapin and 
Proksch 2008; König et al. 2013) and rarely raise awareness on problems of equivalence (McDonald 
et al. 2007; Oberski 2013).  
For a long time, users had to choose between survey based and manifestos based party positions. 
Increasingly, content or topic modelling approaches complement this duality with automatic 
content analysis of texts (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Slapin and Proksch 2008; Slapin and Proksch 
2010). Whereas survey based approaches can build on a rich literature on survey methods in order 
to meet benchmarks of validity and equivalence, text-based approaches still lack a comparative 
assessment beyond mere tests of convergent validity. However, convergence validity between two 
competing measures is at best a very weak test of validity and consequently users are left in the 
dark when it comes to an informed choice of party positions selected to make reasonable 
comparisons.   
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In order to structure these choices of users and improve the decisions of those who model party 
positions, benchmarks or best practices are indispensable. Unfortunately, so far scholars have not 
agreed on a theoretically or empirically sound benchmark. The first section of the article introduces 
two theoretically and methodically convincing benchmarks. Survey experiments with experts using 
conceptually guided anchoring vignettes are the most convincing benchmarks because they reduce 
problems of equivalence and avoid controversial measurement decisions involved in statement-
based models. However, as expert-surveys are limited in number and difficult to get for parties in 
the more distant past, the text-based approaches are indispensable complements. Based on the 
assumptions that party positions are theoretical constructs of latent ideologies, only measurable via 
manifest political statements, I introduce a step by step analysis to infer these latent traits based on 
theoretically selected and observable statements. To transform these observable statements in valid 
and comparable party positions requires a lot of decisions. I categorize them into four fundamental 
decision steps inherent to every theoretical and existing measurement approach.  
Applying existing party positions means to buy a bunch of these decisions even though some 
of them may severely harm the validity of the placements. Therefore, I simulate the impact of 
individual measurement decisions on construct validity using manifesto data and by holding every 
other decision constant.  The simulations indicate a surprisingly clear hierarchy of decisions. 
Overall, the simulation confirms a theoretically proposed ideal treatment of statement-based data 
and point to potential improvements of the existing approaches. The “ideal positions” convergence 
to expert placements (0.86) and outperform existing approaches which intend to measure the 
“market dimension” as well (for example Bartolini and Mair 1990; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; 
Lowe et al. 2011; Elff 2013). Subsequently, the replication of an influential study on voter 
punishment of party position shifts (Hellwig 2012) demonstrates the importance of the findings 
for substantial inferences. The replication demonstrates that many findings in the literature based 
on conventional party position measures stand on shaky ground. What is often accepted as 
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convergent validity between different positional measurements leads in fact to very different 
inferences.  
The simulations indicate another important lesson. The recent history of party position 
measurement has invested a great deal in the sophistication of statistical models capturing latent 
dimensions with noisy indicators. The results of the counterfactual test of alternative 
transformations and modeling decisions result in disappointment concerning all this investment in 
complex statistical modeling. The basics of measuring concepts, such as indicator selection and 
indicator transformation, are much more influential than sophisticated modeling decisions.  
Nonetheless, we need the latest estimator to reveal these shortcomings and hence, I conclude 
by pointing to potential improvements in the development of expert survey items and manifesto 
coding procedures. We need to focus more on the information function of items. We need items 
which provide a better discriminatory power in different areas of a latent dimension. Overall, we 
need a better conceptual footing of indicator development and party position measurement. This 
chapter aims at contributing to the improvement of indicators intending to capture one of the most 
important aspects of political science, namely, the ideology of political parties. Additionally, the 




Construct validity is at the core of the different validity benchmarks, reinforced by convergence 
and discriminant validity. However, it is often said that there is no gold standard for party positions 
‒ which also means there is no accepted benchmark for evaluating the validity of different 
measurement models against each other. I argue that two surveys come very close to an ideal 
measurement of the market dimension in terms of validity and equivalence.  
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The first is the market dimension of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2012, 2015, 
codebook, 19). This item is precisely conceptualized. Moreover, a survey experiment with 
anchoring vignettes proved it comparable across different countries (King et al. 2004, 194; Bakker 
et al. 2014a, 2014b). Anchoring vignettes improve the conceptual perception of a scale and equally 
important might help to standardize the perceptions of the range and skewness of a dimension. 
Interestingly, this survey experiments proved that the market dimension is perceived very similar 
and does not hardly require vignette based rescaling. However, many studies using party positions 
use panel observations often dating back to the 1960s. Unfortunately, the CHESS data are limited 
in temporal coverage and hamper my ambition to assess party positions over a longer time span.  
Accordingly, a second expert survey with interval scales conducted by Michael-John Morgan 
in 1976 complement the benchmark positions. In this survey experts were asked to rank parties on 
a dimension which they specified themselves and over several countries to ensure cross-country 
comparability from 1945 to 1975 (Morgan 1976). Conceptual comparability is here ensured by the 
definition of dimensions by the experts themselves and they almost exclusively named the market 
dimension to be the most important in the countries and time periods they ranked. Equivalence 
over time is provided by the fact, that the very same experts ranked the same parties over the entire 
time-span. Equivalence over countries is improved by the fact, that experts ranked parties in as 
many possible countries. Both measures combined and standardized (0‒1) provide us with 917 
benchmark positions from 1945 to 2014.8 
However, as expert-surveys are limited in number and difficult to get for parties in the more distant 
past, the text-based approaches are indispensable complements. Based on the assumptions that 
party positions are theoretical constructs of latent ideologies, only measurable via manifest political 
statements, I introduce a step by step analysis to infer these latent traits based on theoretically 
                                                 
8 See Appendix, Table D for a precise description of the benchmark positions.  
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selected and observable statements. To transform these observable statements in valid and 
comparable party positions requires to a lot of decisions. Subsequently, I categorize them into four 
fundamental decisions steps inherent to every theoretical and existing measurement approach. 
 
2.2 Step 1: Selection and transformation of indicators  
We do not directly observe the ideologies of political actors. The inference of such a latent trait is, 
rather, based on political statements whose emphasis we observe and relate to the underlying 
ideology. Political statements become a positional appeal only by being framed in one way or 
another. For example, a political actor who addresses every policy field by pointing to market 
solutions or market-related peripheral concepts such as competition or property rights would be a 
market radical. An actor who always favors state-based solutions would be a radical interventionist 
or statist.  
Positions are reflected in frames on issues. A frame-based approach for market liberalism has 
never been consistently applied, but data are available which use this method at least in part. The 
Manifesto Research Group uses coded party manifestos and distinguishes between 56 so-called 
issue categories (Volkens et al. 2017).  Some of them address positional frames and some do not. 
Although the coding scheme was not designed to measure market liberalism, several categories can 
be identified as statements for or against the market (see Appendix Part A, Table A, for a detailed 
description of the selection based on frames). All the issue categories selected are explicitly 
positional, indicated by phrases such as “support for” or “in favor of.” Causally, concrete policy 
statements are manifestations of abstract ideologies. This causal assumption declares the issue 
categories dependent variables and the latent ideological position the independent variable.  
The selection of issue categories should be as broad as possible, because every additional piece of 
information on a specific policy issue with a theoretically meaningful relation to the latent construct 
adds to the precision of the evaluation. Ideally, the different items will have different information 
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functions and thereby cover a wide spread across the range of the latent trait. That means we select 
items which help to discriminate between moderate positions and those which help to discriminate 
between more extreme positions. From a theoretical and methodological perspective a broad 
indicator selection is always superior to a parsimonious one.  
Some researchers have pointed out that the meaning of a political statement is context-sensitive 
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Bobbio 1996; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). Statements with the 
same labels can be right wing in one context and left wing in another. Denotational variance is not 
necessarily caused by deviation in meaning; it might also be caused by the framing strategies of 
political parties. Parties might engage with issues in order to translate them into their own 
ideological issue bundle (Stimson 2015). For example, environmental protection issues were long 
framed in terms of identity politics, but became increasingly subsumed under a state–market 
dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006). To subsume issues into given dimensions (Elias et al. 2015) evokes 
the possibility that indicators are valid for a certain dimension in particular contexts only. Moreover, 
like the left–right dimension, the market dimension, too, can be subject to instability of meaning 
or to varying relations of indicators and latent constructs (Huber and Inglehart 1995). These three 
different arguments all lead to less generalizable assumptions of the relationship between indicators 
and their latent traits. 
A first calculation of a market dimension is now possible with two strong assumptions. First, 
no context-sensitivity is assumed and, second, the statements are interpreted as strictly positional. 
The issue categories are therefore coded as being either mentioned or not. Applying an item 
response model with an assumed Bernoulli distribution yields disappointing results. The model 
fails to converge on a meaningful market dimension (compare Appendix Part A, Table E, Model 
3). This is because parties emphasize many contrasting claims. For example, around 90 percent of 
the 4056 manifestos under consideration include at least one commitment to the welfare state. At 
the same time, around 66 percent of the parties have a positive attitude to the free market. For 
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political scientists, this finding is unsurprising; it serves as the starting point to salience theory 
(Budge and Farlie 1983).  
In political discourse preferences are not only revealed by binary commitments for or against 
certain issues. In fact, political actors assert their support for many, often contradictory, views. But 
their claims become relative when they are in a position to implement their promises, albeit with 
constrained resources. The amount of attention paid to certain political issues reflects those 
constraints and can also reflect the level of real commitment to a political stance (Pelizzo 2003). 
This narrative of salience theory is often presented as orthogonal to spatial approaches. However, 
the concept of salience gains traction mainly when applied to positional statements (De Sio and 
Weber 2014). In this reading, salience is an addendum to positions, not a contradiction. The 
relationship between salience and positions, however, can be conceptualized in different ways, as 
discussed in the next section.  
 
2.3 Step 2: Adding salience to positions 
There are three theoretical starting points for examining the relationship between salience and 
positions (Humphreys and Garry 2000). From one perspective, positional and salience-based 
approaches are antagonistic. From another perspective, mainly in certain readings of the valence 
approach, salience and positions are identical. In a middle-ground interpretation, salience is only 
partly related to positions. From the first theoretical perspective, we need no salience to identify 
positions. But in the last section the market dimension was not confirmed with a pure positional 
approach. From the second perspective, salience and positions are the same. The empirical 
application of this approach would be to equate the absolute amount of salience with positions. In 
the middle-ground approach, the relationship might resemble very complex forms in principle 
(Humphreys and Garry 2000). Every relation depends first of all on the concept of salience. As 




The basis of salience  
Positional and non-positional statements can be emphasized repetitively; repetition is seen as 
increasing salience. In this approach, salience is the sum of emphasis. I call the sum of emphasis 
for a defined source absolute salience. The sum of emphasis is very rarely used in the measurement 
of party positions, because it is dependent on the overall length of a document. For that reason, 
salience is often referred to as relative salience. This relativity is defined in relation to a base of 
absolute statements. Conventionally, the entire sum of statements for a given source constitutes 
such a base. Hence, I call this approach source-based salience. Others argue that only those statements 
with a theoretically defined relation to the dimension of interest should be used as a base 
(McDonald and Mendes 2001; Benoit and Laver 2007). Otherwise, salience and positions are 
influenced by emphasis on things which have nothing to do with the conceptual focus (Laver et al. 
2003; Lowe et al. 2011). To take this argument seriously, the basis of salience is the sum of the 
theoretically relevant statements. I call this approach dimension-based salience.  
The distinction between dimension- and source-based salience is very important. By definition, 
dimension-based salience results in bigger distances between positions, whereas source-based 
salience reduces the distance between political actors. As the whole valence approach is based on 
positional similarity and positions are often measured with salience, the selection of the basis of 
salience is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Strong claims for positional differences are often 
derived from dimension-based measures (Dolezal et al. 2014), whereas source-based salience often 
leads to a valence interpretation (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2014).9   
                                                 
9 There are other approaches splitting salience into actor-specific salience and salience dedicated to the structural 
discourse. Structurally induced salience can have different causes, like agenda shocks  (Laver and Shepsle 1996) or 
simply the party-system-specific emphasis of issues causing parties to talk about things they would not have mentioned 
otherwise (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2014). In a consistent application it leads to 
a context-specific indicator selection. What is actor-specific in particular places and times is then empirically determined 
by a separation procedure. So far, the indicator selection in the context-sensitive approach is dependent on three 
different decisions: the selection of the basis of salience, the specific method of obtaining systematic differences in 





The identification of the salience–position relationship 
The middle-ground theory of salience regards the amount of emphasis as an indicator for real 
commitment to a position (Humphreys and Garry 2000, 11‒15). Often, this leads to an even 
stronger assumption: a linear relation from salience to position. Every additional emphasis adds 
the same amount of movement to a spatial representation. In the case of linearity, it does not matter 
for the location of a party whether an issue such as the privatization of industries is mentioned for 
the first time or the hundredth. Linearity is very counterintuitive, but there are rare arguments for 
other specifications. Lowe et al. (2011) argue for a logarithmic transformation, which means 
marginal decreasing importance for every additional emphasis. They defend this choice with a 
perceptional perspective based on Fechner’s law.10  
In principle, there can be anything from a relationship from linearity to very complex links 
between salience and positions. Fractional polynomial analysis is a method to specify the exact 
mathematical relationship between variables. This technique also allows one to test specific 
assumptions, such as linearity, with conventional measures of certainty. I test the empirical 
relationship between the selected indicators and expert placements on the market dimension with 
fractional polynomial analysis using different bases of salience. Dimension-based salience with a 
logarithmic link captures the relationship between salience and position very well (see Appendix 
Part A, Table C).   
To summarize, the identification of the relationship between salience and position entails two 
decisions. First, the definition of a basis for salience – and the dimension-based approach 
outperforms the alternatives. Second, salience needs to be related to positions. A logarithmic link 
captures the relationship much better than the default option of linearity. Based on these insights, 
                                                 
10 Fechner’s law describes a relationship between the physical magnitude of a stimulus and its subjectively perceived 




confirmatory models for indicator selection can again be calculated. This time, an item response 
model confirms the systematic relationship of the logarithmized indicators with one exception for 
all the selected indicators (see Appendix Part A, Table E, Model 4).11 Only a well-specified salience–
position relationship results in an appropriate confirmation of a theoretically guided indicator 
selection.  
Marginal decreasing importance of repetitive emphasis is a very helpful simplification of the 
salience‒position relationship, introduced by Lowe et al. (2011). However, a supposedly minor 
decision in their approach has serious consequences for the validity of party positions. Lowe et al. 
(2011, 134) assume that for aggregated dimensions different statements have to be logarithmized 
in aggregation, thus assuming that the marginal decline of importance of repetitive emphasis works 
across indicators. Put simply, demanding more consumer protection twice and demanding 
consumer protection once plus once labeling that demand as Marxist is assumed to describe the 
same position on a market dimension. In the next section this assumption is falsified. 
2.4 Step 3: Weighting the indicators 
The literature on measurement of party positions largely ignores indicator weighting. This neglect 
is on a par with the assumption that statements are either left or right wing. A brief look at the 
selected statements demonstrate that it is plausible to think in terms of more or less market liberal. 
Martin Elff (2013) has demonstrated the different locations of statements on latent dimensions. 
Others apply weighting schemes more implicitly. Techniques such as factor analysis employ factor 
loadings as a weighting scheme. Famous indicators, such as the Manifesto Group’s RILE indicator, 
use no weighting (Laver and Budge 1992).  
Theoretically, there is no reason to assume that different statements have the same importance. 
Marxism is a strong and encompassing statement against the market. A simple statement of being 
                                                 
11 Environmental protection is not confirmed to be significantly related to the market dimension.  
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Marxist is usually sufficient to denote a political actor as very statist. A favorable emphasis on the 
minimum wage is different. A minimum wage (captured by controlled economy) is clearly a 
commitment to state intervention, but is far less wholesale an opposition to unhampered market 
solutions as the commitment to Marxism.  
Even maintaining sensitivity to such nuances, it remains difficult to infer numerical differences. 
Is Marxism ten times as intense a signal as commitment to a minimum wage? I am not aware of 
any theoretical discussion on indicator weights in the literature on measurement of party positions. 
Rather, the application of specific statistical techniques automatically imposes indicator weights. 
The most prominent technique is principal component analysis (PCA), which captures linear 
relations in the covariance matrix. Regression analysis is also used to select issue categories 
(Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). Unfortunately, the distribution of the indicators using manifesto 
data does not support any of these techniques.  
The data for text-based indicators are generated by experts, hired coders or computers assigning 
linguistic units into categorical bins to arrive at issue positions with counted frequencies. Since the 
categories are very fine-grained, theoretically overlapping, and often provide equivalent options for 
assigning individual statements, the results are zero-inflated count data with dependent error 
structures. In combination with the insights from the discussion of salience‒position relationship, 
I propose a specific handling of the data. The frequencies of dimension-based salience are 
logarithmized. To treat them as count data again, I coarsen them into natural figures. Depending 
on their distribution, indicators follow often distributive families, such as negative binomial or 
Poisson. I propose a latent mixed response model which can be applied to calculate latent 
constructs such as ideological positions, accounts for varying family links, and does not assume 
normally distributed errors (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004; Bollen 2014). Simply stated, the degree of 
market liberalism of a party explains the marginal likelihood in the frequency of certain statements. 




2.4.1 The mixed response model  
A response model is a generalized linear model specified via a linear predictor, a link, and a 
distribution from the exponential family. I will use the general notation without the subscripts for 
the units of observations, but generally with one level and one latent variable. The predictor 
therefore has the form  






    (1) 
with the first element of  𝝀𝒎
(𝒍)
 set to 1. The elements of x are explanatory variables associated 









 are parameters (factor loadings) (see 
also Rabe-Hesketh et al.  2004, 170).  
The link is a conditional expectation of the response y given 𝒙 and 𝒛. I will use the conditional 
response and combine it with the linear predictor v via a link function g(∙)  
g(𝐸[𝑦|𝒙, 𝒛]) =  𝜈      (2) 
As discussed above for some of the indicators, the response model needs to be a model for 
counts (nonnegative integers); it is typically specified via a log link. The link function turns into 
ln 𝐸[𝑦|𝒙, 𝒛] =  𝜈      (3) 
The specification is completed by choosing a distributional “family” for the conditional distribution 
of the response indicators given the latent and explanatory variables. Conditional on the specific 
kind of the response variable, we use different links. For a continuous response with a normal 
distribution the conditional density becomes  
𝑓(𝑦 = 𝑠|𝒙, 𝒛) =  𝜎−1𝜙(𝑣𝜎−1),    (4) 
Where 𝜙 denotes the standard normal density and 𝜎 being the standard deviation of the error. The 
response model for counts and durations in continuous time (nonnegative integers) is specified via 
the log link (3) and the Poisson distribution. The conditional density is  
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𝑓(𝑦 = 𝑠|𝒙, 𝒛) =  
[𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜈)]𝑠
𝑆!
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜈)).   𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆 − 1, (5) 
where s = 1, …, S are the response categories.  
Dependent on the distribution of the observed indicator, we select the conditional distribution and 
the link of the response process following Equations 2‒5. With numerical integration we arrive at 
the likelihood marginal of the observed and logarithmized data counts, depending on the position 
on the latent variable. A one-unit change of logarithmized emphasis on a specific indicator is 
associated with a specific shift on the latent ideological position. The marginal log-likelihood is 
maximized with a Newton Raphson algorithm using the program Gsem in Stata (Rabe-Hesketh et 
al.  2004). The integral is approximated using adaptive quadrature (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004).  
Figure 1 illustrates the characteristic curves of all items. The curves are based on conditional 
likelihoods over the distribution of the latent trait. The maximum value is 4 because the indicators 
are logarithmized and the logarithm of 100 is around 4.6 (100 percent emphasis on one item is the 
theoretical maximum). On the left side are all items which were assumed to be positive signals for 
market liberalism. For example, government efficiency is an “easy” item. The location is high and 
the curve rather flat. The likelihood that this item is emphasized is high across the entire dimension 
and it discriminates poorly between market liberals and interventionists. Signaling negative attitudes 
toward the welfare state is a “hard” item, with a steep curve, a very low likelihood on the 
interventionist extreme of the scale, and a high likelihood on the market liberal end. Having 




Figure 3: Item characteristic curves 
Note: Calculation based on Equation 5. 
On the right side of Figure 1 are the interventionist items. Only one item does not fit the theoretical 
expectations: environmental protection turns out to be a signal without any discriminatory power 
on the market dimension. Items such as Marxism, controlled economy or nationalization are 
“hard,” with superior discriminatory potential. These results perfectly fit the theoretical 
expectations. A single statement of being a Marxist or a positive attitude to the nationalization of 
private companies is a strong indication that a party is very interventionist. By contrast, 
emphasizing regulation does not tell us much about the location of a party.  
The average slope of the item characteristic curve is the coefficient in the response model and 
turns into an explicit weighting of the indicator when positional predictions are calculated. These 
weights can be compared to those derived from other techniques. For example, PCA leads to 
results where regulation is a stronger signal for interventionism than Marxism. Overall, indicators 
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with very low means are greatly underestimated in response models or factor analytical technics 
where the distribution of the indicator are not Gaussian (see Appendix Part A, Figure A). 
Importantly, then, treating the different indicators as if they have the same informative value for 
an ideological dimension is clearly fallible. Procedures employing the simple aggregation of issues 
produce biased estimates of ideological positions. The bias is fairly systematic, because easy items 
are given too much weight in comparison to hard items.  
 
2.5 Step 4:  Aggregation  
Traditionally, many procedures aggregate party positions by simply adding indicators. However, 
the proliferation of latent variable models applied to positional measurements brought significant 
change in the (maybe rather implicit) choices for aggregation. Many use empirical Bayesian means 
for prediction; hence party positions become weighted means of indicators instead of the 
unweighted sum of indicators. Empirical Bayesian means calculate more than weighting averages: 
they account for the number of observations which informed the likelihood for a position on a 
latent dimension. Estimates based on very few observations (counts) are moderated by the 
procedure, whereas estimates based on a high number of observations are less affected. For 
mainstream parties with a lot of information on the economic dimension, it makes little difference 
which of the two aggregation methods is used. Parties with very low salience on the market 
dimension are moderated by the empirical Bayesian means. Both procedures have advantages and 
drawbacks. The intuition that we would not place actors as very radical based on a single statement 
is appealing, but also contradicts the intuition that a single statement of being a Marxist is sufficient 
to place someone extremely low on a market dimension. I follow the Bayesian assumption by 
preferring moderation of positions with increasing uncertainty.  
To summarize, I followed a consistent deductive reasoning which leads to clear advice on an 
admittedly complex decision tree of transforming indicators and measuring party positions with 
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text-based indicators. Figure 2 highlights the decision steps and types preferred from alternative 
options.  
 
Figure 4: Indicator transformation and measurement decision tree  
 
 




2.6 Assessment of validity  
The correlations between the approach outlined above and alternative measurement approaches 
of the economic or left‒right dimension are illustrated in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Construct, convergence and discriminant validity  













Market Liberalism  0.86 0.87 0.84 0.74 0.79 0.46 
Economic Dimension (Elff 2013) 0.76 0.77 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.33 
Economic (Franzmann & Kaiser 2006) 0.71 0.73 0.56 0.68 0.71 0.41 
Free Market (Lowe et al. 2011) 0.69 0.71 0.54 0.60 0.64 0.28 
Left Right (König et al. 2013) 0.73 0.75 0.49 0.83 0.84 0.75 
Left Right (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006) 0.76 0.79 0.36 0.84 0.88 0.62 
Rile (Laver and Budge 1992) 0.67 0.69 0.31 0.70 0.73 0.40 
Two-Level Model  (country level) 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.70 0.75 0.47 
n 519 468 51 284 234 50 
 
Notes: The 51(50) observations of Eastern European parties are distributed over the following countries: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Party positions for the correlations in this table are based 
on the published procedures from the authors.  
 
Even though there is a certain degree of convergence between the different approaches, the 
approach introduced in this article has the highest correlation with the invariant expert positions. 
Left‒right positions, such as the König et al. (2013) or Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) approach, 
have moderate correlations with economic or redistributive preferences in Western Europe (0.73 
and 0.76). For Eastern Europe the correlation is much weaker. The context-sensitive measure of 
Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) performs best in representing an overall left and right dimension in 
Western Europe. These findings mirror the theoretical assumption that the concept of market 




Context-sensitivity of the market dimension can be tested with a multilevel mixed response model, 
with party positions being nested in countries. Adding the country level to the mixed response 
model and allowing random intercepts and slopes results in lower validity in comparison to the 
model without country-specific parameters (0.78 versus 0.86). The reason is, the country level has 
far too few observations to seriously apply multilevel modeling for the measurement of party 
positions. Ironically, a context-sensitive procedure reduces comparability.  
 
2.7 Counterfactual transformation and measurement decisions 
Other potential measurement decisions listed in Figure 2 are counterfactually tested. The variance 
of the indicator selection is provided by borrowing different approaches from the literature. Martin 
Elff’s (2013) approach has a narrow selection of issues, all of which turn out to be robustly related 
to the market dimension. In contrast, Bartolini and Mair (1990) have a very broad issue selection, 
some of them only very weakly related to a market dimension. Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) were 
the first to apply context-sensitive issue selection as well as actor-specific salience.12 The approach 
is simulated with and without actor-specific salience. These approaches are compared to the 
theoretically guided issue selection discussed above (see Appendix Part A, Table A). After over 
1000 simulation models with every potential specification, I again correlated the resulting party 
positions with the benchmark positions. A look at the results clearly sorts the advisable from the 
unadvisable measurement decisions (see Appendix Part A, Table F, for a detailed overview of the 
simulation results).   
  
                                                 
12 It should be reiterated here that party positions are recalculated with the necessary variance on the four decision 
steps and do not show the positions calculated by the authors originally. For example, Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) 
use an additional smoothing procedure over several legislative periods and Elff (2013) applies a Bayesian estimator to 
predict positions. This is a deliberate simplification in order to separate the decision steps from different approaches 




Table 2: Hierarchy of measurement decisions 
Decision Step  Best Choice       
Indicator selection  broad and theoretically 
guided 
> parsimonious > arbitrary 
 
  
Salience to Position a. Base dimension-based 
salience 





 b. Link logarithmic > linear     
Weighting based 
on 





Aggregation  Empirical Bayes means > Simple addition     
 
Note: See Appendix Part A, Table F, for a detailed overview of the simulation results. 
 
The alternative approach of measuring economic partisan preferences (Franzmann and Kaiser 
2006; Lowe et al. 2011; Elff 2013) has lower correlations with the market dimension compared to 
this approach (see Table 1). After the simulation I can sort out the reasons. Using the absolute 
amount of salience and a narrow issue selection decreases the validity of Elff’s (2013) point 
estimates. Regression-based and country-specific issue selection bias against issues with low 
salience in the case of Franzmann and Kaiser and reduces the comparability of the positions. Lowe 
et al. (2011) use the logarithm after aggregating the indicators, leading to lower validity and 
comparability.  
The most important insight from the simulation is to acknowledge that indicator selection and 
transformation is much more important than model specification. Using techniques like mixed 
response models without an appropriate indicator selection or transformation can produce invalid 
estimates. For example, choosing a linear relation from salience to position rather than a 
logarithmic one reduces the correlation to the benchmark positions on average from 0.80 to 0.55. 
By contrast, using a mixed response model instead of a simple PCA with an appropriate indicator 
selection and transformation increases the correlation from 0.83 to 0.84. Sophisticated statistical 
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models are appreciated, but their application should not compensate for the basics of scientific 
inquiry – namely, concept formation and indicator selection.  
The average correlation between the four different approaches intended to measure the market 
dimension is 0.74. In the next section I demonstrate that the remaining discrepancies between these 
approaches can fundamentally and interestingly change the inferences of studies. 
 
2.8 Substantial impact  
Measuring party positions is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a service to those who use these 
measurements for substantial inferences. As I will demonstrate, if and how parties matter is to a 
great extent dependent on how I measure partisan preferences. For example, Adams et al. (2015) 
claim that voters respond not to party manifestos but to a wider information environment. This 
concept was operationalized with expert placements. Following the approach described above, 
manifesto and expert-based placements are highly similar (in many cases correlations are above 0.9 
within countries). Consequently, Adams et al.’s (2015) findings are better regarded as a 
measurement artefact rather than a substantial result. Expert placements are simply a better 
description of a party position than the RILE indicator with several improvable modeling decisions. 
So why would voters respond to an invalid estimate? 
Studies focusing on positional shifts of parties are even more sensitive to modeling decisions. 
Hellwig (2012) assesses a very important question of government accountability in response to 
economic performance.  I selected this study for replication because Hellwig claims to measure the 
preferences for the “free market” of the major party in government, draws inferences based on 
positional shifts, relies on the same data source and finally provides an argument where ideological 
positions on the economic dimension are well justified and causally short. His major findings are: 
Center-left as well as center-right parties are electorally punished for convergent positional shifts 
(moving closer to the mean voter) and rewarded for divergent shifts (moving away from the mean 
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voter).13 However, in the case of rising unemployment or inflation, electoral reward and 
punishment reverse direction. Electoral punishment of poor economic performance is reduced by 
the parties converging: “Accounting for both partisan and strategic factors demonstrates that 
strategically timed moderating shifts can shelter incumbents on both the right and the left for 
overseeing a poor economy” (Hellwig 2012, 107).  
Hellwig (2012, 101) argues for the validity of the positional measure of “preferences for the free 
market” he uses. Correlation with the approaches discussed in this article is moderate (0.66 with 
the expert survey, 0.70 with the best performing approach of this article). Replacing Hellwig’s 
measurement with the measurement proposed above leads to very different results and inferences 
(see Table 2). There are no longer any significant effects of party movements in models including 
left and right governments.  
Table 3: Replication of “Party Position Taking and Economic Voting“  
DV: Change in 
voter support 
(percentage) 
Original Replication Original Replication Original Replication 
 Full sample Full sample Centre Right Centre Right Centre Left Centre Left 
Convergent Shift (CS) -2.31* -0.71 -2.70 -3.67** -4.44** 1.61 
CS*Unemployment 0.42** -0.02 0.56** 0.34 0.67 -0.55 
CS*Inflation 0.95 -0.96 1.55* -0.25 1.09 -1.32 
Divergent Shift (DS) 2.11 1.29 3.83** 4.78*** 3.31 -3.20 
DS* Unemployment -0.43** -0.06 -0.69** -0.43 -0.60 0.78 
DS* Inflation -0.49 1.12 -0.65 0.69 -0.89 1.14 
n 180 180 101 101 68 68 
 
Note: I used the replication material and therefore the same model specification and variables as Hellwig (2012). Only 
party position shifts are described in Table 2.  
 
Splitting the sample between center-left and center-right governments again leads to different 
results. In contrast to Hellwig’s findings, center-right parties are punished for convergent shifts 
                                                 
13 I focus on the most important findings, summarized in Hellwig (2012, 106, table 2).  
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while center-left parties are rewarded. Conditional on the economy, Hellwig’s findings indicate that, 
in bad economic circumstances, convergence is always the dominant strategy. The replicated 
findings lead to different conclusions. In times of high inflation, divergence is advisable. Positional 
shifts in reaction to unemployment have different effects for left and right parties. Left parties are 
rewarded for divergence and right parties for convergence. The plausibility of the different findings 
could be discussed elsewhere. In fact, the results demonstrate that a correlation of 0.7 between two 
measurements intended to capture the same concept can lead to very different results and 
inferences. I observe about the same level of correlation between many of the competing 
measurements for the market dimension discussed in this study.  
 
2.9 Degrees of equivalence 
In all comparisons using partisan preference measures, I assume the same point estimate to mean 
the same thing across culture and time. This reflects either a strong belief in the cross-cultural 
comparability of ideological positions or simply the ignorance of an old debate about equivalence 
(Berry 1969; Little 2000; van Deth 1998). 
The assessment of equivalence presupposes valid measurements (Garver and Mentzer 1999, 
34). In order to arrive at valid measures several sub-dimensions of validity have to be satisfied.14 
Testing for content and substantive validity requires extensive knowledge and insight into the 
conceptual nature of the construct within a given context (Garver and Mentzer 1999, 35). The 
increasing tendency to use latent variable models as an inductive procedure in political science is 
not supported by its statistical foundations. Valid positions on latent dimensions can only be 
developed and evaluated with a theoretical perspective (Garver and Mentzer 1999, 36; Skrondal 
                                                 
14 Garver and Mentzer (1999, 34) list the following subdimensions: content-validity, substantive validity, 
unidimensionality, reliability, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and predictive validity.  
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and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). Carelessly theorized concepts inevitably lead to problems of low validity 
and low equivalence.  
Equivalence is achieved when two statements have the same truth value in every model 
(Mendelson 1979, 56). That means that the relationship between observed indicators and the latent 
construct is identical. Since there is no absolute identity, equivalence should be seen as a matter of 
degree. Based on the work of Golembiewsky et al. (1976) and Chan (1998), Brown (2014) 
categorizes four degrees of equivalence.15 Identical patterns between indicators and the latent 
construct as well as the same number of indicators over subgroups would be described as 
equivalence of equal form (also called gamma equivalence). The overall left and right dimension is 
often described as having two sub-dimensions: market liberalism and cultural conservatism. Both 
sub-dimensions should have the same relation between indicators and construct across different 
subgroups in order to be rightfully considered gamma equivalent. Empirically, the association of 
the two sub-dimensions varies over cultural contexts (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Franzmann 
and Kaiser 2006; Marks et al. 2006; Rovny and Edwards 2012). Market liberalism and cultural 
conservatism are positively related in Western Europe, but there is a weaker and sometimes a 
reverse association in many other countries.16 These studies demonstrate that an overall left and 
right dimension violates the weakest level of equivalence on theoretical grounds alone. 
A higher benchmark for equivalence demands equal factor loadings across groups (lambda 
equivalence). Equal loadings indicate that different indicators have the same importance for an overall 
latent construct over different subgroups. In the case of left and right, it would mean that economic 
and cultural issues contribute with identical strength to the perception of left and right in different 
contexts. The other two benchmarks demand “equal intercepts” (tau equivalence) and “equal 
                                                 
15 The categorization was developed for Confirmatory Factor Analysis. However, latent measurements approaches in 
a structural equation framework follow the same rationale. 
16 The correlation between a general left and right dimension and the economic dimension using the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (CHES) is instructive. In Western Europe the correlation is 0.9; in Eastern Europe 0.57. Even more instructive 
is the negative correlation between the cultural and economic dimensions in the East (-0.24) and the strong positive 
relation in the West (0.77). 
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residual variance” (theta equivalence). The state of the art in measuring party positions in political 
science struggles with the first level of equivalence.  
Interestingly, there is a growing branch of literature measuring party positions relating 
equivalence to a particular problem of reliability. Even with a shared conceptual interpretation, 
varying perceptions of a scale can distort reliability, leading to positional placements that are hardly 
comparable not because they are differently perceived but because the scale does not provide any 
anchor for orientation. Bias in scale perception is sometimes addressed by attempting to set fixed 
points in the space ‒ so-called anchors, vignettes, or bridging observations. They reveal the bias in 
scale perception of those who made the placements. The bias and stretch parameters are used to 
correct placements in individual survey research (Aldrich and McKelvey 1977) and also increasingly 
to address invariance of party positions (King and Wand 2007; König et al. 2013; Bakker et al. 
2014a, 2014b; Hare et al. 2014; Saiegh 2015). Whereas anchors guide perceptions prior to the 
placement, vignettes or bridges are applied to correct perceptions ex post. Both procedures simply 
standardize the perception of meaning and/or space. But they are not independent of each other. 
Without a solid conceptual frame, there is no guide for a useful fixed point (Mair 2001; Benoit and 
Laver 2012). The two different entry points of the reliability problem have a natural order. 
Difference in meaning is a first-order problem and scale perception a second-order problem.  
Since it is not clear what left and right conceptually mean, there is no convincing anchor to 
standardize the meaning of an overall left and right dimension; it is therefore difficult to invent 
convincing vignettes or ex-post corrections of meaning and scales. For example, Saiegh (2015) 
corrects left and right placements in Latin America using approval of internationally well-known 
politicians to bridge the perception of left and right scales across countries. But how exactly can 
sympathy for, say, Barack Obama reveal our conception and spatial location on a left‒right scale?17 
                                                 
17 In another case, the manifestos of European party factions are used to correct cross-country left and right placements 
(König et al. 2013). Again, from a causal perspective we do not know if the rescaled placements are better or worse 
than the uncorrected ones. European party manifestos might reveal a systematic scaling bias of country-based 
manifestos, but they might also mean something very different at the same time. 
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Anchors, bridges, and vignettes have the potential to increase the comparability of party position 
measurements, but we can assess their effectiveness only in cases where they are conceptually 
grounded.  
There is overwhelming evidence that the left and right dimension lacks a comparable meaning 
across countries. Consequently, it is ill-suited for any attempt at rescaling. Instead, comparative 
studies need to focus on concepts and measures that can travel (Mair 2001, 10). The traveling 
capacities of concepts are usually considered to improve as they move up the ladder of abstraction 
(Sartori 1970), but sometimes it is better to reduce abstraction in order to achieve concepts with 
more pertinence. Market liberalism is an example of how to increase the comparability of political 
preferences by narrowing the conceptual scope.  
 
2.10 The Meaning of Market Liberalism over Time 
Before I assess the equivalence of party positions on a market dimension as measured in Chapter 
2, I have to point to the limits of this assessment. Latent measurement models as a base for 
equivalence tests their roots in psychology. The structure of the data in psychology is usually 
different from the structure of data in political science and partisan research. In psychology, items 
for latent constructs are much more carefully designed and often build on a history of specific 
items-tests, adaptation and improvement. The careful design of items allow high benchmarks for 
model fit parameters. Additionally, psychological research is usually cross-sectional and accordingly 
equivalence is assessed across reasonable sub-groups in one point in time. These cross-sections 
usually draw on thousands of observations with highly valid items.  
In partisan research we usually have times-series data and very limited observations per cross-
section because the most meaningful cultural sub-group is a party system. A party system has 
usually between 2 and 6 effective parties within one point in time. Accordingly, on the partisan 
level there is no convincing way to apply equivalence tests for cross-sections. The only way out 
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would be to inspect the voter level and infer the relations between items and latent constructs 
across groups of voters. As comparable survey items on specific policy issues and party positions 
across time and countries are not available and as I have laid out in the first chapter that voters 
might perceive ideologies different than party elites, I do not see any reasonable solution to robustly 
make inferences about the equivalence of party position measurements across groups.  
As the replication of Hellwigs study in Chapter 2.8 demonstrated, party position change over 
time is an important research field in political science. Longitudinal measurement invariance is 
based on a claim that changing positions of parties are indeed manifestations of different positions 
and not manifestations of change in meaning or measurement. Regulation of the economy is a 
good example. From a conceptual point of view I have argued that regulation is generally a weak 
interventionist signal because it reveals the stated necessity of market interventions. However, 
regulation of the economy from a neoliberal perspective can also mean market making via anti-
trust laws. In the same direction, incentives (another CMP category) mainly address tax policies. In 
the pre-1980s, incentives like tax exemptions and reductions where instruments of economic 
steering, whereas in the 1990s tax incentives rather referred to the abandonment of such 
exemptions in order to induce incentives for a levelled playing field of corporations. Based on these 
examples, it is quite likely that the meaning of a policy category as defined by the CMP/Marpor 
group changes its meaning and thereby the relation to a more abstract ideological dimension such 
as market liberalism.  
Empirical investigation of longitudinal invariance are not very widespread. One reason was 
mentioned above, measurement invariance originates from a discipline with a strong focus on 
cross-sections. Even in psychological research it is rarely applied. “In absence of such an evaluation, 
it cannot be determined whether temporal change observed in a construct is due to true change or 
changes in the structure of the measurement of the construct over time (Brown 2014, 221). An 
assessment of the degrees of equivalence which was limited in my case for cross-culturally 
71 
 
applications is equally valid in a longitudinal framework. Cultural groups are simply replaced with 
time periods.  
A coefficient of a latent structural equation model as the one proposed in the last part represents 
the likelihood of an item being signalled in dependence to the position on the market dimension. 
Being more market liberal basically raises the likelihood of doing statements in favour of the free 
market. As I can reasonably take this last statement for granted, I estimate structural equation 
models with running time series of 10 year intervals and fix the free market issue (401) to a value 
of one in each model. This constrained coefficient serves as an anchor for the scales of the different 
models. I select a ten year interval in order to assure a sufficient number of observation. Admittedly, 
this leads to a smoothing of the coefficients across models and should be taken into account while 
inferring denotational stability of policy issues for the latent dimension of market liberalism.  
In total, I calculate 86 latent measurement models with running ten year intervals and depict the 
coefficients of every issue over time from 1925 until 2015. In Figure 4, these coefficients are 
illustrated. As discussed before, the coefficient reflect the slope of the information curve and 
thereby indicate the discriminatory potential of the individual issues, averaged for the time period 
of the respective model. As explained before, the issue of free market is constrained to a value of 1 
in order to serve as a reference point for the other issues over the entire time period. In 1925 
Marxism (coefficient of -3.8) was around two times as intense of a signal for interventionism as for 
example the nationalization of industries (-2.1). In 2013 Marxism is still around twice as strong of a 
signal for interventionism in comparison to nationalization (-2.8 versus -1.8). The higher the 
coefficient the better the emphasis of the item discriminates between interventionist and market 
liberals. Items with good discrimination are called hard items. The hard items such as Marxism, 
free market, nationalization or reduction of the welfare state have not substantially changed their 
discriminatory power for a market dimension in a period of 86 years.  
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However, other issues have changed their relation to market liberalism. To mention incentives was 
meaningless for a discrimination between market liberals and an interventionists until the late 
1960s. This probably has to do with Keynesian consensus, the widespread acceptance of tax 
policies to incentivize specific investments. Incentives turned into a moderate signal for market 
liberalism afterwards just in line with a change of meaning, referring to a tax structure with equal 
or low taxes for companies. Controlled economy has lost a lot of its discriminatory potential over time. 
The reason lies in the two main policies it captures. Following the code book of the Manifesto 
Project, controlled economy is either assigned in cases where parties mention their intention to control 
prices or where parties signaling their willingness to introduce a minimum wages. My hunch is that 
for a long time the control of prices was the dominant topic within this category and price control 
is a strong interventionist signal even in times of the Keynesian consensus. Within the 1980s price 
controls are hardly ever suggested by political parties and the second aspect of controlled prices, 
supportive emphasis of a minimum wage, dominated the coding of this category. A minimum wage 
is, however, less strong of signal against markets and on low levels also supported by market 
liberals.  
The inference of market liberalism being a concept with a stable meaning over time can only be 
approached in light of clear benchmarks. The literature on measurement equivalence provides such 
benchmarks. The first benchmark of equivalence (gamma equivalence) demands resemblance of 
the functional form across subgroups or in this case time points. I might overall conclude that 
functional resemblance of the hard items is given, as they significantly discriminate between pro or 
anti-market signals across the entire time span. The vast majority of issues do fulfil this criterion, 
because issues crossing from strong negative to strong positive items are not existent. As the 
confidence intervals are overwhelmingly narrow with p-values lower than 0.01 for every item in 




These inference can only be based on the observations of hard items like Marxism, economic control, 
nationalization or welfare state retrenchment and administrative efficiency. Many soft items are hardly 
distinguishable from null effects or even temporally change the algebraic sing. These items should 
be reconsidered following a strict interpretation of gamma equivalence. Inferring lambda 
equivalence would demand to have inseparable coefficient sizes over time. Knowing that 
confidence intervals are very narrow, I need to reject the confirmation of lambda equivalence. For 
example, looking at controlled economy in the 1920s and 2000s indicate a significant difference in the 
strength of a signal against market liberalism. These violations of lambda equivalence necessarily 
rule out equivalence on any higher levels such as thau or theta equivalence.  
This might appear disappointing because point estimates of parties on a market dimension do 
not necessarily reflect the exact same thing even though the procedure I provide has the highest 
construct validity in comparison to other approaches. This in turn means I cannot rule out that 
positional changes of parties are simply an artefact of a changing underlying meaning of an issue. 
In principle, every substantial findings based on such a measure can be an artefact of measurement 
variance.    
However, perfect lambda equivalence of an abstract construct like market liberalism over 86 
years would be extremely surprising for two reasons. First, we know from political discourses that 
issues and their meaning as well as their relation to specific ideologies are subject to permanent and 
often subtle change. Second, the quality of the used items is far away from psychological standards. 
The items I used are not designed to measure market liberalism and the way they are assembled 
induces a lot of uncertainty (see also Benoit et al. 2009). Additionally, uncertainty increase with 
every mathematical transformation.  
On the background of imperfect issues, the proliferation of uncertainty and low number of 
observations across countries, the results should be discussed in relative terms. In relative terms 
means that equivalence over such long time and dozens of countries is a very high benchmark. 
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Measurement equivalence of higher order than gamma for such a coverage is probably not possible 
in the social sciences. Equivalence in relative terms also means to compare alternative ways of 
approaching ideological positions. Equivalence in case of binary left and right distinction means 
that communist and social democrats share the exact same preferences on economic policies. This 
is of course a strange assumption because the different labels of communist or social democracy 
usually stand for exactly a number of differences in these preferences. However, it also demonstrate 
what we implicitly assume while putting a partisan dummy into a regression model. To a lesser 
degree absurd but also connected with a sore tummy is the equivalence of liberal parties and 
national socialists. Measured continuously on a left right scale they would have rather similar 
positions. Liberals because they are drawn to the left by their anti-discriminatory and pluralistic 
approach to values and national socialist because their socialist attitude towards the economy. In 
short, binary and continuous measures of an overall left and right dimension violate already the 
lowest level of equivalence. In a relative perspective, an indicator of market liberalism is an 
improvement although it is still far away from a perfect equivalent description of socio-economic 
preferences over a long time period.  
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Figure 5: The meaning of market liberalism over time
 
Note:  Estimates are based on a generalized structural equation model using running averages over different time periods. From 1925 until 2015 we use 25 year intervals to have a 
sufficient number of observations. From 1990 to 2011 I use 10 year intervals because of the increasing number of coded party manifestos. The average number of observations per 



























































































































































































2.11 Towards comparable government preferences 
With very rare exceptions, governments consists of parties.18 Similar to party’s preferences, 
government preferences are not comparable if the meaning of party positions varies over time and 
space. Accordingly, the problem of equivalence travels from partisan to government preference 
measures.  
Measurements of government ideology usually take notice of the developments in the partisan 
measurement literature with a considerable delay. In political science, and even to a stronger degree in 
the economics literature, distinctions of left, center and right are still the predominant approach. For 
example, around 3.000 studies have used the The Database of the Political Institutions, compiled by 
the World Bank Development Research Group (Beck et al. 2001; Cruz et al. 2015). The dataset codes 
executives as left, center or right. The categorization follows predominantly the self-categorization of 
party families with conservatives, liberals and Christian democrats being right and communists, 
socialists or social democratic parties being left. Interestingly, center parties are those being described 
as “centrist”.  According to the codebook, a “party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a 
social-liberal context” is considered centrist. Even more interestingly, the coders tried to avoid center 
parties which where centrist because factions “average out” to a centrist position like “Marxist right 
wing Muslims”, as the codebook propose an example (Cruz et al. 2015). More fine grained measures 
are very difficult to get for such a coverage and accordingly, the simple categorization of ideologies is 
probably based on problems of data availability.  
Empirically, a simple comparison of a binary distinction and fine grained positions towards the 
market reveal a considerable and growing mismatch (compare Figure 5). There are various reasons for 
this tendency (see also Part 1.5). Before the 1980s parties followed the Keynesian consensus (Singer 
                                                 
18 The most widespread exemption are “technocratic” care-taker governments.  
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1997). In these periods conservative and Christian democratic parties were committed to rather 
interventionist policies, including demand side management and the increasing generosity of the 
welfare state. Parties like the British Conservatives or the Christian Democrats in Italy had more 
interventionist agendas in the 1950s and 1960s than many Social Democratic Parties after the 1990s. 
However, many social democrats adopted moderate market liberal in the 1980s and 1990s (Crouch 
2013; Amable 2013), before a hesitant reorientation after the financial crisis in 2008 took place (see 
Part 1.5). Additionally and with increasing support, populist radical right parties enter the lower right 
part of Figure 5. The reason is, many radical right parties are selectively interventionist, protecting, in 
chauvinist ways, their growing clientele of workers (see Chapter 3.4)  
The phenomena of radical right wing parties is comparable to a broader phenomenon of parties 
with strong nativist identities. It refers equally to an aggregation problem of the overall left and right 
dimension. Radical right parties are classified as right because of their cultural nativist signals and 
usually in full ignorance of their economic and welfare positions. The opposite holds true for many 
liberal parties, which are usually classified as right based on their market friendly positions, even though 
they often held culturally pluralist positions which might be considered left wing. Radical right parties 
and liberal parties often have very similar party positions on the aggregated left and right dimension, 




Figure 6: Mismatch of left, right and market liberalism  
 
 
Notes: Positions of parties calculated as described in Chapter 2 (n=6464). Market Liberal Left Parties are parties from 
communist, social democratic or green party families and empirical values >0.5 (n=386). Interventionist Right Parties are parties 
from Christian Democratic, liberal, conservative or nationalist party families with empirical values <0.5 (n=1269). Party 
values are transformed to a yearly basis in order to minimize sample effects. Party families as assigned in Volkens et al. 
(2017). 
 
Overall, two things can be considered necessary in order to arrive at comparable government 
preferences. First, the left-right dimension is not invariant as well as too imprecise and leads to biased 
results in cross-country and times series analysis. Second, measures on a market dimension are better 
suited, in particular for studies focussing on socio-economic aspects. Finally, government measures 
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Measurements of government preferences do not only entail preferences measures. Government 
preferences are always based on the aggregation of three components: Preference measures of parties 
(1), a weighting component related to the relative strength of parties in multi-party governments (2), 
and a temporal specification (3). 
In cases where governments consist of several parties with different electoral support and varying 
seats or posts in the parliament or cabinet, weights serve to account for the difference in power to 
influence the policy agenda. Usually, there are four options: (1) no weights. The easiest weighting 
scheme is to identify and select the dominant party in the tradition of Schmidt and Beyer (1992). The 
dominant party determines if a government is either left, center, right or affiliated to a specific party 
family (Schmidt 1996; Armingeon et al. 2017). (2) Relative seats in relation to the parliament. This 
measure accounts for weights between coalition partners and for parliamentary majorities of 
governments at the same time. However, relative seats in the parliament obscure preference measures 
with majorities. Imagine a party whose manifesto is fully written and every party member pledges to 
strictly follow the platforms agenda. Using parliamentary seat shares to weight the position means that 
such a fixed ideological positions is now strongly influenced by the election result. A minority 
government with a parliamentary seat share of 30 percent would predict a more interventionist party 
preference in comparison to a party with a 100 percent electoral backup.  
Another widespread applied option is relative cabinet seats or posts. Portfolio theory indicates that 
the relationship between electoral strength and cabinets posts follows a linear relationship, also called 
Gampson’s law (Gamson 1961; Laver and Schofield 1998). Accordingly, seats and posts can be 
considered as equivalent partisan weights in coalition governments, while cabinet seat data are usually 
easier to gather.  
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Figure 6, illustrates the difference between two typical measurements of government preferences. Both 
preference measurements weight cabinet member parties with the relative cabinet seat share. 
Necessarily, categorical distinctions overstate partisan ideological differences and assume constant 
positions over time. Following the categorical approach, a majority of governments is located on the 
extremes of a dimension whereas a continuous measurement would place the majority of governments 
in the center.  
Figure 7: Two types of government preferences 
 
Note: The measures of market liberalism are based on the procedure in Part 1.5. The party preferences are weighted by 
relative cabinet seat share. The left and right measures are based on the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 
2017).  
 
A brief look at the temporal development in the United Kingdom illustrates that the different 
measurements create very different historical narratives (compare Figure 7). There is a common 
tendency until the late 1970s to more interventionism. Governments became culturally more pluralistic 
and economically more interventionist. This changed in the late 1970s when governments became in 
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picture masks the underlying differences across and within countries. The example of the United 
Kingdom clarifies why. As there are mainly single party governments in the United Kingdo, changing 
cabinets are translated into huge ideological shifts using a left-right dichotomy (solid grey line in Figure 
7). Self-evidently, these shifts correspond with more fine grained data on a market dimension, as labor 
governments are in tendency more interventionist. However, these differences take place on different 
levels after the electoral victory of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. The government of Tony Blair is 
ideologically very close to the conservative governments of the 1960s but also definitely more 
interventionist than the conservatives from the 1980s. The British labor governments in the 1970s 
were in favor of marginal tax rates of 98% and were supportive towards nationalized core industries. 
All these well-known differences are washed out with binary indicators of ideology. 
The third component of government preferences is time. Government preferences are often 
applied in time-series-cross section regression models where the time identifier is a year. However, 
since government start- and end-dates are rarely at New Year, a simple yearly assignment overlooks 
the fact that several governments can govern within a year. Two solutions are widespread. The first is 
basically counting the days of a specific government within a year and uses government days as a 
weighting scheme. This is also the solution of the government preference measures in most frequently 
used dataset for government preferences in political science, the Comparative Political Data Set 




Figure 8: Market liberalism and cultural monism versus left-right from 1960 to 2013  
 
Note: The measure of market liberalism is on the procedure in Chapter 2. The left and right measures are based on the 
distinction of Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2017). For the measurement of the cultural dimension 
compare Appendix Part A, Table J. 
 
An alternative periodization would be to use cabinets as temporal identifiers (see Schmidt 2016 for the 
argument). Let us assume a government makes a reform in the first year of incumbency and remains 
inactive the three succeeding government years. A yearly specification should theoretically yield the 
same substantial results as a cabinet periodization (Coefficientyear = Coefficientcabinet * Cabinet 
duration in years). However, standard errors can be different, dependent on how the effect unfolds 
over time. In the example above, the standard errors are higher in the yearly specification because the 
model has three additional cases with inactive governments and only one with a specific change. 
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the observations with the same tendency. In this case, we have three more observations with the same 
relationship and decreased standard errors. Accordingly, the selection of periodization should be 
dependent on the underlying causal assumption over time. For processes which only happen usually 
once or twice under a government, a cabinet periodization should be superior. For political activities 
with a higher frequency, narrower time intervals are also theoretical appropriate.  
The temporal unfolding of government’s impact is of course a more general question. In what time 
horizons do we assume governments to have measurable effects in different policy domains? Yearly 
specification assume an impact within a year, cabinet periodization assumes an average cabinet 
duration to reveal causal impacts. A third and widespread applied option is to use the aggregated sum 
of weighted preferences over time. For example Huber and Stephens cumulate left government years 
over a long time period.19 The accumulation of government years implicitly assumes symmetric and 
monotonous casual effects. Non-linear causal effects are washed out in such a procedure because for 
example, short-term positive and long-term negative effects are averaged to null-findings.  
From the three dimensions of aggregation – partisan ideology, weighting of parties and periodization 
– there arises a multitude of plausible combinations. I select five typical procedures in order to test the 
impact of different inclusions of governments’ ideological preferences. These five government 
ideology indicators represent the typical and most widespread approaches in the literature.  
The first indicator is the left-right indicator from Schmidt and Beyer (1992) and also part of the 
Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2017). The binary distinction is based on a 
classification of parties and uses cabinet post shares of right parties as well as number of days governed 
per year as a weighting scheme. The second selected approach is the so called “Schmidt-Index”, a 
                                                 
19 See Huber and Stephens for a series of studies using this procedure of temporal aggregation (for examples Huber and 
Stephens 1998; 2001).  
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fivefold measure which captures the balance of power between left and right in cabinets based on their 
relative seat share. It stands representative for several other five-fold indices combining left and right 
with parliamentary seat shares. The third approach is the measure of Kim and Fording (2002). Kim 
and Fording use a continuous left and right measure based on party manifestos using the CMP/Marpor 
database (Volkens et al. 2017). The ideology measures is very close to the famous RILE index, the 
default option of the CMP/Marpor database (correlation between the Kim/Fording and the RILE 
approach is 0.96 on the partisan level).20 Kim and Fording use relative cabinet posts as a weighting 
scheme. Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) provide an alternative continuous measure of the economic 
dimension based on CMP/Marpor data with the important difference of applying a context-sensitive 
issue selection. In their approach, left and right has explicitly a party system specific content (see 
Franzmann and Kaiser 2006 for a detailed discussion of their approach). Finally, I use a government 
preference measure based on the procedure described in Chapter 2 in combination with relative cabinet 
seats as a weighting scheme (see Table 4 for an overview of the selection).  
  
                                                 
20 The difference originates from Kim and Fordings choice to use dimension instead of document based salience. 
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cabinet posts Description Source 
Left-right (binary)  x Cabinet posts of right-wing parties in 
percentage of total cabinet posts. 
Weighted by the number of days in office 
in a given year. 
Schmidt and Beyer (1992); Armingeon et al. 
(2017). 
Hegemony of the 
left to hegemony of 
the right (1-5) 
x  (5) hegemony of right-wing (and centre) 
parties (left parties=0), 
(4) dominance of right-wing (and centre) 
parties (0< left parties <=33.33), 
(3) balance of power between left and 
right 
(33.33< left parties <66.67), 
(2) dominance of social-democratic and 
other left parties (66.67<=left 
parties<100), 
(1) hegemony of social-democratic and 
other left parties (left parties=100). 
Schmidt (1992); Armingeon et al. (2017) 
Market liberalism 
(continuous) 
x  See Chapter 2 Own calculation 
Left-right Kim and 
Fording 
(continuous) 
 x Left-Right ideology measured by 26 CMP 
categories weighted by relative cabinet 
posts (continuous; transformed and 
inverted into 0 left – 1 right) 
Kim, H., and Fording, R. C. (2002). 
Government partisanship in Western 
democracies, 1945–1998. European Journal 
of Political Research, 41(2), 187-206. 
Updated by the author for every available 




x  Left-Right ideology measured with 
different CMP categories. The selection 
depends on the controversy of issues in 
specific party systems and election time 
points (see Franzmann and Kaiser 2006) 
Franzmann and Kaiser (2006). 
 
The correlation on the partisan level between the three different CMP/Marpor based indicators is 
between 0.59 and 0.73. The RILE is also listed in order to show that it closely resembles the Kim and 




Table 5: Correlation of preferences on the partisan level 
 Market Liberalism Kim and Fording Franzmann and Kaiser 
Kim and Fording 0.69 1 - 
Franzmann and Kaiser 0.73 0.59 1 
RILE (Budge and laver 1992) 0.65 0.96 0.57 
Note: own calculation. 
I collected cabinet data on 38 countries, summing up to a total of 1.899 government years.21 The 
correlation of the different government preference measures are interesting. First, approaches 
measuring the economic dimension do not necessarily correlate higher internally. For example, my 
proposed measure of market liberalism correlates higher with the RILE and the equivalent measure of 
Kim and Fording than to the economic dimension measured by Franzmann and Kaiser. Accordingly, 
the context-specific measurement of Franzmann and Kaiser have a stronger impact on the preference 
measure than including cultural and foreign affairs issues into the indicator of government 
preferences.22  
 












Kim and Fording (left-right) 0.74 1 -  
Franzmann and Kaiser (left-right) 








Rile (left-right) 0.73 0.97 0.62 0.57 
Note: n=1390 government years in 38 countries.  
                                                 
21 I compiled data on the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. The majority of cabinet information if based on 
Döring and Manow (2017). 
22 Besides, Gamsons law is confirmed as an otherwise identical procedure using seats or posts exchangeable correlate higher 
than 0.9 for every approach (not shown in the table). 
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In Part III, I demonstrate the difference of government measurement procedures for substantial effect 
on various policy domains. As expected, binary left and right approaches have a strong tendency to 
produce null findings. Before turning to the demonstration of these differences, a final note of caution 
needs to be addressed. By replacing left and right with more fine grained dimensions of government 
preferences, we start asking different questions. The interest in the difference of left and right is still 
an appropriate question and we might admit fading policy impacts. We might even find nothing at all 
whereas fine grained preference measures reveal a considerable impact of partisan ideology. Both 
findings are by no means a contradiction. It would just demonstrate that the concept of left and right 
does not matter but more specific ideologies do. However, on theoretical grounds alone it is very clear 
that a left and right dichotomy blurs many meaningful political differences 
  
2.12 Conclusions Part II 
As soon as people start discussing and researching political preferences, the concept of left and right 
dominates. This is appropriate, if we are interested in an abstract metaphor for political preferences. 
But its vagueness raises serious issues with regard to comparability. As long as we do not know what 
left and right conceptually mean, it is impossible to talk about validity. Furthermore, procedures to 
correct the perceptional bias of meaning and scales are dubious if we do not know exactly what we are 
rescaling. A complementary way of increasing comparability is to add precision in meaning by climbing 
down the ladder of abstraction. The market dimension is probably the easiest way to begin.  
Part II develops a method using text-based indicators and four decision steps to transform the text-
based policy statements into ideological positions. The discussion of four successive decision steps 
indicates the complexity of the transformation from linguistic units to valid and comparable positions. 
Salience matters, but only to a limited degree; the logarithmized transformation ‒ though not exactly 
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as Lowe et al. (2011) propose ‒ is a precise description of that relationship. Using emphasis in reference 
to the theoretically important statements in a document also improves the revelation of ideological 
positions (McDonald and Mendes 2001; Benoit and Laver 2007). Following the data-generation 
process, salience of issue positions are count data and, as it happens with fine-grained categories, they 
are not normally distributed and errors are far from being independent. Therefore, the nature of the 
data violates the assumption of many applied models. I propose to use logarithmized dimension-based 
salience and identify indicator-specific distributional family links in a latent mixed response model. A 
good proof of the relevance of this specification is the indicator of Marxism. Marxism is never used in 
any of the approaches measuring party positions with manifesto data. This is because conventional 
models never confirmed the importance of Marxism because of the zero inflated distribution. Using a 
mixed response model and specifying the link and density distribution of the indicator, Marxism turns 
out to be the strongest statement against market liberalism.  
The results of the counterfactual test of alternative transformations and modeling decisions lead to 
great disappointment concerning all the investment in complex statistical modeling and the usage of 
latent response models. The basics of measuring concepts, such as indicator selection and indicator 
transformation, are much more important than sophisticated modeling decisions. Even using a latent 
mixed response model, the one I consider the most appropriate, can calculate useless party positions 
in cases where we select our indicators arbitrarily or do not account for the fact that the text-based 
data usually include salience as well as positional information. Furthermore, the approach demonstrates 
that expert and programmatic positions are very close, thus questioning the longstanding debate 
between scholars who favor manifesto data and those relying on expert surveys. In cases, where both 
approaches still result in very different positions we should take that as a hint to be concerned. For 
example, the prediction of party positions of the ÖVP in Austria is biased to the left using Manifesto 
Data. This is also the case following the approach above. A closer look, that the ÖVP manifestos 
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reveal a systematic coding error. Proposed tax reduction are predominantly coded as controlled 
economy, a “hard” interventionist item.  
The replication of Hellwig’s (2012) study of partisan accountability allows two additional 
conclusions. First, party position shifts are very sensitive to the specific measurement approach. 
Second, even in cases with correlations of 0.7 between two approaches intending to measure the same 
concept, we can observe substantial differences in terms of results and inferences.  
Measuring market liberalism instead of left and right adds precision to socioeconomic preferences 
and increases comparability, but the question of comparability enters the debate on another level. 
Market liberalism can also have different meanings, even in a Western European context (Jabko 2006). 
Standard tests of equivalence across groups are not possible in the case of party positions due to the 
problem that real world does not provide sufficient cases. The remaining and feasible equivalence tests 
indicate comparability of market liberalism over time. This is more than every existing indicator ever 
achieved, judged on theoretical grounds alone. However, as higher levels of equivalence cannot be 
demonstrated for the proposed measure of market liberalism it might still be that differences in 
positions are caused by different meanings and not substantially different preferences. The straight 
forward conclusion is that party positions are uncertain. Accordingly, the precision of many existing 
party positions signaled by the decimal point misleads.  
To embed text-based indicators in the item response theory and apply appropriate statistical 
techniques to measure party positions is probably an improvement. However, we need refinement on 
the indicator level and data from many individual coders to bring the test of equivalence to another 
level. These refinements can only be conceptually guided. We need to come up with issue categories 
providing discriminatory power across the entire ideological dimension. The same holds true for 
anchoring vignettes or survey experiments, which often help to distinguish the perception of the center 
part of a dimension, but fail to add precision to extreme points of a scale. For example, the anchoring 
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vignettes of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey provide three theoretical examples which symbolize a 
center, a center-right, and a center-left party on the market dimension (see codebook of the CHESS 
data). Perceptions of the extremes are not covered.  
Anchors, bridges, or vignettes are most fruitful when applied to dimensions which are conceptually 
grounded. The overall left and right dimensions is not such a dimension. The prevailing dominance of 
the overall left and right dimension hampers the exploration of meaningful and comparable political 
preferences which will prove to be very helpful to understand the behavior and impact of political 
parties in the era of multi-dimensional party competition. This summary necessarily travels from party 
positions to government positions.  
I demonstrate that widespread applied government preference measures can be improved by 
incorporating insights from the party measurement literature. More generally, government preferences 
entails two more aspects than partisan preferences: a weighting schemes for coalition governments 
and a specification of time (periodization). These three aspects combined reveal a multitude of possible 
measurement approaches for government ideology. In fact, there are hundreds of empirical approaches 
in the literature. I select five approaches which represents the majority of applied procedures and 
discuss how they relate to each other. At first sight, they seem to converge as correlations between the 
different approaches are all above 0.57. However, I demonstrated on the partisan level (Chapter 2.8) 
that even correlations of preferences measures above 0.7 do not ensure similar substantial results in 
applied studies. This note of caution motivates the following Part III, where I test the impact of 
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PART III | IMPACT OF MARKET LIBERAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
3.1 Why would government ideology still matter? 
 
Populists and meta-analysts agree, traditional partisan differences become increasingly ineffective. 
Populist and meta-analysts base their inference on different arguments though. Populist argue that 
established parties are only supporting the establishment. Whatever policy signals they might send, 
they are portrayed to deliver the same set of policies to feed their elite clientele (Mudde 2014). Meta-
analysts summarize existing studies on the influence of established parties in governments and 
conclude that parties on average do not make a difference anymore (Imbeau et al. 2001).  
It is a widespread opinion that the vanishing impact of established parties has to do with an 
increasingly restricted room for manoeuver of governments in general. Governments find themselves 
more and more constrained by international commitments (Mair 2009). Moreover, government’s 
discretions over revenues via spending is limited by increasing deficits and accumulated debt (Streeck 
2014). Due to rising debt, creditors like the European Central Bank (ECB) or the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiate the conditions of public spending. More generally, free floating capital 
dictates the terms of governments, independent of whether they appear left or right (Mosley 2003). 
On top, European economic governance rules deeply interfere in the regulatory plans on wages, taxes 
or labor market reforms (Bauer and Becker 2014). These findings challenge a core assumption of 
democracy. Namely, that voters witness at least the potential for substantial alternation. The attempts 
of governments to establish accountability by highlighting ideological differences appears as a 
desperate attempt in an era of populist attacks as well as the academic call that elites have converged 
on doing all the same.  
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Many of those arguments stress a fundamental shift in government’s freedom to exert policy, assuming 
that things have been different in the past. The most forceful narrative of such a change can be found 
in Ruggie’s description of the end of “embedded liberalism” (1982). Embedded liberalism refers to a 
historic constellation when governments were in control of capital flows and commanded the 
economic development of nation-states in the early post-war period. The constellation changed with 
the oil crisis and a new order broke through which abandoned existing conventions of economic 
steering (Goodfriend 2007).  Not only abandoning economic steering but embracing a logic which 
almost entirely passed questions of allocation and distribution to the markets. This attempt became 
known as neoliberalism in the established democracies and also resonates with the Washington 
Consensus as the equivalent for developing countries (Williamson 2009; Serra and Stiglitz 2008). The 
narrative of embedded liberalism and the succeeding neoliberalism describes a major ideational shift. 
This finds tangible manifestations in every more concrete policy dimension such as tax preferences 
(Swank and Steinmo 2002), new public management (Christensen and Lægreid 2002), deregulation or 
the welfare state (Kitschelt 2001; Allan and Scruggs 2004; Hacker 2004).  
Others have argued that governments have always found themselves in highly restricted 
circumstances. Predominantly, capitalism is portrayed as a social order with inescapable tendencies. 
Piketty has forcefully renewed an argument of wealth accumulation in capitalist societies (2014). Fred 
and Somers (2014) stand representatively in the renewed interest for Karl Polanyi. Following this 
perspective, market societies dispose individuals from a complex web of social norms and the more 
disposable people become, the more they demand a radical reversal (Polanyi 1973[1944]). In this light, 
the increasing success of the radical right appears as repetition of history as periods of extreme 
liberalism are followed by a radical right backslash. Streeck renewed the interest in Marxian 
contractions between capitalism and democracy and forcefully points to the role of public and private 
debt helping to delay the inevitable final crisis (2014). In this perspective, governments increase their 
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external dependency and delay the fundamental solution of social problems. These structural accounts 
obviously do not encourage a deeper trust in the abilities of democratically elected governments to 
make a difference. They rather reinforce the interpretation of inevitable tendencies.  
However, inevitable tendencies are an external constrain and external constraints can also be 
described as a phenomenon of tight hands. Tight hands are, however, not always restrictive but can 
be portrayed as a strength rather than a weakness (Vreeland 2003; Putnam 1988). External constraints 
increase the bargaining position of those who favor the implementation of policies in line with 
supposedly inevitable solutions. Several studies have shown, how external constraints offer 
governments an opportunity to pass economic reforms and structural adjustments they had previously 
felt powerless to introduce (Dukelow 2015, Moury and Standring 2017a; 2017b). External restrictions 
often appear in the narrative of “the possible” and thereby obscure the correspondence of policy 
choices and ideological preferences (Hay 1999; McNamara 2002). These attempts have in turn 
triggered resistance from opposition parties, social movements and trade unions (De Giorgi et al. 2015, 
Lima and Artiles 2011, Della Porta and Mattoni 2014). These reactions demonstrate that at least some 
political actors do not adopt the narrative of the inevitable.  
Whatever narrative we select to describe what happened in the coordination of economies, social 
democrats usually play a central role. In Chapter 1.5 I have quantitatively shown how economic 
positions of social democratic parties have shifted on average. Colin Crouch has given this 
transformation a headline “we are all (partly) neoliberals now” (Crouch 2013). As the intrusion of 
neoliberal thought into social democracy is well documented (see for example Amable 2010), Crouch 
mentions a second and for this part more important aspect. The hollowing out of social democracy by 
abandoning their former core constituency is a reaction of social democracy to regain assertiveness in 
a structurally defensive posture (Crouch 2013, 1; see also Kriesi et al. 2006, 924). The era of embedded 
liberalism, with glorious names such as the golden era of the welfare state, was a period where the 
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economic left was the progressive force and the economic right was in a position to curb their efforts 
in the broad equalization project. Those roles became inverted afterwards. The economic right adopted 
a posture to set the agenda and the economic left was left with the role to curb the efforts of 
transforming societies into markets.  
Assertiveness is embedded in an ideational context which incentivizes actors to exert various 
justification strategies. Being in line with the prevailing dogma allows to shift blame back and forth 
between inevitable pressures and conscious choices. Assertive actors can chose to establish 
accountability or blame structural pressures whenever it suits their fortunes. Actors in a defensive 
posture are forced into a position where they have to reveal real responsibility of the assertive others 
and at the same time trying to protect the status quo. Thereby, they lose control of the agenda setting 
power.  
Accepting the importance of assertive and defensive roles implies that the strength of the tight 
hands is valid before and after embedded liberalism. Market liberals blur their responsibility for 
inequality and painful reforms in the neoliberal era and claim responsibility for increasing wealth. 
Equivalently, interventionist have increased the burden for companies and the rich in times when for 
many the communitarian interest prevailed over individual success. Accordingly, it is difficult to find 
a market liberal government before the 1980s promoting major tax cuts. But market liberals are also 
not the ones who favored their increase to almost prohibitive levels. In contrast, it is easy to find 
several progressive tax reforms under interventionist governments before the 1980s. However, after 
the 1980s it became difficult for interventionists to increase taxes, but they were also usually not the 
ones who made the major tax cuts.  
Assertive and defensive postures allow to complement the partisan hypotheses with the existence of 
ideational shifts. In that perspective, partisan ideology has a persistent ability to influence socio-
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economic policies. It points to a perspective where government ideology has always made a difference, 
the wider ideational environment simply shapes the strategic options of interventionists and market 
liberals. However, the empirical results of meta-analysts are still indicating a fading influence of partisan 
ideology (Imbeau et al. 2001). In chapter 3.2 I argue that the empirical null findings of the partisan 
hypothesis has to do with the measurement of government ideology.  
 
3.2 The impact of different government ideology measures 
 
In chapter 2.11 I describe several conventional ways of measuring government ideology and 
complement these measurements with an alternative approach. Initially, the dependent variable was 
described as performance in terms of wealth and equality. However, the causal chain between 
government ideology and abstract concepts of performance, like economic growth or the income 
distribution is very complex. Before turning to such a complex identification, I have to ensure that 
government ideology is measured appropriately. Accordingly, I begin to assess the impact of 
government ideology on policies with a shorter and theoretically more reasonable causal chain.  
These policies or dependent variables are sorted inthree categories and have been introduced in the 
theoretical section as most-likely policy domains because they resonate well with the ideology of market 
liberalism: (1) business and labor market regulation, (2) welfare state and government spending and (3) 
the tax regime. The three areas of policies are selected for two reasons. First, they logically arise from 
the theoretical discussion of market liberalism in Part I. Market liberalism is about the reduction of 
burdens for economic actors and providing a playing field of competition with a minimum of 
interventionist distortions in order to increase the efficiency of market mechanisms. Accordingly, 
deregulation is at the heart of economic policies preferred by market liberals. Equally important is the 
101 
 
reduction of any policy reducing the market exposure of individuals. The most important way of de-
commodifying people are the welfare state and public employment. Accordingly, welfare retrenchment 
and lower public spending are key to market liberals. Finally, the tax regime is closely linked to the 
welfare and public spending part because welfare and public spending always rely on some taxes or 
transfers. Tax and transfers are not only the reverse side of public spending, they are also perceived as 
market distortions by market liberals.  
Respective policies in the three domains, however, should be related to different government 
ideology indicators. Summarizing my arguments, a fine grained measure of market liberalism is a 
superior approach to government preferences on socio-economic policies in comparison to 
conventional left and right indicators because it improves comparability. It improves comparability in 
particular in comparisons over long time periods and different cultural contexts. An appropriate test 
of this assumption demands the comparison over long time periods and many cultural contexts. 
Accordingly, the selection of cases is guided by the attempt to maximize the number of countries and 
time points.23  Although observations from 38 countries over 117 years are way more than existing 
studies have carried out, it is still a selection driven by data availability. This selection is based on a 
theoretical universe of cases including every government in a democracy. 
Every relationship between a government ideology indicator and a policy dimension, such as 
regulation, would in principle deserve a separate article because there is a rich literature for each of 
those policy dimensions. Since my aim is to compare the effects of different government ideology 
indicators, I keep the review of the literature, the inclusion of controls and the discussion of estimation 
                                                 
23 I have gathered data of 38 countries from 1900 to 2017, leading to around 1900 government years. The 38 countries are 
the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
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procedures as brief as possible. The literature review for each and single policy dimension is admittedly 
superficial and I apologize to have left out various important contributions. I simply try to capture the 
most important and generalizable arguments in each sub-section. Besides the parsimonious theoretical 
accounts in the policy dimension chapters, I additionally apply a parsimonious casual identification 
approach. This approach is a generalized approach to policy analysis with government ideology 
indicators and is exemplified in the following.  
 
3.2.0 The generalized causal identification procedure 
As I am interested in  the contribution of government ideology in a causal process leading to changes 
in policies or the economic performance of societies, a probabilistic and partial effects framework is 
applied here. The criteria for causal identification in a probabilistic and partial effects framework arise 
out of the general theory of causality by Judea Pearl (2009). Based on his framework, casual effects are 
identified if all additional backdoor paths are closed.  Backdoor paths are paths of non-causal 
associations between the independent variable of interest (causal variable) and the outcome (Pearl 
2009, 78; see Morgan and Winship 2015, 109ff for an excellent discussion of the backdoor criterion). 
Based on the backdoor criterion, variables can be distinguished into useful, useless and harmful 
controls. The ladder being predominantly mediators and colliders (Pearl 2009, 78-82). The only useful 
control variables are confounders. Confounders are variables which significantly affect the main 
independent variable (treatment condition) as well as the dependent variable (outcome). Such a variable 
needs to be controlled because otherwise a part of the association between the causal variable and the 
outcome is non-causal and leads to misattribution of variance (bias).  
Variables not affecting the treatment or main independent variable, cannot bias the main average affect 
and are at best useless. However, the very same useless variable can in principle open other backdoor 
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paths which in turn requires the inclusion of additional controls and can therefore turn into a harmful 
control. Other harmful controls are colliders. Colliders are variables with two attributes, they are caused 
by the main independent variable as well as by the dependent variable. Including a collider in a 
regression would create a spurious finding because it wrongly takes causal association as non-causal 
and vice versa. Another harmful control variable is a mediator. A mediator is by definition on the 
causal chain between the causal and the dependent variable. The inclusion of mediators also leads to 
spurious non-findings because it averages out the causal association which is now in the model twice. 
The bias of an included mediator raises with the completeness of a mediating process. For example, a 
mediator of a mono-causal relationship picked up the entire association and would lead to spurious 
non-findings of the average effect between the independent variable of main concern and the 
dependent variable.  
All this might appear as a technical and misplaced discussion but the associated problems are very 
wide-spread in comparative political science literature. Let us take an example. In many studies with a 
focus on partisan ideology, union density is a control variable or moderator. However, organized labor 
is not independent from government ideology. Margaret Thatcher is a striking example, the decrease 
in union density is a declared goal of governments with strong trust in markets which in turn helps to 
deregulate the economy in a second step. In this perspective union density is a mediator and might 
cause spurious non-findings of models using government preferences as well as union density. The 
same might hold true for the many other controls in partisan research. For example, trade and capital 
openness are usually affected by market liberals and might lead in turn to pressure on unit labor costs 
or taxation on capital income.  
However, the more serious problem in the social sciences is that the characteristic of a variable is 
often manifold. Union density for example is probably partly a moderator, partly a mediator and partly 
exerts independent effects. The manifold nature of variables is not discussed in the causal identification 
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literature but the interpretation of the impact of those variables is straight forward. If union density is 
at least partially a mediator, the effect of government ideology is downwards biased because part of 
the causal association is wrongly attributed to a non-causal path.  
Why all this might be of any help for the analysis of government impacts on different policy 
dimensions? It is of great help since  it defines a simple test for the inclusion and non-inclusion of 
control variables across policy areas. Based on the assumption above, a control variable needs to 
systematically affect the treatment condition as a necessary condition for an open backdoor path. 
Accordingly, I use a long list of important variables from the political science literature and assess this 
first necessary condition. In case, a variable systematically affects the treatment condition 
(government’s degree of market liberalism) this variable can be assessed in terms of the second 
necessary condition, the impact on the dependent variable (outcome). The practical use of such an 
approach is that many potential confounders can be ruled out simultaneously across policy areas.  
For example, I falsify a widespread argument that market liberal governments start systematically 
from economically worse conditions in comparison to their interventionist counterparts. As this is 
empirically wrong, this argument does not need to be controlled in any further policy analysis where 
government ideology is the main focus. The economic heritage of a government is a frequently applied 
political blame game and resonates also in the more philosophical debate of the justification of market 
societies (Hirschmann 1992; Fourcade and Healy 2007). In order to assess if there is evidence for a 
systematic disadvantage of market liberals or interventionists, I compare indicators of growth, the 
primary balance, inflation and unemployment in constellations where market liberal governments 
alternate into office which were governed by interventionists before. The entire data-set entails around 
1,900 government years with fine grained preferences on the market dimension. Splitting the sample 
at the ideological mean (0.5) we observe 230 cases of alternations from market liberal to interventionist 
governments and vice versa. A more rigorous test leaving moderate governments aside (0.4<MG<0.6) 
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indicates around 90 governments with substantial ideological alternations. Both comparisons reveal 
inconsistent patterns (compare Table 7). In the first set of comparison market liberal governments 
inherit slightly worse conditions form their interventionist counterparts. However, the differences are 
very marginal. In the second set of comparisons, market liberals inherit substantially higher growth 
rates and slightly lower unemployment rates but have to deal with slightly higher deficits and higher 
inflation. Overall, there is no justification to the argument that one side or the other starts from 
systematically worse or better conditions. Accordingly, for all policy areas I can take for granted that 
the economic starting condition does not affect the impact of government ideology. 
Table 7: Economic starting conditions of liberals and interventionists 
Alternation from 
ideology <0.5 to >0.5 
Average 
growth in t-1 
Average 
inflation in t-1 
Average 
deficit in t-1 
Average 
unemployment 
rate in t-1 
Government changes 
from interventionist to 
market liberal 
3.20 (std. 2.93; 
n=101) 
6.40 (std. 7.47; 
n=100) 
-2.49 (std. 4.40; 
n=93) 
6.76 (std. 4.89; 
n=100) 
Government changes 
from market liberal to 
interventionist 
3.28 (std. 3.28; 
n=133) 
6.18 (std. 6.19; 
n=132) 
-2.20 (std. 3.86; 
n=127) 




ideology <0.4 to >0.6 
    
Government changes 
from interventionist to 
market liberal 
3.64 (std. 3.01; 
n=38) 
8.38 (std. 9.79; 
n=37) 
-1.69 (std. 4.22; 
n=35) 
6.56 (std. 4.94; 
n=38) 
Government changes 
from market liberal to 
interventionist 
2.87 (std. 2.87; 
n=54) 
7.06 (std. 7.06; 
n=54) 
-1.59 (std. 4.53; 
n=52) 
6.70 (std. 4.40; 
n=56) 
Notes: own calculations. 
Having ruled out the systematic impact of economic starting conditions, I turn to the other potential 
confounders. I use a balancing tool to compare the first three moments of the distribution (mean, 
standard deviation and kurtosis) of conventional confounders in partisan research (compare 
Hainmueller and Xu 2013 for the procedure). The first three moments are compared between market 
liberal and interventionist governments. Only in cases with systematic deviation between treatment 
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and control, we can expect systematic influence on the treatment condition and further test the impact 
on the dependent variable as a second qualification for a useful control variable.  
In chapter 3.2.1 I assess the impact of market liberal governments on regulation in various 
economic sectors. As this is the first policy domain, I demonstrate empirically that the assumptions 
made above are valid. Variables without effect on the treatment condition as well as the outcome do 
not affect the average effect of government ideology under scrutiny.  
Having established criteria for a parsimonious selection of controls, the statistical estimator remains 
to be chosen. The theoretical argument stresses the comparability of the government ideology indicator 
across countries and time. Accordingly, variance across cases and within cases over time is of 
predominant importance. Thereby, a fixed-effects estimator is ruled out because it reduced the 
explanatory power to within case differences. In contrast, a random-effects estimator accurately 
captured the average effect of theoretical interest (see Bell and Jones 2015 for a general discussion why 
random-effects estimators are often superior in social science applications).  
Before turning to the estimation of government effects, a final note on levels versus first differences 
is necessary. In many studies, including partisan or government preferences, researchers regress levels 
on levels. For example, left governments are regressed on the level of welfare spending as percentage 
of GDP. The level of welfare spending is a consequence of historical developments, an accumulation 
of changes in the past. However, government ideology can at best achieve incremental changes. In a 
design where cross-country differences are used for the estimation, it is theoretically difficult to defend 
that government ideology should make a difference on levels in comparison to other countries within 
a year or cabinet period. It is much more plausible that government ideology only defines the direction 
of change. This is also in line with the rhetoric of politicians. Politicians usually promise to reduce or 
extend spending or the generosity of a welfare component. They rarely signal to retrench spending 
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levels below the level of country x or z. Accordingly, I run random-effects time-series-cross-section 
models on every policy indicator in first differences. However, even in a first difference setting, 
government ideology should never be modelled at their first difference. The reason is intuitive. The 
position of an ideology scale should have persistent impact on the direction of change. Communists 
replacing communists should still do interventionist policies whereas market liberals replacing market 
liberals should keep deregulating. Table 9 summarizes the distribution of plausible confounders.  
Summarizing Table 9, the comparison of market liberal and interventionist governments reveals a 
striking balance across a multitude of important variables. From the backdoor criterion follows that 
only variables which affect the treatment as well as the dependent variable can influence the effect 
under scrutiny. For example, economic openness, a proxy for economic globalization, might correlate 
with more market liberal governments. Market liberal governments increase economic globalization 
or globalization makes governments more market liberal or both reinforce each other. However, 
globalization does not affect regulation systematically. Taken both together, economic openness 
cannot substantially change the effect from government ideology to regulation. In this case it is a 
harmless and also useless control variable.  
Table 9 indicates that only six variables out of 18 qualify as potentially useful confounders. These 
six variables will be related to the different dependent variables in every policy domain. Table 9 entails 
also a row where potential confounders are related to the outcome. In this case, change in regulation. 
Whereas nine variables systematically affect the outcome, only three are useful confounders because 
they also fulfil the first criterion. Assuming for a moment that the list of potential confounders in Table 
9 is exhaustive, only three variables need to be controlled for a causal identification of the average 
treatment effect. The word causal might be too strong for many statistician for such a model. However, 
from the backdoor criterion follows that a closed backdoor path necessarily leads to causal 
identification (Pearl 2009, 77). Of course, these assumptions rest on an exhaustive list of confounders. 
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Omitted variables on a backdoor path probably still exist and challenge a causal interpretation of the 
average effect.  
Table 9: Distribution of potential confounders 
 Market liberal governments Interventionist governments 
  













319.2 5816 -1.944 312.4 5477 -1.497 no no 
Number of cabinet 
parties 
2.05 1.474 1.31 2.368 1.968 0.8356 no no 
Seat share of 
government 
 
49.4 456.9 -1.042 52.8 358.2 -1.14 
no no 
Level of democracy 
 




0.725 0.01017 -0.6847 0.7438 0.008148 -0.6039 
no Yes - 
Turnout 75.92 242.4 -0.7021 76.72 166.4 -0.6599 no Yes + 
Economic 
constraints 
        
Working days under 
strike 
 
1844 3.03e 7 5.687 1759 2.27e 
Yes - Yes + 
Union density 
 
38.74 419.4 0.7874 41.86 377.5 0.2101 no Yes + 
Per capita GDP 
 
13769 5.09E+07 0.4632 14466 3.71E+07 0.8495 no no 
Stock market 
capitalization 
0.6546 0.1974 0.9005 0.4665 0.1791 1.563 Yes + Yes - 
Crisis         
Currency crisis 0.01076 0.01066 9.483 0.0198 0.01943 6.893 Yes - no 
Banking crisis 0.01166 0.01153 9.098 0.02475 0.02417 6.118 Yes - no 
GDP growth 2.823 12.24 -0.8279 2.981 10.08 -0.8101 no Yes - 
International 
constraints 
        




0.1341 0.1162 2.148 0.1697 0.1411 1.76 no Yes - 
EU member 
 
0.4391 0.2466 0.2454 0.516 0.2501 -0.06401 no no 
Capital openness 
 
0.7509 0.1091 -0.8999 0.7139 0.09283 -0.6032 Yes + Yes - 
Openness of the 
economy 
 
83.77 3348 1.747 76.13 2138 1.935 Yes + no 
Former communist 
country 
0.1732 0.1434 1.727 0.1572 0.1326 1.884 no Yes - 




3.2.1 De-regulating the economy 
 
De-regulating economic activities is a core preference of market liberals. Following the proponents of 
market liberalism, market forces increase productivity and market forces unleash under circumstances 
where regulation is low. Indeed, systematic studies have shown the negative implications of regulation 
on productivity in services or even to a stronger degree in the provision of fundamental resources such 
as energy, transport or communication (Bourlés et al. 2013; Barone and Cingano 2011; Klapper et al. 
2006).  The ladder have been typical sectors with high state regulation or outright control in the past. 
There are multiple pathways in which regulation seems to hamper productivity. Regulation can increase 
industry concentration (Fisman and Sarria-Allende 2004) or reduces responsiveness, market entry, 
demand and technology shifts and respective investments (Ciccone and Papaioannou 2007; Alesina et 
al. 2005). It is further seen to hamper employment (Bertrand and Kramartz 2002) and increase prices 
(Martin et al. 2005). All these effects are specific manifestations of the more fundamental nature of 
regulation. Regulation distorts the allocative mechanisms of markets. Nonetheless, interventionist 
governments have established and defended regulation for more than a century. They do so, because 
regulations are expressions of normative claims often besides allocative efficiency. The protection of 
labor market regulation, the environment or other political aspects are at the core of many political 
disputes because they reflect the normative ambition to avoid undesired market outcomes (Polanyi 
1973[1944]). 
Political scientists have mainly focused on two aspects of regulation. Privatization, as a very 
controversial and visible aspect of deregulation was initially seen as a more structurally driven tendency, 
promoted by Europeanisation and globalization. Partisan differences have been found to be of minor 
importance (Zohlnhöfer et al. 2008). Later, others have shown the exact opposite. In a study of 
Obinger et al. (2014), partisan differences take center stage whereas globalization and Europeanisation 
are argued to moderate the partisan effect. Potrafke has shown that product market deregulation can 
110 
 
be well explained with government ideology (2010). Environmental regulation is another prominent 
research field where ideology might play a role. Surprisingly, Woods (2006) finds no impact of 
government ideology on environmental regulation.  
Regulation is an ideal starting point to contrast different government measurements. 
Interventionists try to control the means of production or at least regulate them whereas proponents 
of the free-market opposed state-ownership. I use three different indicators for regulation and relate 
them to the different government indicators. The first is a broad OECD-indicator, summarizing the 
regulatory provisions in seven sectors (OECD 2018a).24 This indicator is standardized for 34 countries 
and has a long time series, starting in 1975 and ending in 2013. The second and third indicator capture 
the regulation of employment via measures of employment protection for regular as well as fixed 
contracts (OECD 2018b). Labour market regulation is a highly salient and controversial issue for 
political parties (Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000; Peck 1996). The differentiation in regular and fixed 
contracts allows to assess the role of market liberals in the process of dualization (see Emmenegger 
2012). Table 10 depicts the ideology effect from the five different indicators based on random effects 
TSCS-regressions. Some ideology indicators have missings and in order to assure that differences in 
the effects of government ideology are not explained by varying sample size, models are fixed to the 
exact same observations.  
  
                                                 
24 Telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and road freight. 
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Table 10: Government ideology and regulation 
DV (all at first 
differences)  
Government 
Measure Coefficient p-value 
N 
(gov. years) Time span 
 
























 Left Right -0.00 0.216 597 1985-2013 



















 Left Right -0.01 0.103 601 1985-2013 















 Market Liberalism -0.27*** 0.000 601 1985-2013 
Note: own calculation. Sources of the dependent variables (OECD 2018a; OECD 2018b).  
Changes in regulation of seven sectors cannot be explained by government ideology as long as 
government ideology is measured in categorical terms. A binary left and right measure as well as the 
Schmidt-Index indicate null-findings. In contrast, continuous measures indicate significant and 
negative effects. In the case of sector regulation, the above developed indicator of market liberalism 
yields the strongest effects with the narrowest confidence intervals. The Kim and Fording procedure 
has substantially stronger results than the indicator based on the Franzmann and Kaiser’s approach. 
As mentioned above, Potrafke also finds negative and significant effects of government ideology 
applying regressions on first differences (Potrafke 2010, 147). However, the effect size of the market 
liberalism indicator is around eight times the effect of the indicator used by Potrafke.25  
The changes in the strictness of regular working contracts appears to be independent of the ideology 
no matter which indicator is applied.  The regulation of fixed working contracts, however, is substantial 
                                                 
25 In his first-difference model, Potrafke uses a government ideology measure from Bjørnskov (2008). This measure 
combines party families and parliamentary seat shares, using social democratic parties as conceptual anchor. Interestingly, 
Bjørnskov uses the party family with the highest variability over time and space to anchor comparability.  
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affected by market liberal governments and again categorical distinctions of left and right indicate null-
findings. So far the results seem to be fairly systematically, categorical ideology indicators refer to null-
findings, whereas continuous measures indicate partisan effects with the market liberalism indicators 
showing the strongest effects. Inferences stand on shaky ground as long as the identification is a 
bivariate association. In the following part I turn to a more robust identification based on the 
generalized framework discussed above. 
Table 11 demonstrates empirically that we can abstain from control variables which are not fulfilling 
the backdoor criterion and that even those fulfilling both conditions are not necessarily affecting the 
main effect under scrutiny considerably. 
Table 11: Potential confounders and the impact on the average ideology effect on regulation 
   
No effect on dependent variable Effect on dependent variable  
Effect on 






















-0.1576*** -0.1583*** -0.1570*** -0.1569*** -0.1308*** -0.1537*** -0.1252***  
No effect on 





















-0.1576*** -0.1545*** -0.1582*** -0.1587*** -0.1524*** -0.1615*** -0.1417*** 
-
0.1563*** 
Note: I fix the observations to those of the bivariate model. The strike variable, however, has additional missings. This 
causes a drop of 100 observations in the respective model.  
 
The results in Table 11 confirm the generalized expectation from the backdoor criterion.  Table 11 is 
organized around the combinatorics of effect on treatment and outcome respectively. As expected, 
without an effect on the outcome or the treatment condition, average effects of ideology are hardly 
changed by the inclusion of those controls. The same holds true for controls affecting the outcome 
but not the treatment. A violation to the expectation is the variable of former communist countries. 
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Former communist countries have deregulated with an enormous pace and accordingly the dummy 
has a very substantial effect on regulation. At the same time, market liberal governments find 
themselves more likely in countries with a communist past. The difference is substantial but not 
significant (see Table 10) and the inclusion of the communist past into the regression models reduces 
the coefficient of government ideology to a certain extend (-0.1576 to -0.1417). This might be seen 
already as a violation of the backdoor criterion and its ability to separate useful from useless and 
harmful controls. On the other hand, a model with a communist past variable only has an R² of 0.60. 
60 percent explained variance with one variable in a first difference model is enormous. In comparison, 
capital openness has an R² of 0.04. However, capital openness systematically affects the treatment and 
reduces the government ideology coefficient stronger than the communist past variable. Obviously, 
under circumstances where variables have a very strong effect on the outcome also minor differences 
in the treatment condition can justify to include such a variable.26  
Besides the communist past, the inclusion of variables fulfilling both necessary conditions, like 
stock market capitalization or capital openness, substantially change the government ideology effect 
because they affect treatment and outcome simultaneously. The strike variable demonstrates that in 
cases where the effect on treatment or outcome is systematic but weak, no fundamental change of the 
coefficients occurs. Overall, two variables are useful controls in a regression of government ideology 
on regulation: capital openness and stock market capitalization. As discussed above, we still have to be 
careful with these variables because the direction of causality is unclear. It is plausible that capital 
openness and stock market capitalization are both at least partly caused by market liberal governments 
as well, exercising an independent and negative influence on regulation. If this is the case, the 
                                                 
26 My interpretation is that confounders with a strong effect on the outcome leverage the importance of differences between 
treatment and non-treatment. In extreme cases, like the communist past example, even tiny differences in the treatment 
condition are sufficient to establish an effective back-door path. Accordingly, a significant effect on the treatment condition 
is not a sufficient selection criteria in these extreme cases.  
114 
 
coefficients of government ideology in the regulation models controlled by capital openness, is at the 
lower bound. At the lower bound because part of the mediated association is mistaken as confounded 
association by the model. Accordingly, the “true” average effect is probably between – 0.125 and -
0.158.  
In summary, the degree of market liberalism has a robust and systematic negative effect on the 
regulation on seven important sectors of the economy. In fact, market liberal governments reduce the 
regulation indicator on average 0.16 points per year on a scale from 0 to 6. 6 is a typical value of a 
communist country and a value of 4 depicts the mean of the entire sample. Accordingly, it takes 12.5 
years under market liberal rule to turn the regulation of the economy from a communist country to an 
average regulated country. This inference is based on a precise measurement of market liberalism. 
Using a continuous left-right scale, borrowed from the Franzmann and Kaiser approach, would let us 
infer that it takes 18.2 years of right wing rule to achieve the same amount of deregulation. Inference 
based on a binary distinction of left and right government ideology would suggest to negate any 
implication from government ideology on the regulation of the economy.  
Beyond the substantial and measurement implications, some advices for causal identification can 
be drawn. Testing the systematic effect on the treatment and outcome allows us to simplify statistical 
models with a parsimonious selection of necessary controls. Thereby, circumventing the various 
pitfalls of models overburdened with useless and harmful controls. Accordingly, the next policy area 




3.2.2 Retrenchment of welfare and government spending 
 
Public spending is the symbol of interventionism. The biggest share of public spending is dedicated to 
redistributive transfers and tax schemes or public employment. Public spending is connected to a relief 
from market exposure, a form of de-commodification with clientelistic appeal at least to market liberals 
and populists. Retrenchment of public spending is a core claim of market liberals. Its expansion, or at 
least the defense of welfare, is a core obligation of interventionists. If the ideology of market liberalism 
matters it should matter in the domain of public spending. Evidence lend firm support for a 
relationship of government ideology and public spending until the 1990s (Hicks and Swank 1992; 
Cusack 1997; Camaron 1978; Schmidt 1996; Allan and Scruggs 2004). However, even these studies 
already make mention of a trend in political science. This trend rightfully addresses a changing 
international environment and highlights the constraints of national actors in a world economy 
(Strange 1996; Frenkel et al. 1996). A huge amount of literature has engaged with the nexus of 
government spending and the internationalization of the economy (for example Garret and Mitchell 
2001).  
The same holds true for the biggest public spending share, welfare spending. Very similar to the 
public spending versus globalization debate, the welfare retrenchment debate has been evolved around 
the core question of how much influence government ideology still has. A meta-study of Imbeau et al. 
(2001) summarizes the debate with a null-finding of the partisan effect. I am not about to replicate the 
specific aspects and the very convincing arguments which were brought forward in this debate. My 
point is summarized already in the conceptual part of this thesis and highlights two aspects – one 
conceptual and one methodological. The conceptual one builds on the argument that external 
constraints like globalization still demand a response of governments and that market liberals are 
simply more eager to give in to these constraints whereas interventionists should at least show more 
resistance. The methodological aspect has been discussed in great length above. It states that static 
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measurements of government preferences bias against partisan effects the more observations over 
time and space we include in the comparisons.  
Data on welfare spending exist for more than 1,000 government-years. Matched to the different 
government ideology indicators they build another ideal test case for the arguments made above. I 
complement the spending indicators with an indicator having a shorter causal chain to policies under 
government control. The indicator of welfare generosity measures the degree de-commodification 
aggregated over the welfare schemes of unemployment, pension and health entitlements (Scruggs et 
al. 2017). Whereas spending patterns are subject to demographic and economic dynamics beyond 
control of governments, a change in a generosity score can only occur if governments consent to that 
change.  
Table 12 lend first tentative evidence for the patterns which were observed already in the case of 
regulation. The measure of market liberalism has the most substantial and significant effects in 
comparison to the other ideology indicators. The binary measures fail to show a systematic impact on 
both spending indicators. The change in generosity is, however, significantly and negatively related to 
every indicator of government ideology. As in the case of regulation, the Kim and Fording approach 




Table 12: Government ideology and public spending 
DV (all at first 
differences)  
Government 






 Patterns of the welfare entitlements and spending 
 
Welfare Generosity  Left Right -0.04*** 0.045 647 1971-2010 
















Government Spending  Left Right -0.04 0.343 1.062 1960-2015 















 Market Liberalism -1.36*** 0.005 1.062 1960-2015 
















Market Liberalism -0.52*** 0.003 1.186 1960-2015 
Note: own calculation. 
Governments spend on average 42.3 percent of their GDP publicly. Only 5 percent of countries 
witnessed periods where public spending was below 30 percent. Governments spending more than 56 
percent of their GDP constitute the upper 5 percent of the distribution in the sample. Accordingly, 
the relevant range of public spending in democracies lies between 30 and 56 percent of the GDP. Due 
to the models depicted in Table 12 it takes 19 years under a market liberal government to transform a 
country from a place with extreme high public spending to a place with extreme low public spending.  
The impact of government ideology on social spending is substantially comparable as the relevant 
range of social spending lies between 6 and 18 percent of the GDP. 23 years of market liberal rule 
would suffice to retrench welfare spending in Sweden to US levels. This effect is very consistent with 
the effect on changes in generosity. In less than 17 years of a market liberal legacy a country would 
move from the 95 percentile to the 5 percentile in terms of welfare generosity. Interestingly, in the 
regressions on welfare generosity even categorical indicators of government ideology turn significant. 
However, the substantial effect of the binary left-right indicator is about 40 times smaller than the 
effect of market liberalism.  
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Turning to the robustness of these findings, the balance of the important covariates remains the same 
as in Table 10. The selection of useful controls can be complemented by regressing the seven variables 
with impact on the treatment condition on the three dependent variables above. Most of the 
government ideology effects are hardly changed by including the useful controls. One exception is the 
model with public spending as dependent variable controlled by GDP per capita. GDP per capita is in 
logarithmic scale. 

















































Note: Observations are fixed to the bivariate model. The strike variable, however, has missings. This causes a drop of 100 
observations in the respective model. The coefficient of market liberalism in TSCS model using first differences of 
regulation as the dependent variable. Empty cells reflect the fact that the indicators do not affect the dependent variable 
systematically and accordingly cannot change the average effect under scrutiny.  
 
The inclusion of wealth strongly reduces the effect of government ideology. That means, the richer a 
country the stronger the tendency to be governed by market liberals and the stronger the tendency to 
curb general government spending. Additionally, it seems that retrenchment efforts are accompanied 
by a higher frequency of strikes. With less strikes, the retrenchment of market liberals would have been 
even stronger. The efforts of market liberal governments to retrench welfare follow different dynamics 
than the broader category of public spending. The impact of government ideology on social spending 





3.2.3 The revenue side. Changing the composition and progressivity of tax systems 
 
Ideological controversies about public spending necessarily involve a discussion on revenues. Taxes 
have been developed to be the major source of state income and accordingly became an important 
element of political competition. As many argue, not quite from the beginning. Whereas in the early 
20th century taxes were highly inefficient and scattered around hundreds of revenue sources, taxes 
became entrenched in the battleground of economic interest and ideologies with the raise of the 
working class (Steinmo 2003, 209). Traditional taxes have put heavy burdens on the poor and modern 
tax systems can be seen as a revolution brought forward by workers and unions to tackle the growing 
inequality in capitalist societies (Weber and Wildavsy 1986). Besides workers, wars have played a crucial 
part in anchoring the acceptance of taxes, since governments were in excessive need during that times 
and learned how to tax income and expenditures when the centralization of resources was needed the 
most (Steinmo 2003, 210).27 Between 1930 and 1945 all industrial societies had extended the tax base 
massively as well as introduced progressive taxation in order to channel wealth and income into the 
war economy.  
In the after-war period, many expected conservatives to roll-back taxes to pre-war levels. However, 
the acceptance of the new tax revenue state by conservatives emblematized the “Keynesian 
Consensus” (Galbraith 2015) and nullified respective expectations. Tax policies became an important 
policy tool to steer economic and social developments (Howard 1999). This consensus is at the core 
of the observations that conservative and Christian democratic political parties have been more 
interventionist in comparison to their successors in the 1980s and 1990s (see also chapter 1.5). So it is 
argued that in the early post-war period tax policies followed a consensus in balancing equity, 
                                                 
27 In a straight forward manner we can perceive highly levels of public spending to be strongly influenced by wars as 
suggested by Obinger and Schmitt (2017).  
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effectiveness and efficiency (Blough and Shoup 1937; Martin 1989 both cited from Steinmo 2003). 
What has developed was a tax regime with high marginal tax rates, generous tax incentives and strict 
capital controls underlying the idea that the “capitalist and their money could be used to promote the 
ends of society as a whole” (Steinmo 2003, 215). In this constellation, equity and growth were widely 
regarded as two equally achievable ends. Empirical evidence supported this view, tax-burden and 
growth simply did not correlate (Barro 1991).  
The outlined perspective draws a stylized image of the ideational change perspective (Swank and 
Steinmo 2002). In this perspective overall ideas of ideal tax systems prevailed and partisan, ideological 
or contextual differences are of marginal importance. However, there are other scholars highlighting 
the politics of taxation. Peters argues (1992, 9), we would expect “parties of the political left in office 
to adopt more progressive (personal and corporate income with high marginal rates) taxes, and parties 
of the political right to adopt more regressive (sales, insurance contributions) taxes “. However, as 
Peters admits, there is only narrow quantitative and qualitative support for a systematic empirical 
manifestation of such a claim (see Castles 1982; Peters 1980). The reason why tax systems seem to be 
only marginally shaped by political ideologies are thus stated differently than in the ideational change 
perspective. Parties usually compromise their claims in coalitions. Rising taxes is usually not very 
popular and thus the political business cycle provides only brief windows of opportunity for such 
unpopular measures (Schneider 1984).  
Most of the scholars agree, however, that we witnessed a sea change of policy makers’ tax attitudes 
within the 1970s and 1980s. The ideal of tax systems changed severely (Swank and Steinmo 2002). The 
political climate changed towards a less egalitarian perspective on distributive justice. Many tax reforms 
took place which were pushing back the boundaries of the state caused by a disillusionment in 




What has happened? In 1981 Ronald Reagan introduced the most radical tax reform in the American 
history, decreasing tax rates of about 30%.28  Taxes were lowered for individuals and corporations and 
financed with the abolition of loopholes and exemptions. Turning away from exemptions was to 
abandon symbolically any attempt to steer the economy via the tax system. As McClure or Slemrod 
argue, attitudes towards government intervention and redistributive policies had drastically changed 
(McClure 1984; Slemrod 1995). These attitudes had also changed outside the US and accordingly other 
industrialized countries were quick to follow and used astonishingly similar measures to the US tax 
reform. Sandford has summarized those measures as a decrease in personal income taxes (in particular 
at the top end), the income tax base has been leveled (less loopholes and exemptions), increase in VAT 
and social security contributions and a decreasing corporate tax (1993, 10-20 taken from Steinmo 
2003). These changes have been described as “level the playing field” (Williams 1991, 24), a reduction 
of market distortions caused by government incentives or also precisely as a “regressive tax mix” 
(Ganghof 2006).  
The disenchantment argument that tax incentives lost their legitimacy for economic policy steering 
was complemented by technological and politically induced change – financial globalization and the 
reaction of internationally acting corporations (Porter 1995).  To summarize, a regressive tax mix was 
supposedly diffused by changing ideas towards the ability and willingness of elite policy maker to use 
taxes as an instrument for economic policy making (Swank and Steinmo 2002). This disenchantment 
argument was further reinforced by the financial globalization, restricting attempts to keep taxes on 
capital or corporate gains high.  
                                                 
28 Initially the reform caused a massive raise in public debt and left Americans with a system which was even more 
complicated and unfair as the previous criticized one. Major adjustments became unavoidable and another tax reform in 
1986 responded to the most widespread flaws of the previous reform. 
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Moving from the ideal of embedded liberalism where progressive taxes played a key role (Ruggie 1982), 
to the ideal of “levelling the playing field”, or market conform taxation, leaves only little room for an 
explanation based on partisan ideology. To make things even more complicated, some authors find 
that left-parties made deeper tax-cuts in the period of disillusionment (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998). 
However, Ganghof casts some doubt on these findings as he points to important coding errors and 
the negligence of tax rates on sub-national tiers (2006, 142). Far more important, Ganghof points to 
another aspect. Taken constrained capital taxation for granted, interventionists are left with little choice 
but to shift to regressive taxes in case they want to defend high public spending (Ganghof 2006).29 
Another option remains: a shift in the internal structure of income taxes which can equally provide 
states with comparable revenues (Ganghof 2006). Basically, exemptions within the income tax for 
capital gains. More precisely, Ganghof points to at least three different tax systems which can be fully 
equivalent under the assumption of tax competition and whose distribution over different countries 
cannot be explained by the ideational shift argument (Ganghof 2006).  
However, the evolution of these types of income taxation is also not systematically aligned with 
ideological differences (Ganghof 2006). Nonetheless, the discussion about different ways of dealing 
with international tax competition reveal that tax-systems have faced always normative trade-offs. 
Ganghof structures these trade-offs as a trilemma between equal treatment within capital incomes, 
equal treatment between capital and labor incomes and equal treatment within labor incomes. There 
is simply no perfect tax systems and ideological heuristics play out again in a sense that they do the 
weighting between those three benchmarks (Ganghof 2006). 
                                                 
29 This argument directly feed back into the analysis of the welfare spending. Some have argued, that an early adoption of 
the regressive tax mix increase the resilience of welfare states to keep spending levels high (Wilensky 2002; Kato 2003). 
However, Ganghof has argued that the chain of causality is just reversed. High spending countries basically have to rely on 
a higher tax base were regressive taxes are only one element of (2006). 
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In a nutshell, Ganghof argues that policy makers can opt for a flat income tax and thereby achieve 
equity in taxation within capital gains as well as equity between labor income and capital income. 
However, this choice means to sacrifice progressive taxation of wages as well as keeping tax revenues 
on a high level. A flat income tax, as the most market conform choice, is probably a challenge for a 
left leaning party because they sacrifice their ideological claim of equality in opportunities via 
redistribution in two ways. First, no progressive taxation and low tax revenues. Whereas left parties 
might have difficulties to sell such a tax system to their voters, I do not see why it constitutes a trilemma 
for market liberals. Sacrificing high tax revenues and progressivity only constitutes a problem for the 
left.  The ideological controversy over tax system therefore turns into a debate where market liberals 
push for flat income taxes and the interventionist counterparts opt for the defense or introduction of 
dual income taxes, as the Nordic countries did, or a differentiated income taxes, as usual in many other 
countries.  
All systems face their specific weakness. Flat income taxes with low revenue raising ability exert 
strong budgetary pressure. The huge deficits of the Reagan administration is only one striking example. 
The dual income tax creates strong incentives to shift labor income to corporate or capital income 
because the latter is taxed to a lower degree. The differentiated income tax decreases these very same 
incentives because capital and labor income are subject to similar taxation but it creates differences 
across different sorts of capital incomes.  
Taken the tax competition pressure for granted and looking at the partisan configuration described 
above, I could develop clear expectations on the impact of market liberal ideology in comparison to 
more interventionist political parties even in times of disillusionment. Corporate tax rates are subject 
to international pressure and parties should not make a difference here (see also Griffith and Klemm 
2004; Ganghof 2006). As interventionists should defend high tax revenues and redistribution via dual 
income taxes or differentiated income taxes, in both cases progressivity should be higher. That means 
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that top marginal tax rates or the difference in the marginal rate between low and high income should 
be increased or at least not reduced under interventionist governments.30 Additionally, regressive tax 
components like VAT, payroll taxes or social security contribution should be increased by both, market 
liberals as well as interventionists. Reduced, however, for different reasons. Interventionists have to 
defend a high revenue base under fiscal pressure on corporate taxation. Market liberals are advocates 
of more regressive taxes in order to compensate for the preferred lower and less progressive income 
taxes. On top, in particular VAT, is seen to be a very efficient tax, causing low allocative distortions 
and does not impede competitiveness.  
This configuration was not fundamentally different in the era of the Keynesian consensus except 
for one aspect. High capital control cushioned the international pressure on corporate and capital 
income taxes. Accordingly, partisan differences should have included competition on corporate and 
capital taxes. I am actually very convinced that this was the case. As partisan ideologies should still 
make a marginal difference on the tax progressivity and composition of taxes, ideology should have 
always mattered to taxes.  
This is not about denying a parallel shift in the attitudes of political elites across ideological camps. 
However, this ideational background is more determining on which level of taxation parties compete 
over differences but does not hamper the necessity to make a difference on the most important policy 
tool of redistribution. Until the 1970s, interventionists were ready to increase top-marginal income 
taxes to almost 100%. Conservatives in the UK and Sweden were evidentially not in line with this 
development. However, they would have preferred rates of about 50 to 60%.  
                                                 
30 Ganghof uses the same argument concerning corporate tax a top marginal income tax rates. He confirms the null-
expectations on corporate taxes by including a partisan dummy in the regression. However, for unknown reasons he has 
not included a partisan dummy in the regression on marginal top income rates and uses a rather complex inference on the 
effect of veto points in order to see his claim confirmed (2006).  
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A simple comparison of some major economies reveal huge differences in taxation several years after 
the war. The German pro-market coalitions with Christian Democratic dominance decreased the top 
marginal income tax from around 90 percent to about 50 percent in ten years. In the same period, 
social democratic governments in Sweden doubled the progressivity of the income tax to rates with a 
margin of about 70 percent (Du Rietz et al. 2013). As these marginal income taxes replaced an equally 
progressive defence tax, social democrats basically defended the status quo of high marginal income 
taxation. The same holds true for the democratic presidency of Truman in the United States. Top 
marginal tax rates maintained around 90 percent of the high incomes. The first republican president 
after the war (Eisenhower) lowered them to rates of about 70 percent (Piketty 2013). 
Therefore, I expect government ideology to matter even in times of retrenchment. Market liberals 
should decrease tax rates of top marginal income more strongly than their interventionist counterparts. 
In contrast, the ideology of governments should not make a difference on low income taxation, 
corporate tax rates, VAT or other regressive taxes such as payroll taxes or social security contributions. 
What follows from the argument above is again, to stress the importance of explaining first differences 




Table 14: Ideology of governments and the change of tax rates 
DV (all at first 
differences)  
Government 




 Patterns of business and labor market regulation  
 
















Market Liberalism -2.38*** 0.007 999 1960-2017 
Corporate tax rate  Left Right -0.08 0.208 771 1914-2017 















  Market Liberalism -0.68 0.329 771 1914-2017 
VAT  Left Right -0.03 0.520 1.008 1958-2017 















  Market Liberalism -0.31 0.549 1.008 1958-2017 
Marginal tax on 67% 
income bracket 
 Left Right -0.01 0.823 347 2001-2017 















  Market Liberalism -1.19*** 0.010 347 2001-2017 
Marginal tax on 167% 
income bracket 
 Left Right -0.10*** 0.002 347 2001-2017 















  Market Liberalism -0.92** 0.030 347 2001-2017 
Note: own calculation. The dependent variables are collected from various sources (see Appendix Part B, Table A). 
Table 14 depicts the regression coefficients for the different ideology indicators for the change in the 
different tax components. In line with the expectations and the findings of Ganghof (2006), top 
marginal income taxes are systematically decreased by market liberal governments. Even a binary 
measurement of government ideology shows such a relationship, although the coefficient is about 11 
times as weak as compared to the continuous measure of market liberalism. The negative effect of -
2.38 is very substantial as units are regressed in a temporal specification of government years. As also 
hypothesized, corporate taxation and VAT are not subject to a systematic effect of government 
ideology. Turning to a comparison of the marginal income tax of the 67% income bracket and the 
167% income bracket, market liberals tend to reduce both. Accordingly, there is systematic reduction 




Former studies on the politics of taxation have usually used samples with far fewer observations. In 
the influential book “the politics of income taxation” Ganghof uses changes in taxes from 1983 to 
2003 as the dependent variable. This leading to 21 observations in his regression models. In the 
regressions above I have collected data of up to 1.018 observations with a specification much closer 
to the actual causal process of party ideology and change in specific taxes. As in the previous chapters 
on welfare policies and public spending, the inclusion of necessary controls neither change any of the 
coefficients of market liberalism substantially nor reduce the significance levels (not shown here).  
 
3.3 Market liberalism and performance 
 
Policies such as the character of welfare entitlements, the structure and size of public spending, the 
composition of the tax base or the regulation of economic sectors are only partly an end in itself. Often 
they are motivated to establish rights for citizens, change the distributions wealth and increase 
performance. Performance can be related to many things but some aspects of performance seem to 
be crucial to governments. The most prominent being economic well-being, the distribution of well-
being and increasingly the financial sustainability of such abstract achievements. As argued before, 
governments themselves establish direct links of accountability between economic well-being and the 
distribution of wealth. One of the most productive and salient strains of literature in political science 
has asked if voters actually follow such an invitation to accountability. The literature on economic 
voting basically asks if voters follow the politician’s invitation to reward and punish abstract indicators 
of well-being like economic growth (see Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier 2007 for an overview on the 
economic vote literature). Scholars on economic voting rightfully distinguish precisely between the 
potential differences of such accountability invitations. Voters can reward retrospectively or 
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prospectively and they can judge economic well-being on the basis of their own situation (pocketbook 
voting) or on the basis of the well-being of a society as a whole (sociotropic voting).  
As the overwhelming evidence indicates that voters reward politicians performance in rather 
sociotropic ways it appears reasonable to assess if government ideology makes a difference on the 
distribution and level of wealth. However, many aspects influencing economic performance are 
beyond government’s control. Nonetheless, models of economic voting seem to work even in 
constellations where growth is obviously driven predominantly by exogenous world market prices 
(Campelo and Zucco 2018). This is particularly evident in developing countries where growth rates are 
predominantly influenced by fluctuating commodity prices, creating an almost random volatility in 
growth (Campelo and Zucco 2018). As economic voting still works in these countries the role of 
accountability becomes problematic. More generally, economic voting is one of the most robust 
empirical mechanism of accountability and accountability is at the heart substantial alternation. 
Substantial alternation of governments is in turn at the core of democracies. So it is worth asking “do 
governments ideology really makes a difference for the well-being of societies?” This was the core 
question of the traditional partisan theory and the refined rational partisan theory (Hibbs 1992).  
The summary of conventional expectations are as follows: “On the side of the macroeconomy, Left 
party governments are more likely than Right governments to pursue expansive policies designed to 
yield lower unemployment and extra growth, but running the risk of higher inflation. Right party 
governments weight the prospect of extra inflation more heavily. As a result, they are more cautious 
about stimulating aggregate demand, and they entertain less ambitious targets for demand-side fueled 
employment and output growth” (Hibbs 1992, 363). A huge body of theoretical and empirical articles 
follow have followed the initial hypotheses. Hibbs again has summarized the offspring of that debate 
in 1992 with a grain of disillusionment: “Partisan Theory empirics should acknowledge our ignorance 
and take account of the fact that demand policy multipliers (Phillips curves) and sustainable rates of 
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output growth and unemployment are most likely stochastic, and that political authorities, along with 
everyone else, are ex ante dynamically uncertain about, and ex post continuously attempt to learn 
about, the current values of structural and policy parameters governing macroeconomic fluctuations, 
in order to project intelligently the consequences of their policy actions” (Hibbs 1992,  371). 
The inability to influence growth in a systematic manner is described in a period were many 
economies were still dominated by demand-side management. It is conventionally assumed, that 
governments’ abilities to steer the economy has further declined afterwards. In another influential 
review, the partisan theory was thus again declared to be not resonating with empirical observations 
(Imbeau et al. 2001). Other studies with stronger focus on growth regimes in different institutional 
settings have also difficulties to show the impact of ideology and have mainly abandoned partisan 
variables in their approaches (Soskice and Hall 2001).  
However, politicians are less hesitant than ever to keep the economic voting mechanism alive. This 
has to do with the market liberal turn. Market liberals with increasing influence over liberal, 
conservative and to a certain extent also over social democratic parties need to give economic 
performance a crucial role in their menu of promises and accordingly in the list of benchmarks there 
are wanted to be judged by. As demonstrated in chapter 1, more than 200 years of market liberal 
thought have quite consistently stressed the core value of efficiency and the amount of wealth. From 
Adam Smith to more recent thinkers, market liberalism has to be judged not on intentions but on 
consequences. The most important consequence is macro-efficiency. Macro-efficiency could be easily 
equated to the economic voting literature. The majorities of studies have shown that macro-efficiency 
(sociotropic voting) is way more important to voters than pocketbook voting. Obviously, the 
accountability chain established by politicians resonates with the behavior of voters.  
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What has changed in the era after the Keynesian consensus are the dominant mechanisms. In times of 
demand-management politician were seen to steer growth and employment via public spending and 
specific incentive structures in the tax system in order to channel workers and capital to its specific 
destinations. This narrative was removed by a new narrative. Directed public spending gave way to 
new public management and the steering of capital flows to the abolishment of regulatory distortions. 
These are the well-known emblems of the neoliberal era which resonated in the specific policy fields 
as probably most forcefully described in the approach to tax systems (Swank and Steinmo 2002). I 
described in Chapter 3.1 the turnaround of interventionism from assertiveness to defensiveness. The 
masters of demand management were interventionist and market adherers struggled to give not too 
many concessions to the increasing encroachment of central steering. In the new era, market conform 
policies became the progressive force and interventionist had to defend their shrinking terrain of 
central control and redistribution.  
Of course, the classical partisan hypotheses cannot survive in these circumstances because their 
causal mechanisms, although never really confirmed, were abolished and the political and scholarly 
debate focused on international developments curbing the ability of governments to do something else 
than market-making. Nonetheless, economic performance remained the most important benchmark 
to judge the success of governments. For good reason, because reforms of less welfare, lower taxes, 
privatization, deregulation or internationalization were all justified by gains in macro-efficiency. 
Interestingly enough, scientists stopped to engage in the most salient partisan accountability chain. 
Economic voting studies further flourished but the underlying assumption that growth has something 
to do with governments became a rarely assessed area of research.  
The rare exceptions paint a unified picture. Three papers are usually cited (around 23.000 google 
citations combined) in order to argue that right governments have higher growth rates than their 
interventionist counterparts (Barro 1991; Knack and Keefer 1995; Bjørnskov 2005). Only the 
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Bjørnskov paper really used a measure of government ideology. In fact, a measure based on the 
database of Beck et al. (2001), a threefold and yearly distinction of left, center and right governments 
from 1975 to 2000.31 Additionally, Bjørnskov uses decadal averages in growth and government 
ideology ending with 121 observations.  
Finally, he restricts his sample to democracies and excludes Eastern European countries. In his 
seminal article from 1991, Barro used no direct measure of government ideology but establishes a link 
between government consumption, market distortions and growth. Both being negatively related to 
growth. The sample entails 98 countries, many of them being not democratic. Knack and Keefer (1995) 
also look at market enhancing policies or institutions and do not discuss any measure of government 
ideology. Accordingly, market conform policies and institutions seem to increase growth rates, the 
evidence for government ideology, however, is at best thin. In the paper of Bjørnskov, the average 
growth difference between a left and right governments over ten years is 0.4 percentage points. 
Turning that prediction to a real world story, a market liberal incumbent would promote its re-election 
with a difference in growth of 0.04 percentage points based on top of an average the growth rate of 3 
percent in the last government year. It is hardly convincing that voters would be extremely impressed 
by such an offer for re-election.  
To summarize, to the best of my knowledge, political scientist have mainly abandoned the idea that 
government ideology systematically influences growth trajectories in democracies. The partisan theory 
has various fields of more specific policy fields where consistent partisan effects can be demonstrated. 
However, the path from ideology to growth is hardly ever systematically assessed, in particular with 
government ideology indicators beyond binary left and right distinctions. In the economics literature, 
                                                 
31 It is based on a dataset for political economy whose underlying paper had in January 2018 over 3000 citations. The three 
papers combined had over 23.000 citations at the same time point.  
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the growth increasing effects of market liberalism seem to be common knowledge. However, this 
common knowledge is rather indirectly inferred from institutional aspects like freedom of enterprises 
or the protection of property rights (rule of law), the size of the government or the openness of the 
economy (see for example Barro 2003). They simple assume that market liberals increase economic 
openness, better defend property rights and decrease public spending. These studies usually provide 
big comparisons, including authoritarian and communist countries. However, a closer look reveals, 
there is not a single study using continuous indicators of government ideology and only one major 
study looking at government ideology and growth with at least a threefold measure of government 
ideology. Market liberals and many economist clearly believe that market liberalism has positive growth 
effects.   
In the following I assess that claim. The assessment is structured in four parts. First, I relate different 
indicators of government ideology to growth rates. I only select democracies because only in 
democracies voters have a choice to determine the majorities for varying ideologies. Furthermore, I 
theoretically expect, if at all, that governments influence growth in modern economies with a low 
dependence on fluctuating resource prices. These countries are predominantly democracies.  
The comparison of ideologies in democracies is admittedly a different comparison than many 
economist have in mind when talking about government ideology. In democracies, the dominant form 
of government is centrist and sometimes fluctuates to the center-left or center right but very rarely 
includes communist or libertarians. The assessments thereby aims at differences in the margins. The 
improvement of the following assessment lies in the more precise modelling of government ideology 
and the size of the sample. It includes more than 50 years of governments in 38 countries summing 
up to around 1.200 government years. After testing the average effect of different ideology indicators, 
I turn to the robustness of that findings in three ways. First, alternative explanations with an effect on 
the treatment condition are discussed. In a second step, pathways of policies with systematic ideology 
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effects from the previous chapters are analyzed in order to verify the possibility that different policies 
might have contradictory growth effects. An in a third step, I turn to the long term effects. The history 
of market liberalism is full of long-term concerns. Market liberal reforms might need time to resolve 
the shackles of the past (Hirschmann 1997) or it simply needs short-term pain of austerity for long 
term gains of growth (Guajardo et al. 2014).   
 
3.3.1 Market liberalism, productivity and growth 
 
The first analysis relates the degree of market liberalism to economic growth on a yearly basis.32 The 
binary correlation reveals that market liberal governments have a negative effect on growth in 
comparison to more interventionist governments in a sample of over 1.200 government years. There 
are two omitted variables which are usually brought forward to explain such a substantial negative 
relationship. The two most obvious being the level of wealth and the state of the economy preceding 
market liberal governments’s incumbencies. Both can be ruled out by a closer look at their relation to 
the treatment condition. Market liberal governments do not inherit systematically worse economic 
condition from their interventionist counterparts and GDP per capita is, if at all, slightly higher in 
constellations of interventionist rule. Other determinants in TSCS models on growth highlight the 
openness of the economy as a positive contributing factor and government consumption as a negative 
one (see Table 9). Openness of the economy, either in trade or capital flow terms, are potential 
confounders because they also might affect growth. However, economic openness has no effect on 
growth in my sample and capital openness has a small negative effect on growth. Additional controls 
                                                 
32 I collected comparable growth rates from various sources (compare Table A, Appendix Part A).  
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such as a banking crisis or a currency crisis does not affect the relationship between government’s 
ideology and growth.  
As discussed before, growth is to certain extend exogenous and even if we find a significant negative 
effect of market liberal ideology on such a broad sample there  might be additional factors not included 
in the model which are distributed unfairly across interventionist and market liberal governments. One 
way to strengthen the faith in the revealed relationship between ideology and growth is to come closer 
to the benchmark of macro-efficiency. Economic growth can be decomposed into the productivity of 
multiple factors like labor and capital. A typical measure of the allocative efficiency for multiple factors 
is the index of so called multifactor productivity (MFP), sometimes called total factor productivity. It 
compares the amount of goods and services produced to the amount of combined inputs used to 
produce those goods and services. Comparable data are provided by the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BoLS 2018).  
Table 15: Government ideology and productivity 
Market Liberalism and growth  
  Government 





GDP growth  Left Right 0.04 0.501 1231 1962-2015 
  Schmidt Index 0.17 0.501 1231 1962-2015 
  Kim and Fording -1.32** 0.030 1231 1962-2015 
  Franzmann and Kaiser -1.03* 0.057 1231 1962-2015 
  Market Liberalism -1.67** 0.018 1231 1962-2015 
      
Change in labor 
productivity 
 Market Liberalism -0.77 0.121 1207 1971-2015 
Change in multifactor 
productivity 
 Market Liberalism -0.80 0.166 466 1985-2016 
Note: All coefficients are based on random effects models using the first difference of the dependent variable. Please find 
a detailed description as well as source so the dependent variables in Appendix Part B, Table A. 
 
Another useful measure of efficiency is to look directly at changes in labor productivity (measured are 
provided by the OECD 2018c). However, panel regressions of government ideology on both 
indicators do not yield significant results. The tendency is negative and substantial, though. That 
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means, there is at least no further evidence that market liberal governments increase productivity in 
the short-term. A core benchmark of market liberalism, macro-efficiency, seem to be not visible 
improved in the short run neither.  
Systematic policy change and aggregated performance might relate to each other. A specific policy-
mix can have adverse effects on growth. In order to validate the link between typical market liberal 
policies and growth, I select only those where ideology made a significant difference. For example, 
corporate tax rates are reduced due to external pressure and it does not matter what kind of ideology 
informs the government decisions. Multiple studies indicate lower corporate tax rates to increase short-
term growth but since government ideology makes no difference here, these findings are of minor 
importance. The more relevant and remaining policy channels are: Sector regulation, generosity of the 
welfare state, public spending and marginal top-income tax rates. These four differences in policy 
making are tested as mediators between ideology and economic performance in a path model. Thereby, 
I can establish effective channels of co-variation. Two paths models are estimated using first GDP 
growth, second changes in labor productivity as dependent variables.33  
First of all, the results demonstrate that around 50 percent of the negative effect of ideology on 
productivity and growth can be explained by these four channels. These channels indicate a systematic 
pattern. Market liberal governments have three systematic growth increasing policy channels and one 
growth depressing channel. Lower marginal high income taxes, lower public spending and deregulation 
increase growth. Decreasing the generous of the welfare state has negative growth effects. The path 
model from ideology over policies to productivity indicate different patterns and explains why market 
liberals have no effect on productivity. The regulation as well as the top marginal income tax channel 
                                                 
33 A model including multifactor productivity as dependent variable is omitted because the similar results as the productivity 
model with fewer observations.  
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remain ineffective on productivity whereas the remaining two channels of welfare generosity and 
public spending show the same pattern as in the model on GDP growth. Market liberal governments 
increase economic growth without increasing the productivity.  
Figure 8: Path models from market liberal governments to growth and productivity 
Notes: Structural equation model estimated in Stata using SEM package (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004). Both models 
converged after 2 iterations. Estimator: Maximum likelihood estimation with missing values (n=735 and n=729). 
Clustered standard errors at the country level. 
 
Economic growth without productivity growth can have several causes. The most prominent being, 
people simply work more, demography changes, human capital increases, relative size of different 
economic sectors change or finally, investments increase faster than depreciations. In any case, to 
reduce the generosity of the welfare state is growth depressing as well as productivity depressing in all 
models. To decrease public spending, however, has positive growth as well as positive productivity 
effects. The negative policy effects outweigh the positive ones in both productivity models whereas 
the positive effects prevail in the GDP growth model. In relation to the philosophical justification of 
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market liberalism, this is an important difference. Historically, market liberalism is normatively 
defended on the grounds of the increased economic activity as well as in terms of efficiency. There 
slight indications that the first might hold but the models are not in line with evidence for the second. 
Before I turn to an evaluation of the long term growth effects of market liberal government, I focus 
on the second most important benchmark of government performance – the distribution of wealth.  
 
3.3.2 Market liberalism and inequality 
 
If the poorest of a society is better off than a king in another, who cares about equality? In the tradition 
of this justification of inequality by Adam Smith, market liberals have always turned their attention to 
the level of wealth and not its distribution. However, the distribution of wealth remains a core concern 
of the opponents of market liberals and to certain extend also to liberals whose concern is an 
undermined competition through the concentration of wealth. Furthermore, the accumulation of 
wealth is of fundamental concern to those highlighting the importance of relative wealth as the more 
relevant category of well-being and equally to those who stress the equality of opportunities which are 
highly related to financial means in market societies. Finally, inequality has been linked to growth since 
a long time. The majority of scholars see inequality positively linked to growth (Kuznets 1955; Barro 
2000; Forbes 2000). Several studies of the OECD have later found evidence for the opposite (OECD 
2014; Cingano 2014). Bjornskov (2008) points to the interesting correlation that inequality curbs 
growth only under left wing governments. Comparable to the studies of ideology and growth, there is 
no study linking ideology and inequality with an appropriate indicator of government ideology. 
The benchmark of economic equality in wealth and income suffers from a massive disadvantage in 
comparison to growth as a dependent variable. For a long time, comparable data were simply not 
available and for assets they are still only scarcely available. However, at least for income distributions 
138 
 
this has changed. The World Wealth and Income Database provides long time series of income shares 
across a huge number of countries (WWID 2018). The lack of comparable data explains why systematic 
studies on the impact of government ideology on inequality are difficult to find. On the contrary, there 
is a strong theoretical consensus that the most important raison d’être of interventionists is to reduce 
inequality. The power resources theory confirms that leftist power in government is a decisive factor 
of redistributive outcomes (Esping-Andersen 1985; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003). 
The most important mechanisms in the power resource theory are redistribution via progressive taxes 
and welfare entitlements. I might add regulation as a third and probably equally important factor 
because it has the potential to hamper accumulative tendencies of market outcomes quite efficiently.  
However, power resource theory has been advanced on cases in the industrial world. To my 
knowledge there exists only one systematic study looking at government ideology and inequality in 
developing countries (Ha 2012). This study demonstrates that government ideology has a strong effect 
on inequality (Ha 2012).34  
Selected form the WWID (2018), I use two indicators because of its coverage and theoretical 
proximity to inequality. Top income share as a percentage of GDP are the best existing data to compare 
the distribution of wealth across countries and time. I use the top 1 percent income share as an 
indicator of the super-rich, usually a class of people whose gains are based on capital ownership. The 
second indicator is the top 10 percent income decile minus the top 1 percent, usually referred to as the 
upper-middle class. I follow the same procedure as on the growth indicators. First, I compare different 
government ideology indicators on the change in top income shares. Followed by several robustness 
                                                 
34 One of the key contribution of Ha’s study is, that he complements the existing government ideology data base of the 
World Bank with information on government’s coalitions (Ha 2012, 542). As demonstrated in Chapter 3.2, the effect of 
government ideology crucially hinges on the measurement of government ideology.  
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tests and ultimately looking at the causal chains between ideology, policies and the distribution of 
wealth.  
Table 16: Market liberalism and inequality 
Change top 1 % income 
share 
 Left Right 0.02 0.181 689 1913-2014 
 Schmidt Index 0.09 0.181 689 1913-2014 
 Kim and Fording 0.42** 0.012 689 1913-2014 
 Franzmann and Kaiser 0.41*** 0.002 689 1913-2014 
 Market Liberalism 0.67*** 0.000 689 1913-2014 
       
Change top 10 - top 1 % 
income share 
 Left Right 0.01 0.244 687 1913-2014 
 Schmidt Index 0.05 0.244 687 1913-2014 
 Kim and Fording 0.15 0.187 687 1913-2014 
 Franzmann and Kaiser 0.34*** 0.000 687 1913-2014 
  Market Liberalism 0.45*** 0.000 687 1913-2014 
Note: Own calculation. Source of the dependent variable (WWID 2018).  
The coefficients in Table 16 depict a now familiar pattern. Binary distinction between left and right 
indicate no influence of ideology whereas continuous measures yield strong effects. The index of 
market liberalism has again the strongest substantial coefficient as well as the narrowest confidence 
intervals. The effect size is remarkable. 0.67 is a coefficient for an average and yearly effect. A market 
liberal government in comparison to a very interventionist one, would accordingly increase the income 
share of the top 1 percent in a four-year term of around 2.6 percentage points of the GDP. That is a 
very substantial amount of upwards redistribution. To a lesser extend, but still positive and significant, 
we observe a growing income share of the upper-middle class under market liberal governments. 
These effects are robust. There are four confounders with partially strong effects on the two 
inequality measures and systematic effects on government ideology. Rising GDP per capita also 
increases income inequalities and the inclusion of the indicator in the regression slightly reduces the 
government ideology effects. Stock market capitalization strongly increases top income shares and the 
inclusion of this variable further increase the effect of government ideology. Neither the inclusion of 
a banking nor a currency crisis substantially change the effect of government ideology. Finally, capital 
openness has a substantial effect on top income shares. Since we know that capital restrictions are 
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lifted under market liberal governments in tendency it reduces the effect of government ideology to 
an average effect of 0.38, still significant to the 99 percent level. In comparison to the effects of 
government ideology on growth, the evidence is much more supportive to the fact that market liberal 
governments increase the well-being of the better of in comparison the lower income classes.  
I use the same four policies where government ideology was shown to systematically differ and 
include them in a path model from ideology to the two indicators of income distributions (Figure 9). 
In the path model with the top 1 percent income share, as dependent variable almost none of the 
association between market liberal government and inequality is taken up by the mediating chains. 
Only public spending has a systematic association with rising income shares of the top 1 percent. 
However, the government effect of ideology on spending is not significant anymore. The regulation 
chain shows a similar pattern with a reversed direction of association. More regulation decreased top 
income share and only slightly fail to reach appropriate significance levels. The direct association from 
ideology to income inequality is stronger and still significant. That means, effective mediation over 
these four policy domains does not take place and market liberal governments employ other channels 
to increase the income of the top 1 percent.  
The model with the changing income share of the upper middle class as dependent variable show 
slightly different patterns. The regulation chain is highly effective and indicates that deregulation 
increases the income of the upper 10 percent income class. Interestingly, the effect of public spending 
is way more substantial on the top 1 percent income class in comparison to the upper-middle income 
class, the ladder being usually seen as benefitting from public employment. The chain from ideology 
over welfare generosity and top income tax rates, does not indicate any statistical association. The 
reason is that income shares are measured as gross income shares. In particular the tax and welfare 




Figure 9: Path models from market liberal governments to income distributions 
 
Notes: Structural equation model estimated in Stata using SEM package (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004). Both models 
converged after 2 iterations. Estimator: Maximum likelihood estimation with missing values (both n=735). Clustered 
standard errors at the country level. 
 
Coming back to the initial question of the impact of market liberal governments, it seems that all 
policies which systematically differ between market liberals and interventionist governments, have 
either no relation to income shares or increase the income share of the top earners. Besides the four 
channels discussed here, there remains a significant and substantial positive effect of market liberal 
governments on top income shares unexplained.  
Taking both dimensions of performance in the short term together, market liberal governments do 
have a negative track-record on economic growth although some of their preferred policies have 
positive growth effects without improving productivity. At the same time, market liberal governments 
increase the income of the top earners and thereby increase economic inequality. As economic 
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inequality is often argued to be the price to be paid for wealth it seems that the price is paid anyways 
whereas the promise of wealth seem not to materialize. At least not in the short-term. In the next 
section I assess the long term effects of market liberal governments on growth and inequality.  
 
3.3.3 The long run 
 
Promises of long term gain often appear if things turn  bad in the short term. Or in contrast, if things 
run well for political opponents, politicians stress the importance of former reforms or point to long 
term deterioration. A striking example is Sweden. Sweden has always served as a role model for an 
egalitarian state and unsurprisingly various market liberal think tanks have tried to make the point that 
Sweden’s success under social democratic governments is in fact caused by the market liberal past of 
the country (Amselem 2015; The Economist 2013, Norberg 2013). Such an intellectual twist is not 
even captured well in Hirschmann’s tableau on rival interpretations of the market society (1982). It is 
something like a reversed combination of the doux-commerce and feudal-shackles theses (1982, 1481). 
The argument goes as follows: Early 20th century market liberals in Sweden have successfully 
introduced the market morals, resolved the feudal privileges and paved the way for an economic spirit 
which even survived a 40 year social democratic hegemony.  
Various scholars, usually from sociology, have made the opposite point. Market societies consume 
a highly valuable attitude which was build up in pre-capitalist times. Probably most famously the theory 
of organic solidarity by Durkheim (2014[1893]). This line of thought has always stressed the non-
contractual foundation of contracts - social trust. It makes market transactions possible in the first 
place. Whatever reason is brought forward to justify the long-term benefits of a social order between 
free-marketers and interventionists, it simply might be that effects take time to unfold. 
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Interestingly, a widespread approach to long-term effects are panel regressions on time-series data with 
a long time span. For example Roine et al. (2009) finds that government spending reduces income 
inequality in the long run. In fact, a standard panel regression does not tell us anything about long-
term effects. Without any specific time lags, panel regression do the opposite and capture short term 
effects independent of the length of a time series. Times-series-cross-sectional models are supposed 
to deliver an average effect of any independent variable on the dependent variable for a defined 
periodization. Using country-year periods produces effects within one year. An alternative approach 
to long-term identification is based on aggregation. Scholars simply sum up the years of left or right 
governments over a long time span and relate it to the levels of specific policy indicators. For example, 
a country governed in 30 out of 40 years by social democrats should have a more generous welfare 
state in comparison to a country with long conservative legacy (Huber and Stephens 2001). This is in 
fact a reasonable design, as long as effects unfold in linear and symmetric ways. However, it does not 
capture the argument of short-term pain for long-term gain as stressed above. Decline and rise of 
benefits from specific policy reforms is washed out in such an aggregated design because 5 years of 
pain and 5 years of gain basically create a null finding.  
One option to approach closer to the unfolding of effects over time is to apply growth curve 
modelling. Growth curve modelling is embedded in a structural equation framework and relates a 
treatment in time point t to changes in a dependent variable in time point t+n (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 
2004). Furthermore, structural equations facilitate the inclusion of intermediate treatments. I refer to 
intermediate treatments as changes in the treatment condition between t and t+n. For example, a labor 
reform implemented in t with a lasting effect in t+10 could be identified in a country where the same 
market liberal government govern from t to t+10. However, in many circumstances governments 
alternate in the mean-time. Theoretically as well as empirically, it should make a difference to include 
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IMT’s because we have seen above that consistent short-term effects are expectable and confirmed in 
various policy domains.  
Despite the simple inclusion of intermediate treatments, causal identification of long term effects 
is very challenging. Pearl has defined causal identification as a perfect closure of alternative backdoor 
paths (2009). It should be obvious that every lagged effect creates additional and open backdoor paths 
in principle. Accordingly, every attempt to identify long term effects stands on shaky ground. However, 
this shaky ground is nonetheless very interesting, because from a theoretical perspective it is very likely 
that many of the events we are interested in, only materialize in the long-term and are affected by 
repeated intermediate treatments which might reinforce or hamper the substance or direction of 
change.  
 
3.3.4 Identification of long term effects 
 
I use the following procedure to identify the long term effects of market liberal governments on 
inequality and growth. I first change the periodization from yearly observation to cabinet observations 
in order to coarse time and thereby simplify the structural equation models. I remain in a first difference 
framework in order to reduce endogeneity problems and construct the first difference from t1 to t+1 
until t+5 respectively. I relate the government ideology in t to the changes in inequality in t and to every 
other change in inequality in t+n. Effectively, this resembles five separate regressions with the same 
independent variable and lagged effect on the dependent.  
As discussed earlier, the longer the time span between the ideology of government and the change in 
the dependent variable, the higher is the likelihood that governments with a different ideology have 
gained majorities in the mean-time and reduce the effect of the government from t1. To omit 
intermediate treatments (thereinafter IMT) would cause an underestimation of the treatment effect. 
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To integrate the intermediate treatments is not accurately feasible in a regression framework because 
the IMT’s have effects on each change from t1 until t+n. For example, after three succeeding market 
liberal governments the cabinet might be replaced with two succeeding communist governments.  The 
market liberals had time of three cabinet periods to constantly increase the income share of the top 1 
percent and there might be a lasting effect of their policies in t+4 and t+5 as well. However, the effect 
in t+4 and t+5 is in this example strongly biased because of two succeeding communist governments 
which probably reduce the income share of the top 1 percent. Ignoring this would yield a growth curve 
of market liberals with raising inequality in the first three cabinet periods, followed by a decline in t+4 
and t+5. The inference on such a model would be, that in the long run market liberals decrease 
inequality. As this is a fairly stylized description of IMT effects, it is just a matter of probability that 
over time the chance to have influential IMT’s increases. Accordingly, a growth curve controlling for 
IMT’s and a growth curve without should increasingly diverge over time.  
Running two structural equation models without and with IMTs we find exactly the expected bias 
(see Figure 10). The short term effect in t is almost the same across both models.35 However, from 
cabinet period three onwards the dynamics diverge. In the models without IMTs we would assume 
that market liberal policies implemented in t fade to exert significant effects on inequality after around 
7.5 years. Controlling for IMTs creates another narrative. The inference based on this model indicate 
persistent growth in inequality even five cabinets after the initial treatment. A substantial interpretation 
suggests that 13 years after a market liberal government the income share of the top 1 percent is 13 
percentage points higher assuming everything else to be equal.  
                                                 
35 A positive and significant effect of 1.34 corroborates the findings from the yearly observations. It is slightly lower than 




Figure 10: Long term effect of government ideology on inequality 
 
Note: The y-axis captures the size of the coefficients and the x-axis the cabinets in time t until t+4. The coefficients of both 
models are based on a structural equation models using a maximum likelihood estimator with missing values and robust 
standard errors at the country level. The total number of observations for both models is 765. 
 
The substantial interpretation leaves an exorbitant impression. The reason is, regression coefficient are 
related to a one unit change in the independent variable. In the case of the applied measure of market 
liberalism this would be an alternation from a radical communist to a radical market liberal government 
– not a really frequent real world event. Typical alternations in the real world are changes from a 
moderate interventionist to a moderate market liberal government or vice versa. Numerically, such an 
alternation is on average a 0.3 change on the market liberalism scale (range 0 to 1). Accordingly, a real 
world alternation from a moderate interventionist to a moderate market liberal, would on average 
increase the income of the top 1 percent by 3.9 percentage points of GDP after 13 years. When Ronald 
Reagan took over the presidential office from Jimmy Carter, the top 1 percent income share was 10.6. 
Around 13 years later. Right before Bill Clinton took over the presidency from George W. Bush Senior, 
the top 1 percent income share reached 13.9 percent. The long term effect of market liberalism on the 
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The Ronald Reagan example indicates a rather good predictive power of the SEM models. In reality, 
the model fit is difficult to assess. I used the possibility of missing imputation (a great strength of 
SEMs) as well as robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) and both specifications make 
many of the standard model fit parameters meaningless. The remaining model fit parameter is the 
coefficient of determination (CD) which measures the amount of variation accounted for in the 
endogenous variables (or constructs) by the exogenous variables (or constructs). It is basically an 
equivalent to an adjusted R² in standard regression models. In the model without IMTs the CD is 
0.056 and increases to 0.388 with the inclusion of the IMTs.  
As market liberal actors rarely take a stance on the dynamics of inequality in the long run, it is 
important to evaluate the performance on economic growth, the core benchmark for market liberals. 
Comparable to the short effects I focus on two components of growth. First, I use the changes in the 
per capita growth, measured with expenditure method in international dollars at current prices and 
power purchasing parity (also deflated). This measure is conventionally seen as an indicator for the 
standard of living, a measure based on economic output (see OECD 2018 for a detailed description). 
As a second measure I look at changes in labor productivity. As discussed before, growth can be 
generated by different means. The theoretical promise of market liberals is based either on efficiency 
as well as on the amount of output. Efficiency means that the means of production become more 
productive or at least different productive factors are better allocated. If the efficiency is not improved, 
growth can still exist. In this case, growth is simply the result of more economic activity as we have 
seen in short term assessment. I measure productivity by an OECD indicator of GDP per hour 
worked. “It measures how efficiently labor input is combined with other factors of production and 
used in the production process” (OECD 2018b). Comparable to the long term identification of 
inequality caused by government ideology, I apply the same models with the change in per capita GDP 
and labor productivity with and without intermediate governments.  
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Figure 11: Long term effects of government ideology on growth 
 
Note: The y-axis captures the size of the coefficients and the x-axis the cabinets in time t until t+4. The coefficients of both 
models are based on a structural equation models using a maximum likelihood estimator with missing values and robust 
standard errors at the country level. The total number of observations for both models is 765. 
 
Figure 11 depicts the impact of market liberal governments on per capita growth using a cabinet 
periodization. Different to the negative short term (yearly) effect, the impact turns positive in the first 
cabinet term already. The growth effect remains positive and significant for the second and third period 
in the models using IMTs. Independent of the IMTs, in period 4 and 5 significance drops below 
conventional levels. The effects are aggregated effects as the dependent variable captures percentage 
change from t to t+1 or from t to t+n respectively. Since the growth effect convergences at around ten 
in period three, there is no additional effect of market liberals from period t on growth in t+4 
independent of the significance levels.  
However, the differences in growth in the first three periods (around 7.5 years) are already 
substantial. The aggregated difference between a market liberal and an interventionist government 
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materializes on average in constellation where market liberals alternate into office held by radical 
interventionists before. A more realistic real world alternation could be seen as a change in 0.3 on the 
market liberalism indicator. Such an alternation would leave us with a predicted increase of growth of 
around 3.3 percent in 7.5 years. That is a yearly plus of 0.44 percentage points in growth per capita. It 
is not about belittling the growth effects of market liberal governments but the average per capita 
yearly growth rate in this sample is around 3 percent. Now we can attribute 0.44 of this growth pattern 
to market liberals with a very high margin of uncertainty. Not only the confidence intervals are very 
broad but the explanatory power of the model is way below the one using income shares as the 
dependent variable (CD of 0.03 in comparison to 0.388).  
Looking at the long term effects on change in labor productivity the findings from the short term 
are confirmed. As in the short run, there is basically no systematic effect of market liberal governments 
on productivity. The same holds true for the long run (compare Figure 12). The assessment of long 
term performance do only partially confirm the patterns from the short term. Inequality in income 
distribution is increased by market liberal governments and there is evidence for a lasting effect across 
the entire time span (five government periods with an average duration of 2.5 years). The path models 
indicated that the most effective of the assessed channels are deregulation and reduced public 
spending. As market liberals systematically achieve both their impact on rising top income shares seem 
to be plausible. Interestingly, welfare generosity and top marginal income taxes do contribute anything 
systematic to the findings. As this has probably to do with income shares being measured based on 
gross income. As taxes and welfare contributions have a direct effect on net incomes, the effect of 
market liberals revealed in these models are probably at the lower bound.  
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Figure 12: Long term effects of government ideology on productivity 
 
Note: The y-axis captures the size of the coefficients and the x-axis the cabinets in time t until t+4. The coefficients of both 
models are based on a structural equation models applying a maximum likelihood estimator with missing values and robust 
standard errors at the country level. The total number of observations for both models is 765. 
 
The impact of market liberal governments on their own core benchmark is a bit puzzling. Economic 
growth shows a short term negative association with market liberal government and a long term 
positive effect. The policies which contribute to such an effect are in particular deregulation, reduced 
taxation and less public spending. These three policy channels indicate substantial and systematic 
growth increasing effects. In contrast, welfare retrenchment has negative effect on growth, at least in 
the short term. It might that market liberal governments focus on welfare retrenchment in the early 
phase of the political business cycle and employ growth enhancing policies like deregulation later. This 
being speculation, it could explain the diverging findings of negative short term and positive effect 
over the first cabinet period. However, the growth effects are rather uncertain and substantially low in 
the long run. Additionally, productivity is not affected by market liberal government. Consequently, 
there is no indication that market liberal governments deliver systematically in the domain of their core 
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in fact associated with higher labour productivity whereas public spending creates the opposite. Public 
employment as well as employment in countries with lower social protection seem both to hamper 
productivity.  
To summarize the policy opportunities for interventionists and market liberals in relation to 
growth and the income distribution, many policy areas are attached with trade-offs. Regulation is for 
example an effective chain to increase growth but also to increase inequality. The patterns of public 
spending and top marginal income taxes indicate a similar trade-off. Interestingly, a generous welfare 
state seem to achieve both, growth and a more equal income distribution. However, more generous 
welfare states have tax and transfer implications which might feedback into growth depressing 
tendencies, at least in a constellation with a high share of transfer recipients. Overall, it is difficult for 
governments to achieve a growing and egalitarian society. Market liberals seem to have clear 
preferences on the trade-off and taken all the evidence together make a systematic difference in 
particular in the growing inequality of income. Market liberals seem to achieve slightly higher growth 
rates in return. Interestingly, these growth rates have not much to do with increasing efficiency, as 
many market liberals have claimed, but are simply based on more economic activity.  
In the next part I turn to a specific constellation where market liberals, mainly conservative parties, 
started to open the possibility of government participation for radical right parties. Initially, these 
invitations were based on a calculus that coalitions with radical parties would allow conservatives to 
be liberated form grant coalitions and the engage in more unhampered retrenchment policies. The 
following chapter demonstrates that this reasoning was done under false premises. Radical right parties 
became inconvenient partners in terms of welfare retrenchment but more reliable allies in the domain 
of deregulation. In any case, the rise of the radical right and their inclusion in democratic governments 
has fundamentally changed the partisan constellation and the majorities for specific for socio-
economic policies.  
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3.4 The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on Socio-Economic Policies36 
Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) have successfully evolved from “pariahs to power” (De Lange 
2008). At first ostracised by other parties, they are now represented in the parliaments of most Western 
European countries, have taken part in government in a number of them, and therefore influence 
policymaking. Accordingly, scholarly attention has slowly started to move its focus from explaining 
their electoral fortunes to analysing their impact on public policies (Akkerman and De Lange 2012; 
De Lange 2012).  
With a few exceptions (e.g. Verbeek and Zaslove 2015), however, previous studies have so far 
mostly focused on the impact of PRRPs on policies within their ‘core domains’, such as migration and 
integration policy (e.g. Akkerman 2012). However, achieving parliamentary or executive 
representation also gives PRRPs potential influence in other core areas of state intervention, including 
economic and social policies. This article offers the first systematic comparative study of their impact 
on both redistributive (i.e. social spending and welfare generosity) and regulative (i.e. market-making) 
economic policies in Western Europe.  
In order to analyse the impact of PRRPs on socio-economic policies, we combine quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Lieberman 2005). We first address the impact of the parliamentary representation 
of PRRPs and their government participation on socio-economic policy formulation between 1970 
and 2010 in 17 West European countries. Using a matching tool for case selection, we complement 
                                                 
36 This chapter is an article co-authored with Alexandre Afonso and Dennis Spies published in European Political Science 
Review. This article travelled a bit and along the way it received very valuable comments. We would like to thank three 
anonymous reviewers. Their careful reading and feedback improved the article significantly. Beyond the reviewers, we 
would like to thank Simon Franzmann, Christina Zuber, Gregor Zons and André Kaiser for helpful suggestions. 




our statistical analysis with a case study of PRRP government participation in Austria in the 1990s and 
2000s in order to gather insights into the policymaking processes at work.  
 
3.4.1 Populist Radical Right Parties and Socio-Economic Policy 
 
The last three decades have witnessed the strengthening and “mainstreaming” of PRRPs within West 
European party systems (Mudde 2007). While the electoral fortunes of parties within this family vary 
greatly, many have managed to establish themselves as relevant actors in government coalitions in 
countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and Italy. As their electoral success 
hinged on stricter immigration controls, tougher law and order policies, and restrictive welfare 
provision for immigrants in particular (Betz and Johnson 2004; Mudde 2007; Van der Brug and 
Fennema 2003), it has naturally raised the question of their impact on policy formulation (see Mudde 
2013 for a recent review).  
Previous studies have understandably focused on the impact of PRRPs on the policy domains that 
they are considered to “own”, such as immigration, integration and law and order (Akkerman 2012; 
Bale 2008; Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2013; Zaslove 2004). Indeed, research has shown that these 
parties mobilize voters primarily along the value/identity dimension and not so much on the socio-
economic dimension of electoral politics (Arzheimer and Carter 2003; Gabel and Huber 2000; Kriesi 
et al. 2006; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). However, this does not mean that they cannot affect 
socio-economic policies, especially as coalition politics involves complex negotiations about different 
policy issues with other parties. Yet, no systematic large-N analysis has been conducted on the socio-
economic policy impact of PRRPs and the number of qualitative case studies explicitly addressing this 
question is limited (see, however, Afonso 2015; Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). This is somewhat 
surprising because the role and preferences of PRRPs in the socio-economic domain have been the 
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subjects of sharp controversies, depending on the alleged preferences of their voters (vote-seeking 
strategies) and the autonomy of PRRP party elites towards them when it comes to coalition formation 
(office-seeking strategies). 
 
3.4.2 Vote-seeking strategies 
The first comparative studies in the field already pointed out that the Radical Right was not only 
interested in culturally-related issues, but also in socio-economic questions as a result of the 
realignment of the economic preferences of working-class voters towards pro-market agendas. One 
of the most prominent advocates of this view was Kitschelt (1995), who argued that the electoral 
success of PRRPs hinged on a combination of nationalism and neoliberalism (see also Betz 1994). 
According to Kitschelt, PRRPs were indeed radical with regard to their culturally authoritarian stance, 
but also in their demand for laissez-faire policies aiming at less redistribution, lower taxation and 
reduced welfare expenditures. They supported the deregulation of state monopolies and the 
dismantlement of neo-corporatist arrangements perceived to benefit the political establishment. 
Following this view, we would then expect PRRPs to support measures of liberalization once in 
government. 
In recent studies, the market-liberal character of PRRPs has been questioned, especially by those 
interested in the political attitudes of PRRP voters. These studies convincingly show that PRRP 
supporters share similar concerns about cultural identity and especially immigration control 
(Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009) 
but are profoundly divided in their socio-economic preferences. This divide exists in particular 
between their two traditional core clienteles, the anti-state petite bourgeoisie on the one hand and the 
traditionally left-leaning working class on the other (Ignazi 2003; Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde 2007; Spies 
2013; Afonso and Rennwald 2017). In the face of these divisions, PRRPs are believed to follow 
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strategies of “position blurring”, either presenting “vague or contradictory positions” (Rovny 2013, 6) 
or downplaying  their socio-economic program (Cole 2005; Spies and Franzmann 2011; Afonso 2015), 
which some authors see as essentially subordinate to their nationalist ideology (Mudde 2007, 119). 
However, such electoral strategies are of limited value once PRWPs are in office because their position 
on these matters becomes much more difficult to obscure, when laws have to be voted and budgets 
allocated. Then, strategies of position blurring might translate into inconsistent socio-economic policy 
reforms, e.g. by mixing up general liberalization with “specific (often purely symbolic) protectionist 
measures and new programmes for selected groups (small business owners, families with children and 
so on) deemed vital to the political success of the government” (Heinisch 2003, 103). 
Finally, different expectations of the policy impact of PRRPs appear in several studies where 
PRRPs are presented as new working class parties (Arzheimer 2012; Ignazi 2003). These studies either 
show that working-class voters are already the most important group in PRRPs or claim that working-
class support for the Radical Right is steadily increasing (Betz 2002; Spies 2013; Afonso and Rennwald 
2017). The common inference from these electoral changes is that PRRPs have abandoned their 
former market-liberal positions in favour of more centrist agendas, in line with the preferences of their 
now more left-leaning supporters (Aichholzer et al. 2014; De Lange 2007; Kitschelt 2004; Kitschelt 
2007; McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Schumacher and Kersbergen 2014; Van Spanje and Van der Brug 
2007). This re-orientation of PRRPs should express itself especially with regard to redistributive social 
policies as the working-class still has a strong interest in the preservation of traditional social insurance 
schemes (Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2013, 229; Afonso 2015). 
Summarizing the arguments on the policy preferences of PRRPs derived from their electoral 
constituencies, the theoretical expectations are mixed. On the one hand, even the initial advocates of 
the “winning formula” (Kitschelt 2004; Kitschelt 2007; McGann and Kitschelt 2005) acknowledge 
that the socio-economic profile of PRRP voters today is much more left-leaning than in the early 
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1990s. On the other hand, PRRPs do not seem to follow a clear socio-economic agenda and the 
salience of these issues in their programmes remains low. Their policy stance is therefore unclear both 
during electoral campaigns, when they try to diffuse their positions, and in government, when they 
seem to advocate somewhat inconsistent political platforms.  
 
3.4.3 Office-seeking strategies 
 
So far, we have derived our arguments on the policy impact of PRRPs from the socio-economic profile 
of their voters. However, as far as Western Europe is concerned, PRRPs have been able to enter 
national government coalitions only with other right-wing (Conservative, Christian-democratic or 
Liberal) political parties generally holding market-liberal views on the economy.37 The participation of 
these parties in government is hence embedded in intricate processes of coalition formation and log-
rolling with centre-right parties. According to De Lange (2012, 907), right-wing coalitions are an 
attractive option for mainstream right parties because PRRPs enable them to form politically viable 
and ideologically cohesive coalitions. As far as the mainstream right is concerned, political deals with 
PRRPs can draw on giving them concessions in the domain of immigration control (which PRRPs 
“own” and on which mainstream right parties have converged anyway) in exchange for their support 
for liberalizing socio-economic reforms (which are more important for mainstream right parties than 
for PRRPs). This kind of political deal, however, may be dangerous for PRRPs if one considers their 
strong working-class base. Indeed, cutting welfare programmes on which many of their voters rely 
can translate into severe electoral losses. How can this trade-off be resolved? 
                                                 
37 One exception is the Syriza-Independent Greeks coalition formed in Greece in 2015, and Swiss governments where the 
radical right shares office with all major parties. The radical right has also held office with left-wing parties at the sub-
national level in a number of countries. 
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We argue that this is possible only by differentiating socio-economic policies between those 
concerning redistribution (welfare state retrenchment being the most prominent among these) and those 
concerning the deregulation of former regulated markets, including financial liberalization, privatization 
of former state-owned companies, and the labour market (see Aranson and Ordeshook 1981; Lowi 
1972). While their mainstream right coalition partners generally have a strong interest in both kinds 
of liberalization (see Bale 2003; Giger and Nelson 2011), we argue that PRRPs might have incentives 
to support (or consent to) deregulation but are more hesitant to support policies of welfare 
retrenchment once in government.  
Starting with redistribution, supporting welfare retrenchment might be a serious problem for 
PRRPs because at least part of their electoral base has a strong interest in traditional social insurance 
programs, such as pensions (Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2013, 229; Afonso 2015). Welfare 
reforms can be expected to be salient issues, and strategies of position blurring which can be successful 
during electoral campaigns – are very difficult to carry out when in government. Thus, PRRPs face a 
potential trade-off between office and votes when it comes to redistribution (Afonso 2015): 
supporting the policies of their liberal and conservative coalition partners may harm their own 
working-class electorate, while defending the interests of their own electorate may jeopardize alliances 
with their mainstream-right partners. If PRRPs focus on votes, they should be more likely to defend 
the status quo when it comes to redistribution.  
 
H1: Centre-right governments with PRRP participation will pursue more redistributive economic 
policies compared with centre-right governments without PRRP participation.  
 
As far as deregulation is concerned, we argue that the picture is different than this for redistributive 
issues, and that this domain is less problematic in terms of coalition bargaining and electoral effects. 
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We see three main reasons for this. The most straightforward can be found in the interests of their 
potential mainstream right coalition partners. If PRRPs demand tougher immigration legislation but 
do not consent to welfare retrenchment, deregulation in other less salient domains becomes the only 
concession which can be offered.  
Besides this coalition-based logic, PRRPs themselves might have a direct interest in deregulation 
given their general hostility to organized interests, especially to trade unions. This widespread critique 
of neo-corporatism among PRRPs is rooted in their anti-elite ideology (see Heinisch 2003; Mudde 
2007). PRRPs as “outsider” political actors may also favour deregulation because they have not been 
part of the state-market networks (including connections between parties, trade unions and employers) 
that have governed many European market economies. Therefore, policies that might break up these 
corporatist networks and undermine the power of interest groups and established parties can be 
expected to find PRRP support. Trade unions, in particular, are among the most purposeful defenders of 
regulation (Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013) because both labour market deregulation and privatization of 
formerly state-owned enterprises directly concern their own power base (Obinger, Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2014). 
Hence, the deregulation of these domains should be in the direct interest of both PRRPs as well as pro-business 
mainstream right parties.   
Finally, PRRPs might prefer deregulation to retrenchment because it is surely less salient in the eyes 
of their voters. Deregulation often appears rather technical and usually demands a higher degree of 
information to assess its outcomes, making such policies less conflictual in electoral terms than policies 
with clearer distributional effects. Therefore, support for deregulation might be more compatible with 
PRRPs’ electoral strategy of “position blurring”. Taking the three arguments together, we expect 
PRRPs in government to support policies of deregulation, or at least to consent to such reforms 




H2: Governments with PRRP participation will support deregulatory economic policies. This results 
in deregulatory economic policies comparable to these of centre-right governments without PRRP 
participation.  
 
Finally, the potential policy impact of PRRPs does not only hinge on their conflict between vote- or 
office-seeking strategies but also on the opportunity structures they face once in government. This 
involves, for instance, cabinet duration and the size of cabinet majorities. While the lack of adequate 
majorities and of sufficient time for the implementation of reforms are restrictions for any kind of 
government – be it with or without PRRP participation – for the analysis of PRRPs this argument is 
arguably even more important. Empirically, governments with PRRP participation tend to be less 
stable, and are significantly shorter than other governments. They might therefore simply lack the time 
to implement either redistributive or deregulatory reforms. To account for this, we will compare their 
policy impact depending on government duration and expect for both H1 and H2 that PRRP 
governments will have the most pronounced impact in the long run.      
 
3.4.4 Research Design, Method and Data 
To investigate our hypotheses, we combine a statistical analysis with case study evidence. We first 
conduct a large-N quantitative analysis investigating the average effect of PRRP government 
participation on redistributive and regulative economic policies. In a second step, we quantitatively 
compare the impact of governments with PRRP support with comparable market liberal governments 
depending on how much time the respective governments had to implement redistributive and 
deregulative reforms. Thirdly, we select two cases (one with and one without a PRRP in cabinet), 
based on the distribution of the statistically most important variables. This within-case comparison 
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provides us with evidence to establish the inference from the statistical analysis and weakens the power 
of alternative explanations.  
We start by calculating several time-series cross-sectional regression models. In the first series, we 
analyse PRRPs’ impact on welfare generosity38. In the second part, we estimate their impact on 
deregulative economic policies. All models are based on data for 17 Western European countries39 for 
the period 1970-2010 (see Table 1). The sample selection is intended to cover the whole range of 
countries within Western Europe for the entire period since the rise of the first PRRPs.40  
Regarding our methodology for the quantitative part, there are often considerable doubts about 
the robustness of average effects in social science studies using macro variables (e.g. Kittel 2006). This 
is because the regression results are very sensitive to the specification choices made and the inclusion 
and exclusion of specific cases (Imbens 2015). This problem is particularly salient in our case as well. 
Technically speaking, the characteristics of governments where PRRPs participate are far from 
balanced compared with those without it: PRRP governments are not only significantly more market-
liberal but also tend to govern in wealthier countries which are already more liberalized, have weaker 
labour unions and considerably higher public debts and lower levels of unemployment.41  
In order to deal with this, we use entropy balancing as an established and non-parametric way to 
obtain regression weights (Hainmueller and Xu 2013). This procedure assigns higher weights to 
observations of governments without PRRP membership that are more similar to governments with 
                                                 
38 In addition, we also report models with welfare spending as the dependent variable in the Online Appendix of this paper 
(see Table C). In essence, these models show very comparable effects on the impact of PRRPs on welfare generosity. 
39 These are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.  
40 We also run all models on restricted samples focusing (1) only on the period from 1990 to 2010 and (2) only on countries 
with PRRPs in parliament from 1970 to 2010. The findings of the subsample regressions very much resemble the findings 
of the regressions based on the entire sample of countries from 1970 to 2010. The additional models are reported in the 
Online Appendix (Figure C and D).  
41 See Table B in the Online Appendix for an overview of the distributions. 
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PRRPs. Put more simply, more market-liberal governments in wealthier countries with low union 
density and higher degrees of globalization compare closely with our governments of interest and are 
consequently given higher regression weights. Theoretically, these adjustments should make the 
estimators less dependent on specification choices, a proposition we tested with several robustness 
checks.42 In all models, we apply panel corrected standard errors to avoid overconfidence (Beck and 
Katz 1995). 
 
3.4.5 Dependent Variables 
Building on the tradition of two independent dimensions of socio-economic policies – the 
redistribution via production of public goods and the regulation of market externalities (Aranson and 
Ordeshook 1981; Lowi 1972) – we differentiate between PRRPs’ impact on redistributive and regulative 
economic policies.  
To capture the redistributive dimension of economic policies, we use changes in welfare generosity 
(Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2014) as our dependent variable. Welfare generosity consists of the average 
entitlements to pensions, unemployment and sick leave, which are calculated as the replacement rate 
of the (gross) average production worker wage. Welfare generosity takes into account both benefits 
as well as entitlement duration and qualification (see Scruggs 2014 for detailed description) and is 
therefore more closely linked to the influence from political decisions than, say, social spending as a 
share of GDP. 
In contrast to measurements of welfare efforts, the regulative dimension of economic policies is more 
challenging to measure. For our measure, we consider three policy fields: labour market regulation, 
                                                 
42 See Figure E in the Online Appendix.  
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the privatization of infrastructure, and the regulation of financial markets.43 Labour market regulation 
measures the strictness of employment protection for permanent and fixed-term contracts. It consists 
of eight indicators (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2013). The 
privatization of infrastructure consists of seven indicators tapping into the regulation in energy, 
transport and communications (OECD 2011). The regulation of financial markets is captured by the 
index developed by Abiad and Mody (2005) covering six policy fields. The presence of an underlying 
regulative dimension was tested via principal component analysis and confirmed with structural 
equation modelling. Both procedures helped establish that the three policy areas belong to an overall 
regulative policy dimension.44 The latent construct obtained from the structural equation model will 
serve as our indicator of regulative economic policy.  
For both welfare generosity and deregulation, cabinets (rather than country-years) are the more 
suitable temporal and substantial units of analysis because the preferences of political parties are 
expected to gain effectiveness within governmental periods (see Schmitt 2015). Hence, we use cabinets 
as our unit of analysis. 
 
3.4.6 Main Independent Variables: PRRPs in Government 
PRRPs are expected to influence policymaking via their participation in government. Table 1 lists the 
parties we regard as being PRRPs and the years and cabinets in which they have achieved formal or 
informal government participation. We define parties as being formal coalition partners when they are 
represented in the executive decision-making body, the cabinet, and support their coalition partner(s) 
                                                 
43 While the inclusion of additional policy fields would surely be plausible, our selection is motivated by the overall 
importance of these three areas for national political economies as well as by the availability of quantitative data. 
44 The latent variable model shows an almost perfect model fit (X²=0.00***; CFI 1.0). The specific results are reported in 




in the legislative arena. In contrast, informal coalition partners are not represented in the executive 
but lend support to the coalition in the legislative arena in various forms, ranging from support for 
single but crucial legislative packages (e.g. adoption of the yearly budget) to systematic legislative 
support via sanctioned coalition-agreements (see: Bale and Bergman 2006). With regard to our cases, 
all informal PRRP governments took the form of minority governments in which the legislative 
support of PRRPs was crucial for the governments’ ability to pass legislation. Because of this, we see 
PRRPs in both formal and informal governments as being accountable in the eyes of their voters. In 
order to classify parties as being PRRPs, we follow the definition of Mudde (2007) and see nationalism 
as their core ideological feature, leading to the list of parties presented in Table 1. However, a very 
similar list of PRRPs might be obtained by using alternative definitions (e.g. Carter 2005; Ignazi 2003; 




                                                 
45 However, the Schüssel II government will be analysed in combination with the Schüssel I cabinet. We proceed this way 
because it lasted only one month in 2002 and two in 2003. Therefore, we remain with 19 cases for the statistical analysis.  
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Table 17: PRRPs in government from 1970 to 2010 
 
Country PRRP Government Participation (formal or informal) Duration 
Austria 
Freedom Party (since 
1986 PRRP) 
Formal: 04.02.2000-24.11.2002 (Schüssel I), 
24.11.2002-28.02.2003 (Schüssel II), 





Alliance for the 
Future of Austria 
(BZö) 




Informal: 27.11.2001-18.02.2005 (Rasmussen F I), 
18.02.2005-23.11.2007 (Rasmussen F II), 
23.11.2007-05.04.2009 (Rasmussen F III), 





Italy Northern League 
Formal: 11.05.1994-17.01.1995 (Berlusconi I), 
11.06.2001-28.05.2005 (Berlusconi II), 
28.05.2005-17.05.2006 (Berlusconi III), 





 National Alliance 
Formal: 11.05.1994-17.01.1995 (Berlusconi I), 
11.06.2001-28.05.2005 (Berlusconi II), 




Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn Formal: 21.07.2002-27.05.2003 (Balkenende I) 0 
Norway Progress Party 
Informal: 08.09.1985-09.05.1986 (Willoch III), 
16.10.1989-03.11.1990 (Syse), 




Sweden New Democracy Informal: 03.10.1991-06.10.1994 (Bildt) 1 
Switzerland 
Swiss People’s Party 
(since 1999 PRRP) 
Formal: 15.12.1999-10.12.2003 (Bundesrat 1999), 
10.12.2003-12.12.2007 (Bundesrat 2003), 





Notes: Table 1 reports only PRRPs that have attained informal or formal representation at national government level 
prior to 2010. While most of these cases have also been included in previous studies on the policy impact of PRRPs (De 
Lange 2012; Rovny 2013), the Syse (Norway) and Bildt (Sweden) governments might call for further explanation, as there 
were no official coalition agreements between the PRRPs and the government parties. Concerning Syse, Narud (1995: 10-
11) explains that the centre-right coalition parties were “dependent on the support of the Progress Party” and that the 
good experiences with this support paved the way for the Progress Party’s inclusion in later governments. With regard to 
Sweden, the Bildt government “was dependent on the New Democracy’s support to pass its legislation” making this party 
also a “veto player” for the reform of social policy (Anderson and Immergut 2007, 370). Government duration is coded 
categorically: 0 if the government lasted less than 12 months; 1 if between 12 and 36 months; 2 if for more than 36 months. 
 
3.4.7 Alternative Explanations and Controls 
In order to assess the impact of PRRPs on socio-economic policies, we need to make sure that 
differences are not due to ideological differences in their (right-wing) coalition partners. We start from 
the idea that these differences cannot be fully captured by party families alone. In order to analyse the 
potential impact of PRRPs, we therefore need measures of government positions on redistributive 
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and regulative economic policies beyond mere party lines. To calculate these positions of each single 
party (including PRRPs) we use the Comparative Manifesto Project data (CMP) and follow the 
approach of Röth (2017) by selecting socio-economic policy issues which can be definitely attributed 
either to more market-liberal or state interventionist policies.46 We then calculate government 
positions by weighting each government party’s position by its relative cabinet seat share to account 
for the variety of positions in coalition governments (see Döring and Manow 2012). The resulting 
variable market liberalism of government has been standardized and ranges from 0 (most interventionist) 
to 1 (most market-liberal). Please note that the CMP data does not allow us to separate between 
redistributive and deregulative economic issues. Thus, and if our assumptions on the different interests 
of PRRPs in these two policy dimensions are correct, the overall economic positions of PRRPs might 
appear more centrist than they deserve. While the main objective of the market-liberalism variable is 
to control for the ideology of PRRPs’ coalition partners, this leaves the programmatic effect of PRRPs 
to be explained mainly by the dummy accounting for their government participation.         
The ability of governments to implement reforms in line with their preferences depends on several 
factors. We consider that the most important of these are adequate majorities with sufficient time for 
the implementation of reforms. We control time through the duration of the cabinet in months and 
majorities with the relative cabinet share of seats in parliament. 
Globalization and Europeanization are seen to be the main drivers of welfare state retrenchment and 
especially of economic deregulation. We control for globalization with the proportion of exports and 
imports to overall GDP. The influence of Europeanization is tested by an index of European 
                                                 
46 The aggregated measure of market liberalism vs. state interventionism entails the following categories: Free enterprise 
(401), Incentives (402), Administrative efficiency (303), Economic orthodoxy (414), Regulation (403), Demand 
management (409), Economic planning (404), Controlled economy (412), Nationalization (413), Marxist analysis (415), 
Less spending on welfare (505), Less spending on education (507), Welfare state expansion (504), Social justice (503), 
Environmental protection (501), Anti-Growth (416). The issues are combined via a latent mixed item response model, 
using market liberalism as a latent construct and the empirical Bayesian means for the positional predictions (for a detailed 
discussion of the measure see: Chapter 2). 
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Monetary Union (EMU) integration, summing up the membership levels of the three implementation 
stages. EMU can be seen as the most powerful instrument for restricting the fiscal and monetary 
autonomy of the member states, thereby curbing tendencies towards interventionist economic policies 
(Höpner and Schäfer 2012). 
Besides Globalization and Europeanization, the so-called post-industrial context is seen as having 
an impact on distributive and regulative economic policies. We capture the conflicting assumptions 
related to the post-industrialization arguments (Iversen and Cusack 2000) with a control consisting of 
the percentage of the working-age population active in the service sector. We also include union density as 
a control because organized labour might be a relevant opponent of both less redistributive and more 
market-liberal reforms. 
Short- and long-term economic and demographic developments are major drivers of welfare 
generosity. Unemployment is an important influence on this and varies significantly in the short-run. 
Consequently, the lagged level and changes in unemployment are controlled for in the models. The 
overall affluence of a society is controlled by the Chain index – the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita. In addition, we include the growth rate of GDP in order to capture economic cycles. We control 
for public debt by the lagged level and the change rate, as public obligations should restrict redistributive 
generosity and might make deregulatory policy reforms more necessary. The base and change rate of 
people entitled to pensions is controlled by the proportion of people older than 65 as a percentage of the 
population; child-related welfare demand is captured by the proportion of people younger than 15. Migration 
is seen as an intervening force in social spending, even though expectations in this regard are 
ambiguous (Soroka et al. 2015). We control for its impact by including the net migration rate in our 
models. Finally, each model includes lagged level dependent variables to capture the declining likelihood of 




3.4.8 Quantitative Analysis: Average Effects of PRRP Government Participation 
We present the results of the balanced time-series cross-sectional regression models in Table 2. 
Overall, we estimate four models, two with welfare generosity and two with deregulation as the 
dependent variable. The central independent variables are PRRP government participation, the market 
liberalism of the respective government, and the government duration. Interpreting the effect of the 
PRRP dummy, note that it shows the difference of having a PRRP in government compared with 
market-liberal governments without PRRP participation. The PRRP dummy thus represents the 
distinct combination of redistributive and deregulative issues in the Radical Right’s manifestos, as well 
as the distinct situation these parties are confronted with in terms of logrolling with their mainstream-
right coalition partners. In models 2 and 4, we further analyse this average effect by interacting it with 
government duration. 
Starting with model 1, we compare the average impact of PRRPs on welfare generosity with other 
market-liberal governments – of which PRRP governments are a sub-category of. While the degree of 
market liberalism has a substantial and negative effect on welfare generosity (-2.29***), the average 
effect of PRRPs is positive (+0.59***). Therefore, whereas more market liberal government without 
PRRP inclusion systematically reduce the generosity of the welfare state, PRRPs curb these 
retrenchment efforts significantly while being members of centre-right coalitions. The balanced model 
shows very plausible effects on several other variables and explains a remarkable part of the variance 












































Hypothesis involved H1 H1 H2 H2 
PRRP gov. support 0.59*** -0.52* 0.65 1.88* 
PRRP* Gov. duration - 1.09*** - -1.42 
Market liberalism of government 









Gov. duration (in months) -2.21** -0.77 13.91***  -1.42 
Gov. seat share -1.28* -1.18* -7.52***  -7.39*** 
l. union density -1.34*** -1.85*** -8.82***  -8.02*** 
Δ unemployment -0.60 -0.95 29.82***  32.60*** 
l. unemployment -0.71 -0.03 6.40**  2.88 
De-industrialization -1.20 -2.07** 3.32  3.97 
l. debt 0.00 -0.00 -0.03* -0.01 
Δ debt 0.71 0.59 -9.02*** -8.41** 
Δ GDP 0.08 0.66 28.91***  33.11*** 
Ln GDP -2.77* -4.46*** 3.98 5.42 
Δ pop >65 -0.19 -0.49 -6.22**  -7.69*** 
Δ pop <15 -1.93 -1.23 6.56  5.60 






l. Level Social Spending (2a-2b) - - - - 
l. Level Deregulation (3-4) - - -9.86***  -8.55*** 
Migration rate 1.10 -0.28 -3.24  -0.28 
l. Globalization 3.25** 2.88** -16.01***  -17.29*** 
Δ Globalization -1.65 -2.82** -12.69*** -12.03*** 
EMU-Integration -0.24 0.34 3.68*** 3.30*** 
Cons. 6.75*** 10.39*** -12.53** -15.30** 
R² 0.29 0.39 0.73 0.71 
Number of countries 16 16 17 17 
Time frame  1970-
2010 
1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
n 200 203 237 237 
 Positive cases 19 19 19 19 
Robustness (Appendix Part C) Figure B
  




Notes: * < 0.90; **<0.95; ***<0.99 levels of confidence. All coefficients are standardized by beta weights and 
consequently coefficients are comparable. Δ refers to changes and l to lagged variables.  
 
The difference between market liberal governments with and without PRRP support should increase 
with the time a government has to implement its preferred policies. This is exactly what we find in 
model 2, integrating the interaction between market liberalism and government duration. For the ease 
of interpretation, we graphically present the interaction effect in Figure 1, separating government 
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duration into three categories (short if the government lasted less than 12 months; medium if between 
12 and 36 months; long if for more than 36 months). In the short-run, PRRPs do not significantly 
matter for the generosity of benefits. However, with increasing time the differences play out very 
clearly. Whereas market-liberal governments pursue welfare retrenchment, governments with PRRP 
support defend the status quo or even slightly increase the generosity of the welfare state. The models 
1 and 2 therefore give support for H1.   
 
Figure 13: Average marginal effects (AME) on welfare generosity and spending conditional on government duration 
 
 
Coming to the regulatory dimension of economic policies, model 3 shows that market liberal 
governments substantially and significantly deregulate the economy (+11.82***). While the effect of 
PRRP cabinet participation on deregulation is also positive, it turns out as insignificant (+0.65; model 
4). Therefore, market liberal governments with PRRP participation are not less inclined to 




























Government duration (0 = short, 1 = medium, 2 = long)
PRRP support Market liberal governments
AME with 90% CIs on Generosity
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turning to the interaction of time and ideology in Figure 2, we see that this general statement on the 
limited impact of PRRPs on deregulation is mainly due to the shorter government duration of PRRP 
cabinets. While market liberal governments without PRRPs are strong drivers of deregulation once 
they have sufficient time to shape their preferred policies, the impact of market liberal governments 
with PRRPs is slightly positive and turns to zero for long-term governments. Disaggregating the effect 
of PRRPs on the three sub-dimensions of deregulation, we observe that PRRPs seem more open to 
labour market deregulation and privatization than to financial market deregulation (see Appendix Part 
C, Figure E). As the former forms of deregulation directly or indirectly affect the power of organized 
labour, these findings are in line with our theoretical expectations. However, for all three sub 
dimensions we find that centre-right governments with PRRPs are still less inclined to deregulation 
than centre-right governments without PRRPs.    
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In sum, the quantitative analysis shows that governments with PRRP have a different impact on 
redistributive and regulatory economic policies than centre-right governments without PRRP support. 
Regarding the former, their impact on welfare generosity is in line with vote-seeking explanations. 
PRRPs tend to block the retrenchment agenda of their mainstream right coalition partners. Regarding 
deregulation, the effect of PRRPs in government is overall supportive and crucially hinges on the 
opportunity structure of governments. PRRPs seem to hesitantly support the deregulation agenda of 
their market liberal allies, especially so in the areas of the labour market and privatization of former 
state owned companies. However, market liberal governments without PRRPs deregulate these policy 
areas far more.  
 
3.4.9 Selections for case study analysis 
 
The quantitative models provide evidence on the average relationship of PRRPs as government 
members and the resultant change in redistributive and regulative policies. The main aim of the 
following qualitative case studies is to trace how PRRPs shape formulation and implementation in 
redistributive and regulative policies. There are arguably multiple ways to select cases for intensive 
analysis drawing on quantitative analysis (Lieberman 2005; Weller and Barnes 2014). We follow the 
rationale of Weller and Barnes (2014) in proposing to use quantitative information for the selection 
of pathway cases: cases which have a high likelihood of allowing the observability of the mechanism 
(Gerring, 2007) which is theoretically expected, and whose presence is assumed by quantitative models 
at another level of causality. 
The basic idea is not to rely on the predictive fit of a case in a quantitative model alone (as e.g. 
Lieberman 2005 suggests), because a good prediction can be caused by many other variables beside 
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the main one of interest (Rohlfing 2008). Therefore, we select a case with good prediction and choose 
a second case for comparison with very similar attributes on all the important control variables. 
Thereby, we raise the likelihood that the observed mechanism is due to the factor we are interested in 
– namely the presence of a PRRP in government. To ensure this similarity we apply coarsened exact 
matching (Iacus, King and Porro 2012), as it allows us to select cases that vary as little as possible with 
respect to variables other than the one of interest. The rationale is straightforward, as coarsened exact 
matching provides us with comparable cases within different strata from which we select the “most 
similar” ones.47  
We apply this method by selecting every important variable for the model of welfare generosity as 
well as for the model of economic regulation. The results indicate different groups for comparison 
which have highly similar covariates but differ in the presence of a PRRP in government. As it turns 
out, multiple comparisons might be justified by the procedure, however we prefer within-country over 
cross-country comparisons because we assume unobserved characteristics to be more similar in 
within-country analysis.48 Therefore, we choose a comparison between the Klima I (no PRRP 
participation) and the Schuessel I (FPÖ participation) cabinets in Austria.  
Table 3 illustrates the distribution of the dependent and the most important independent variables 
for the two cases and shows their comparability with regard to the most important explanatory 
variables: the degree of programmatic market liberalism as well as the economic fundamentals hardly 
                                                 
47 Alternative procedures are mainly based on regression residuals or the propensity score. However, different compositions 
of residuals allow strongly unbalanced comparisons in principle (Rohlfing 2008). Selections based on propensity scores 
avoid selection bias of the treated, but fail to balance those covariates which do not relate to the treatment variable (King 
et al. 2011). 
48 See Table D and E in the Online Appendix for the alternative comparisons following the CEM procedure. We could 
have analyzed the Balkenende I cabinet in the Netherlands or different Bundesrat cabinets in Switzerland. However, we 
decided not to choose one of them, because the Balkenende I cabinet had a very short duration and the cases in Switzerland 
have a much longer timespan than the ones we selected. Also, government participation in Switzerland is a problematic 
concept in cross-national comparisons because of the well-known “Zauberformel”, leading to the unique setting that here 
a PRRP is in a coalition with mainstream-left parties.   
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vary, both had exactly 33 months in government, the amount of public debt is almost identical, and 
the lagged level of unemployment is basically the same.  
 
Table 19: Characteristics of the selected cases 
      Dependent Variables 
  

















































































































































             
1997-
1999 
Austria Klima I -2.20 0.82 5.10 0.62 4.03 0.20 3.24 91.84 33 68,11 
2000-
2002 
Austria Schuessel I 2.00 0.82 9.02 0.66 4.00 -0.33 2.02 83.81 33 67,54 
Notes: Our calculation is based on the coarsened exact matching results.  
 
3.4.10 Qualitative Analysis: Austria 1997-2003 
Our case study analysis focuses on Austria, one of the first Western European countries where a PRRP 
participated directly in a coalition government. In 2000, decades of power-sharing between the SPÖ 
(Social Democrats) and the ÖVP (Conservatives) came to an end when the Conservatives decided to 
form an alliance with the FPÖ, led at the time by the late Jörg Haider, giving rise to widespread 
international criticism. After decades of a de facto duopoly between the two mainstream parties, the 
FPÖ presented an interesting coalition alternative for the ÖVP to push a liberal agenda that had been 
systematically blocked by the SPÖ and the unions (Obinger and Tálos 2006, 23). Here, we compare 
the grand coalition SPÖ-ÖVP headed by Viktor Klima that preceded the accession to power of the 
FPÖ with the FPÖ-ÖVP coalition headed by Wolfgang Schüssel. Our case comparison makes it 
possible to find some insights into the effect of PRRP participation in government. We focus on 
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welfare reforms as measures of redistribution and privatisation and the regulation of public 
monopolies as measures of (de-)regulation. 
 
The Klima Cabinet Reforms (1997-2000) 
 
In 1997, PM Viktor Klima (SPÖ) accessed the Austrian premiership as part of a grand coalition with 
the Conservative ÖVP. Klima was the Finance minister under Franz Vranitzky’s previous grand 
coalition cabinet established after the 1995 elections, and was close to Third Way ideas. As such, he 
was committed to some degree of fiscal consolidation, to a moderate departure from the strongly 
compromise-oriented type of corporatist negotiation that characterised policymaking (Karlhofer and 
Tálos 2000), and to a moderate reduction of state intervention. An important backdrop of economic 
reforms in that period was the peculiarly important role of the Austrian state in the economy, and the 
strong connections between the main political parties and the largest industries and banks. In 1989, 
the Austrian government was the biggest owner of listed Austrian companies, controlling 37% of 
shares (Ditz 2010, 243-4). Moreover, a large part of the industrial and banking sector was indirectly 
controlled by the main parties. For instance, the two largest banks, the Creditanstalt and Bank Austria, 
were closely connected to the Conservative ÖVP (“black”) and the Social Democrats (“red”) 
respectively. For many experts, the large size of the state-controlled sector was considered inefficient 
and costly. 
In many ways, economic reforms during this period were spurred by the accession of Austria to 
the European community and the implementation of the rules of the Single European Market. A 
significant movement of deregulation and opening was undertaken from the early 1990s onwards, 
especially in the areas of telecommunications. Based on a law passed in 1993, twenty-seven 
privatisations were initiated (Ditz 2010, 243-4). This movement peaked in 1998, when privatisations 
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proceeds generated about 12% of GDP (Belke and Schneider 2003: 18), the greatest share accounted 
for by Telecom privatizations.  
In some areas, however, liberalisation during the Klima cabinet was thwarted by the interests of 
the mainstream parties. For instance, even if both mainstream parties in the coalition had agreed earlier 
on a wide-ranging programme of the privatisation of the banking sector, the actual implementation of 
this programme was considerably protracted because parties proved very reluctant to hand out a 
significant part of their economic power. In 1994, an attempt by the Swiss bank Credit Suisse to take a 
participation in the Creditanstalt was thwarted in the middle of coalition infighting, with parties eager 
to keep the bank under Austrian control. Later on, an attempt by the “red” Bank Austria to buy the 
“black” Creditanstalt created again conflict within the coalition (Berliner Zeitung 1997), was perceived 
as a hostile takeover and severely undermined the trust between the coalition partners. Most 
importantly, this episode showed the limits of the grand coalition to pursue actual liberalisation, and 
was presented by the FPÖ and its leader Jörg Haider as a yet another proof of the cartelisation of 
Austrian politics and the grip of mainstream parties on the economy.  
In the area of welfare, the Klima cabinet set about to implement an encompassing reform of the 
pension system that would significantly reduce the contribution of the federal state. This reform 
included a change in the mode of calculation of benefits taking into account the whole career of 
workers rather than the best years only, and penalties for people retiring early (Schludi 2005, 75). The 
plan faced fierce resistance from the unions, which organised mass demonstrations against it (Schludi 
2005, 175-6). Interestingly, even the FPÖ was staunchly against the plan (Schludi 2005, 169). In a 
context where the ruling SPÖ had strong ties with the labour unions, the government decided to 
involve them and negotiate concessions, but their support could not be garnered. Within the centre-
right ÖVP, this led to voices demanding that the unions be side-lined altogether. However, the number 
of union-affiliated MPs within the social democrats gave the unions de facto veto power, thereby 
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blocking the reform and even risked a vote of no confidence in parliament. Eventually, a very 
substantially watered-down version of the reform was passed and agreed with the labour unions.  
Even if deadlock had been overcome, it became clear to the conservative ÖVP and its new leader 
Wolfgang Schüssel that substantial reforms geared towards fiscal consolidation and economic 
liberalisation would be too difficult to pass in a coalition with the SPÖ, given their strong ties with the 
unions (Luther 2010, 81). From a more party-political point of view, seeking an alliance with the FPÖ 
was also a way to counter the ascendency that the “red” bloc constituted by the social democrats and 
unions were garnering, as shown by the takeover of the Creditanstalt. 
 
The Schüssel Cabinet Reforms (2000-2003) 
 
The 1999 Austrian federal elections yielded unexpected results: the SPÖ came first as expected with 
33.2% of the vote, but Jörg Haider’s anti-immigration FPÖ came second (with 26.9%) by a few 
hundred votes over the ÖVP (26.9%). While the social democrats were ready to negotiate yet another 
grand coalition with the ÖVP, the latter refused and eventually agreed on a government programme 
with the FPÖ (Obinger and Tálos 2006, 9). In many ways, building a coalition with the FPÖ was 
perceived as an opportunity for the ÖVP to push through the retrenchment and deregulation measures 
which had been watered down while in government with the social democrats. In this context, the 
ÖVP-FPÖ coalition set about implementing a drastic programme of austerity measures that would 
scale back a number of social programmes and public spending in general (Obinger and Tálos 2010). 
The government was determined to reduce public spending to a greater extent and at a quicker pace 
than any of its predecessors (Ditz 2010, 245). The FPÖ received important portfolios in this area, 
notably Finance and Social Affairs (Luther 2010, 88; Ennser-Jedenastik 2016: 415). 
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While the pension reform of the previous government had been substantially watered down by the 
power of unions, the Schüssel government opted for side-lining them in the decision-making process, 
thereby breaking with a longstanding tradition of corporatist agreement in Austrian policymaking. The 
FPÖ did not oppose this strategy as it was in line with its longstanding hostility to union power. In 
this context, a major pension reform provided for an increase in the retirement age, cuts to benefits 
for people retiring early, a higher retirement age for public servants and a reform of widows’ pensions. 
This reform was similar to the one passed in 1997, but its fiscal retrenchment component was to be 
achieved within a space of three years whereas the watered-down reform of 1997 was supposed to 
achieve the same within 30 years (Schludi 2005, 180). Over the two cabinets led by the ÖVP with 
FPÖ support, public spending as a share of GDP decreased from 51.4 per cent in 2000 to 48.2 per 
cent in 2007 (Ditz 2010, 248). 
The FPÖ had initially signed up to the retrenchment agenda of the ÖVP but afterwards 
significantly tempered its impetus for welfare retrenchment when it realised it severely hurt its own 
electorate (Heinisch 2003). Before accessing power, the party had combined a form of “welfare 
populism” advocating fiscal retrenchment at the expense of self-serving public servants and politicians 
on the one hand, combined with a staunch defence of acquired rights and promises of increased 
spending targeted at its working-class clientele on the other. Hence, the party had always opposed 
retrenchment for existing pensions, and defended benefits for “deserving” recipients such as the sick, 
disabled, elderly, and mothers (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016: 418). The party had also been keen on public 
spending if it served electoral purposes, as the record of Jörg Haider in government in the Land of 
Carinthia demonstrated. One of his flagship measures had been, for instance, the “Kinderscheck” a 
monthly payment paid to mothers for each child, making the region the most generous for family 
allowances in Austria. He also initiated a “mother’s pension” allocating 150 euros extra for “deserving” 
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mothers above 60, heavily subsidised gas and other benefits targeted at pensioners in particular, often 
handed out in cash in front of TV cameras (Profil 2009).  
In 2002, early elections were held after the resignation of several FPÖ ministers and the collapse 
of the coalition. The FPÖ was severely damaged, losing 34 seats and two-thirds of its votes, and joined 
another coalition with the ÖVP on a much weaker basis. In 2003, after this major electoral defeat, the 
FPÖ sought to temper the move by the ÖVP to reform the pension system. While it had agreed on 
the broad agenda of a major pension reform, internal opposition within the party led the sitting social 
affairs Minister to ask for a referendum on the issue (Schludi 2005, 187). After the reform was 
eventually agreed in cabinet, on the next day eight of the FPÖ’s eighteen MPs declared they would 
not support the bill in the plenary vote unless there were further measures to alleviate changes (Luther 
2010, 96). The party was also able to introduce a few compensation measures targeted at its own 
clientele. One of them was the so-called “Hacklerregelung”, which allowed older workers in specific 
physically demanding professions - one of its core clienteles – to retire early (Ennser-Edenastik 2016: 
420). In this context, the party clearly sought to act as a retrenchment brake to preserve its electoral 
prospects. 
In the areas of privatisation and liberalisation, where the direct costs to voters were less clear, the 
government pursued reforms in a fairly unrestricted manner. For instance, measures of financial 
liberalisation passed under the Schüssel cabinet allowed for a five-fold increase in the market 
capitalisation of the Vienna stock exchange (Ditz 2010, 254). For the first time, the cabinet planned 
the total handover of ownership of a number of former state monopolies to the private sector. With 
a new law, they transformed the state holding agency tasked with managing state participation in 
industrial sectors (ÖIAG - Österreichischen Industrieholding Aktiengesellschaft) into a privatisation agency.  
The state totally rescinded its participation in airports, the tobacco industry, banks and other industrial 
sectors, and reduced its participation in Telekom Austria and the Austrian Post (Kepplinger 2009: 1-
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2). In 2001 alone, privatisation proceeds reached 925 million Euros. This partly continued the 
movement started in the 1990s, but also accelerated in a number of domains, for instance in railways, 
which yielded significant resistance from the unions (Ditz 2010, 245).  
For both the ÖVP and the FPÖ, privatisation was much less controversial than welfare reform 
because it involved lower electoral costs and even concrete strategic benefits for both parties. For the 
ÖVP, privatization was a way to weaken trade unions and social democrats, whose power base lay in 
the state monopolies. For the FPÖ, privatization was a way to dismantle the political cartel that 
controlled large parts of the Austrian political economy, to which they had never belonged, and 
perhaps place some of their officials in bureaucratic positions of influence. This strategy became 
explicit when the coalition adopted a new rule in 2001 to bar the representation of organizations with 
collective bargaining rights in the board of the Association of Social Security Providers, an 
organisation hitherto governed according to the principle of self-government. This new rule was 
notably used to deny the chair of the Union of Railway Employees a seat on the governing board of 
the institution. This decision was later overturned by the Constitutional court. In the area of 
deregulation, the electoral trade-offs faced by the Radical Right in the area of welfare were less present, 
and the interests of the PRRP and the mainstream right were more aligned. 
  
3.4.11 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
While previous studies of the policy impact of PRRPs have focused almost exclusively on cultural 
issues, the impact of these on socio-economic policy formulation has so far largely been ignored by 
researchers and commentators. Our mixed methods comparative study of the impact of PRRPs on 
redistributive and (de-)regulative economic policies takes a first step towards filling the gap and 
unpacking the logic that shapes socio-economic policy-making in cabinets with and without PRRPs. 
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Starting with the finding that, so far, Western European PRRPs have only been able to form coalitions 
with market-liberal mainstream parties, our results indicate that governments with PRRP participation 
show less political will to retrench welfare benefits compared with other centre-right governments. In 
contrast, coalitions with PRRP participation show significantly more political will to deregulate – and 
especially to privatize – the economy, even if these efforts are not as pronounced as those of market-
liberal governments without PRRP participation. Both with regard to redistributive and deregulative 
policies, differences between PRRP and non-PRRP governments become more visible for long-term 
governments with sufficient time to implement such reforms.   
Based on our mixed methods design, we see two interrelated arguments for why PRRPs do allow 
for greater deregulation but not for greater welfare state retrenchment when participating in 
government. First, the working-class constituency of PRRPs makes it difficult for these parties to 
openly support welfare retrenchment, especially when it comes to traditional social insurance schemes 
benefitting their electoral clienteles, such as pensions. Secondly, restrained by their voters’ interests, 
PRRPs do offer their centre-right coalition parties concessions with regard to deregulation. In the 
following, we would like to point to the theoretical implications of these findings for further research 
and also discuss how they are supported or contradicted by the quantitative and the qualitative parts 
of our mixed-methods design.   
Starting with welfare generosity, our quantitative analysis broadly supports the theoretical 
expectation that PRRPs will have difficulties in following a program of retrenchment because of their 
rather left-leaning voter bases. The qualitative case study on Austria made it possible to nuance this 
view, as the FPÖ indeed supported the welfare retrenchment effort of the ÖVP, until it realised that 
it was damaging electorally and afterwards sought to temper the retrenchment impetus of its coalition 
partner. We see this as a telling example that the immigration-focused Radical Right might not be 
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aware of the electoral consequences of their socio-economic agenda – a situation that might be 
especially relevant for PRRPs with no former governmental experience.  
With regard to deregulation, the political agendas of centre right and PRRPs find common ground, in 
particular where traditional structures of market regulation are dominated by labour unions. 
Privatization of state owned companies and deregulation of labour markets not only constitute 
liberalization efforts per se, but also erode the power base of PRRP competitors such as left-wing 
parties. This strategy is emphasised by Jensen (2014) when he talks about the “erode and attack” 
strategy pursued by right-wing governments to undermine their left competitors. In our study, the 
quantitative influence is shown by the positive effects of PRRPs in government on labour market 
deregulation and privatization. It is complemented by the case studies demonstrating similar results 
on another level of causality. In Austria, the Radical Right also supported privatisation efforts which 
could undermine the power base of trade unions and social democrats.  
In the long run, changing the actors that implement policies might have an even greater impact 
than directly changing the policies. Future research should therefore pay much more attention to these 
procedural changes. The arena of industrial relations seems especially promising for such analyses, as 
changes here might also feed back into redistributive issues. Also, focussing on the role of salience for 
the policy reform agenda of PRRPs could be a valuable avenue for research. In line with Culpepper 
(2010), it seems easier to liberalize in domains that are not very salient or technical (such as economic 
regulation) than in ones that are highly politicized (such as welfare issues) and our analysis is very 
much in line with this general statement. While such differences are surely relevant for all parties and 
are well documented in research on welfare state retrenchment (Pierson 1996), salience might play an 
extraordinary role for the strategies of PRRPs, because it makes it more difficult to “blur” their 
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PART IV | MARKET LIBERALISM AND THE 
SUPERIMPOSITION OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS 
 
4.1 Market liberalism and territoriality 
Promotors of the ideology of market liberalism have never systematically articulated a stance on 
territoriality. Nonetheless, there exists several entry points for the derivation of policy preferences 
between centralization and decentralization. Since the 1980s decentralization has been promoted as a 
good public policy by many market liberals for the developing world (see Wibbels 2005 for a sceptical 
assessment of the related policies). Based on Tiebouts’ notion of “voting by feet” (1956), 
decentralization has been promoted as a territorial order with competition inducing effect. At the same 
time, market liberal have often been hesitant to accommodate regional demand for authority in cases 
the demand was framed as an identity issue, usually raised by national minorities (Verge 2013). There 
is growing literature on partisan ideology and preferences towards territoriality which will be addressed 
in the following chapters. Furthermore, these chapters entail a theoretical complement to the existing 
approaches which is first tested on cases in Turkey (Chapter 4.2) and in a second step assessed on a 
broader sample including 14 countries with substantial demand from specific national minorities. This 
complement is a theory André Kaiser and I call ideological authority insulation. Following the theory, 
political parties in governments only empower sub-national territories in case where the majority of 
the sub-national territory is ideologically close to the main governing party on a market dimension. 
Accordingly, market liberals superimposes genuine territorial concerns with the rationale to empower 




4.2 Centre–Periphery Conflict and Ideological Distance in Turkey49 
This chapter integrates ideology into a game-theoretical model of centre-periphery bargains. 
Ideological differences between national and sub-national elites constitute a major obstacle for the 
accommodation of autonomy claims. While reforms bringing about decentralization are often analysed 
systematically as well as through case studies, cases where, despite claims to autonomy, decentralization 
does not occur have been largely neglected by scholars of territorial politics. Turkey is such a ‘negative 
case’. We argue that ideological distance prevents national parties from accommodating peripheral 
authority claims. We test our expectation with a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative 
analysis of party positions with in-depth qualitative analysis of party documents showing how the 
different ideological positions of national and Kurdish parties affect decentralization demand and 
national response in Turkey between 1987 and 2015. Our findings support the theoretical expectations, 
but also point to additional inferences. Whereas asymmetric authority demands have been widely 
ignored, symmetric local autonomy has become an important issue in territorial politics.  
The partisan representatives of Kurdish citizens in Turkey have long striven for more autonomy. 
Their claims have a strong identity component rooted in cultural differences and precedents of 
autonomy in neighbouring countries. Economic power has partially shifted from the western industrial 
areas of Turkey to the central ‘Anatolian Tiger’ provinces (Tok 2008; World Bank 2015, 96); the areas 
of dense Kurdish population remain poor on average, but still provide about 6 per cent of Turkey’s 
GDP between 1987 and 2015 (TUIK 2015).50 This is slightly more than the ratio of the Scottish GDP 
to the overall GDP of the United Kingdom. Adding to the economic importance and territorial size 
                                                 
49 This Chapter is an article co-authored with André Kaiser, Çağan Varol (all University of Cologne) and Uğur Sadioğlu 
(Hacettepe University) and published in Swiss Political Science Review (2016). 




of the Kurdish populated areas, Kurdish autonomy claims challenge the centralist and nationalist 
attitudes of many Turkish elites. Territorial integrity and cultural unity are of particular concern for 
conservative political actors in Ankara. Hence, the centre in Turkey depends on the Kurdish areas in 
economic as well as symbolic terms.  
Autonomy for the Kurdish region, secession as well as irredentist mobilization are preferred options 
for the Kurdish majorities in eastern Turkey. This underpins the credibility of the autonomy demands. 
Thus, this case fulfils all conditions referred to in the introduction of this special issue. This should 
lead us to expect that the centre at some point concedes to the Kurdish demands (Mueller et al. 2016e). 
Admittedly, in many other cases regions with comparable minority mobilization and economic and 
symbolic capacities received asymmetric authority and thereby a recognition of their specific identity. 
In the Turkish case, however, there is no single instance in recent decades where the government 
signalled its willingness to accommodate Kurdish autonomy demand.  
Existing theories of national partisan preferences towards minority accommodation fail to predict 
the unresolved “Kurdish question”. We argue that the main factor preventing movement towards a 
more decentralized Turkish state is the ideological distance between neo-liberal and culturally 
conservative national governments in Ankara and the Marxist and culturally pluralist mobilization of 
Kurdish political actors. Hence, we add the role of ideological distance between partisan actors to the 
analysis of centre–periphery conflicts and integrate ideology into a game-theoretical model. Since many 
case studies, as well as systematic evidence, point to a positive relationship between ideological 
proximity and transfers of authority to the periphery, we complement the causal symmetry with a 
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‘negative case’ – one where against the expectations of other theoretical approaches authority transfers 
fail to occur.51  
We critically discuss existing approaches to explaining asymmetric decentralization and conceptually 
develop our argument that ideological distance is a so far ignored but very important factor. We 
integrate this factor into a game-theoretical model of centre–periphery conflict. Given significant 
ideological distance between national and peripheral political actors, we expect conflict to be the 
outcome instead of exit (secession), loyalty (status quo) or concessions towards asymmetric 
arrangements. Next we test this argument with a mixed-methods approach to Turkish party 
competition. Quantitatively, we use party manifesto-based preference mappings to illustrate the 
constellation of actors on economic, cultural and territorial dimensions. Important veto players, such 
as the Constitutional Court (CC), the National Security Council (NSC) and the president are taken into 
consideration. Qualitatively, using party documents and legislative proposals, we trace the development 
of party preferences, their framing and also attempts to implement territorial reforms between 1987 
and 2015.  
The analysis largely confirms our quantitative findings. National parties most of the time ignore 
Kurdish claims to autonomy. Decentralization at the local level became a major issue for the national 
parties. However, the discourse about local authority was entirely decoupled from Kurdish autonomy 
demands and evolved as part of the populist and peripheral mobilization strategy of Islamic parties. 
Accordingly, the framing and meaning of local authority is very different for central and peripheral 
parties. Kurdish parties frame local and regional authority as part of radical democracy, striving for 
                                                 
51 A negative case is a case which lacks the outcome of interest. Additionally, informative negative cases are characterized 
by the possibility principle. This principle states that relevant negative cases are those where the outcome has a real chance 
of occurring (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 654). In our case the realistic possibility of authority accommodation is given 
through the presence and powerful mobilization of the Kurdish minority as well through the fact that a number of existing 
theories would predict authority transfers to Kurdish dominated regions. 
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effective political decentralization of sub-national entities. The national government parties 
overwhelmingly frame local authority in terms of effective public service provision and mainly refer to 
administrative decentralization. These differences reflect the ideological differences on the other 
dimensions. Neo-liberal, nationalist and Islamic ideologies prevail on the national level and contrast 
sharply with the culturally pluralist and market-sceptic mobilization of Kurdish parties.  
 
4.2.1 Decentralization Claims and National Responses: The Role of Ideological Differences 
Asymmetric claims for territorially based authority always come with an identity component. Ethnicity, 
due to its malleability, underlies many claims to political self-determination (Chandra 2012). In 
multinational states the mobilization of national minorities results in claims to political self-
determination or co-decision rights on a territorial basis (Keating 2001). The claimants usually envisage 
an institutionalized asymmetric authority which underlines their distinctiveness (Stepan 2001). These 
recognized differences are mirrored in de jure asymmetric authority arrangements (McGarry 2005), 
which differ from de facto political differences in federated or decentralized states. Hence 
asymmetrically distributed authority is a political answer to identity claims (Hooghe et al. 2015). It is, 
however, just one plausible answer to sub-national demand, with other responses ranging from 
symmetric federalism and consociational arrangements to ignorance, suppression, military conflict and 
secession.  
In order to explain this variation in the willingness of national actors to accommodate authority 
claims, scholars turn to national actors’ preferences on the territorial dimension (De Winter et al. 2006; 
Massetti and Schakel 2016). But these revealed preferences do not show very systematic patterns. 
Moreover, they are only weakly related to an overall left–right dimension of political conflict or to 
economic and cultural sub-dimensions (Toubeau and Wagner 2015; Swenden and Maddens 2009). 
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Several concepts are proposed to make sense of the erratic nature of signalled preferences on 
territoriality by national mainstream parties. The electoral vulnerability concept starts from the 
assumption that national parties are willing to decentralize in order to prevent losses in a particular 
sub-state at national elections (Meguid 2009; Alonso 2012). The congruence concept argues that if the 
same party governs on several territorial levels at the same time, this facilitates authority shifts due to 
internal party pressure (Elias and Tronconi 2011, 518–20; Petersohn et al. 2015, 629). The authority 
insulation concept argues that shifts of authority occur in order to empower national actors on a sub-
national level if they expect to gain stable majorities in these areas (O’Neill 2005). This argument 
implies the perceived stability of electoral support of the political party over time and at different levels. 
Authority is insulated in areas which are electoral strongholds, irrespective of their electoral or 
economic importance (O’Neill 2003). 
The concepts of vulnerability, congruence and insulation build on different causal mechanisms and 
lead to different expectations with regard to territorial reform. The electoral vulnerability argument 
argues that authority is transferred to sub-national levels with the aim of securing national majorities 
(Alonso 2012). In contrast, congruence and insulation refer to an empowerment of the same party on 
another territorial level. Others argue that the bargaining power of regional minorities can lead to 
national actors’ willingness to accommodate irrespective of their genuine preferences. Once 
mobilization for autonomy is given and exit seems a viable option, the bargaining power of minorities 
depends on the economic and/or symbolic dependency of the centre on that particular periphery 
(Mueller et al. 2015). However, cases where accommodation fails to appear for important regions with 
viable exit-options cast the explanatory power of all the accounts mentioned so far into doubt. We 
claim that Turkey is such a case. The south-eastern provinces are electorally, economically and 
symbolically an important part of the Turkish nation and the signalled request for authority is highly 
credible, but the claims to autonomy have so far led to hostile reactions. 
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We argue that national government parties may be willing to shift authority to those regions where 
ideologically proximate parties govern.52 Our theory of ideological authority insulation (Röth and 
Kaiser 2016) claims that asymmetric authority shift is a likely outcome if two factors come together: 
credible minority mobilization and stable ideological proximity between national and regional political 
elites.  
The calculus of ideological insulation builds on two causal bases. One argument relates to increased 
control by replacing or side-lining elites. Additionally, authority shifts may lead to establishing new 
institutions and new positions which can be staffed with allies. Thereby, asymmetric decentralization 
serves to mobilize support and to consolidate control by replacing or side-lining the sub-national elites 
of ideological opponents (Boone 2003, 356; Aalen and Muriaas 2015).  
Our argument can be made explicit by formulating it in a game-theoretical way. The empowerment 
of ideological allies on the sub-national level alters the structure of costs and benefits for national 
parties as well for minorities. A shift towards more authority for ideological allies on the sub-national 
level creates veto players for competing parties on the national level who may enter government in 
future. Thus, for the party which shifts authority to sub-national levels, empowering ideological allies 
may achieve considerable long-term gains. The reform may be seen as a means to solve a prisoner’s 
dilemma by institutionalizing authority differences in a short-term equilibrium (Zuber 2011).  
Asymmetric authority claims are articulated because minorities have strong reservations about the 
location of authority in the centre (Zuber 2011). From the regional-minority perspective, the risks of 
                                                 
52 For earlier arguments in this direction – which, however, have so far not been systematically developed on the conceptual 
level and tested empirically – see Garman et al. 2001; Maddens and Libbrecht 2009; Toubeau and Massetti 2013; Toubeau 
and Wagner 2015. In contrast to the niche-party literature (Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012), we assume that claimants to more 
regional authority do have an ideological stance. Since these parties offer their population the option of a new state or 
autonomously governed territory, by definition they provide their potential voters with a broader vision of society beyond 
mere claims of authority. 
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being governed centrally should decrease with ideological proximity, reducing the willingness to secede 
and moderate the claims towards authority. Asymmetric arrangements attempt to alter the risk 
calculations of the minorities and keep them in the state (Young 1994). Consequently, ideological 
similarity drives minority challengers as well as national actors to consent. In contrast, ideological 
distance increases the incentives for confrontation symmetrically.  
Accounting for ideological differences solves the puzzling fact that the same national elites follow 
different strategies towards different regions in the same country. In Zuber’s illustrative case, Tatarstan 
and Bashkortostan succeeded in their autonomy claims, gaining far-reaching asymmetric authority 
from the Russian government; while Chechnya failed to receive any specific recognition (Zuber 2011, 
557–64). Such differences can be observed in other countries as well. In some cases no institutional 
recognition of self-determination is achieved at all, even though national minorities are mobilized to a 
considerable degree. As we argue, the pay-offs in an asymmetric decentralization game are 
tremendously altered when ideological distance between national and minority elites is factored in (see 
Table 1).  
The incentive to decentralize under ideological proximity (Solution B) is even higher than in the 
model suggested by Zuber (Solution A). Empowering ideological allies brings long-term gains because 
national elites basically install a power base by the replacement or consolidation of regional elites. 
Under the assumption of ideological proximity asymmetric arrangements are likely to occur. It is 
actually not even a prisoner’s dilemma any more, but the dominant strategy, because both actors 
benefit most from the asymmetry solution (NE: AA > SQ > VC > S, RE: AA > S > SQ > VC). In 
contrast, the empowerment of ideologically distant actors comes with considerable long-term costs. 
These costs of establishing a power base for political opponents and of possibly dealing with spill-over 
effects to other territorial entities in the longer term make accommodation under ideological distance 
very unlikely and reduce the willingness of national actors to accommodate authority demands 
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(Solution C). Ideologically distant regional elites prefer secession or asymmetry over being dominated 
by national ideological opponents (status quo), but national elites neither accept the separation of 
territory because secession is a major symbol of weakness nor accommodate towards the asymmetry 
option as this is also very costly in political terms. Therefore violent confrontation turns out to be the 
likely outcome under the assumption of considerable ideological distance (NE: SQ > VC > AA > S; 
RE: S > AA > VC > SQ).  
Table 20: Confrontation Game with Ideological Constraints 
NE      /     RE Cooperation Defection 
Cooperation 
Asymmetric Arrangement (AA) 
Solution A: 3/3  
Solution B: 4/4 
Solution C: 2/3 
Secession (S) 
Solution A: 1/4  
Solution B: 1/3 
Solution C: 1/4 
Defection 
 
Status Quo (SQ) 
Solution A: 4/1  
Solution B: 3/2 
Solution C: 4/1 
 
Violent Confrontation (VC) 
Solution A: 2/2  
Solution B: 2/1 
Solution C: 3/2 
Note: Solution A is borrowed from Zuber (2011), leaving ideological concerns aside. Solution B captures the relationship 
between national elites and ideologically proximate regional elites. Solution C depicts the case of ideologically distant elites. 
NE = National Elites; RE = Regional Elites.  
 
4.2.1 A Quantitative Assessment of the Turkish Actor Constellation 
Quantitative evidence supports the ideological similarity argument with regard to both programmatic 
signals (Toubeau and Wagner 2015) and the implementation of asymmetric decentralization reforms 
(Röth and Kaiser 2016). In addition, many case and area studies substantiate this relationship for 
positive cases: that is, cases where decentralization reforms occur. What remains under-researched are 
those cases where reform demands are denied. As a population comprises positive and negative cases 
(Mahoney and Goertz 2004), the absence of asymmetric decentralization despite regional demand is 
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also of theoretical interest. A causal relationship is only well established if it is met by positive and 
negative cases alike (Walker and Cohen 1985).  
Turkey serves as a negative case, because a long history of Kurdish autonomy demands has not so 
far led to concessions by Turkish governments. Our argument leads us to expect that this is due to 
ideological distance between the political parties concerned. We trace the ideological constellations of 
Kurdish parties and the major Turkish national parties from 1987 to 2015. Primary documents, such 
as party manifestos are coded and quantitatively assessed to map the preferences of actors on three 
dimensions: economic, cultural and territorial. The economic dimension captures the degree to which 
political actors advocate social coordination via markets and acceptance of market outcomes (Röth 
2016). On the cultural dimension, we use the acceptance of cultural heterogeneity versus the advocacy 
of cultural homogeneity as conceptual extreme points. The stance on this dimension is reflected by 
more concrete issue positions towards political participation, multiculturalism, protection of minorities 
and nationalism. Both economic and cultural positions are measured by using fine-grained issue 
positions and their saliencies from the CMP/MARPOR dataset (Volkens et al. 2015) according to the 
procedure proposed by Röth (2016). Many important programmes and policy statements in Turkey 
are not available from the CMP dataset. In these cases we coded the documents ourselves using the 
CMP coding scheme.53 We converted the issue positions and salience measures into comparable 
positions.54 
Since national governing parties change and Kurdish parties run through a ‘circle of formation–
closure–formation’ (Watts 2010, 69), the quantitative assessment also gives an overview of the 
                                                 
53 See Table B in the Online Appendix for an overview of the documents used. 
54 Issue emphases are converted to party positions by using the approach of Röth (2016). For the selection, confirmation, 
weighting and aggregating of items via generalized structural equation modelling, see the Online Appendix. For the 
different sources of programmatic documents, see Table F in the Online Appendix. 
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evolution of the complex Turkish party system (see Figure 1). The different Kurdish parties 
(highlighted with a dashed line) adopt very interventionist positions on the economic dimension. In 
only two cases (1991 and 2004), have they contested elections with more moderate centre-left 
positions, motivated by coalition requirements. Between 1987 and 1991 the Kurdish MPs were part of 
the SHP before they founded the HEP.55 In 2002 the DEHAP also followed a coalition strategy with 
the SHP and both parties converged on economic positions.  
Culturally, the Kurdish parties’ pluralist vision of Turkey sets them at an ever increasing distance 
from the AKP and MHP. The AKP stresses the values of Islam as a unifying cultural umbrella, whereas 
the MHP highlights Turkish nationalism. The CHP, as a centre-left party, held relatively monistic views 
until the late 2000s, when they started to move towards more cultural pluralism. With regard to the 
territorial dimension, the Kurdish parties have a tradition of formulating detailed claims to strengthen 
regional and local authority. Successive Turkish governments have perceived these claims as 
challenging the constitutionally protected unity of the Turkish state, often leading to Kurdish parties 
being banned.56   
The Turkish mainstream parties, despite their differences, have mainly adhered to centre and centre-
right economic ideologies since the 1980s. Only the SHP in the early 1990s, and the CHP since 2002, 
have held economically centre-left positions and been able to pass the 10 per cent electoral threshold. 
Our overview also indicates that until the early 2000s Turkish cabinets were short-lived and the party 
of the president and the leading cabinet party rarely corresponded. Only since 2002 with the successive 
majorities of the AKP has the Turkish system become more stable. The corresponding reduction of 
veto powers opened up a window of opportunity for constitutional change. Overall we observe the 
                                                 
55 For party names in English and Turkish, see Table A in the Online Appendix.  
56 A related reason for banning Kurdish parties is their alleged relationship to terrorist activities.  
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largest ideological differences between national governments and Kurdish parties in the 1990s. In the 
early 2000s these differences decreased, but began to rise again when the AKP put more emphasis on 
Islam as the unifying cultural umbrella for Turkey and started to lose votes in the Kurdish regions. 
A detailed account of decentralization preferences is not captured in the CMP/MARPOR data. The 
degree of autonomy claims is based on our detailed coding of programmatic proposals of the Kurdish 
parties (lower part of Figure 1). We explain these preferences in more detail in the qualitative part. 
What is already visible in the quantitative overview, is the correspondence of ideological distance and 
the intensity of the autonomy claims.  
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Figure 15: The Party Constellation in Turkey between 1987 and 2015 
   
Note: Party positions on the two dimensions are measured with CMP/Marpor data using the procedure of Röth (2016). See Appendix Part C for a detailed description 
of the measurement. All manifestos of the Kurdish parties have been coded by the authors (see Appendix Part C, Table F).  
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4.2.2 Territorial Authority in the Turkish Context  
The history of territorial politics in Turkey helps us understand the specific discourse about local 
and regional authority. A system of democratic local government was gradually built up in modern 
Turkey, especially following the establishment of the Republic and the municipal legislation of 
1930. The principle of the election of the mayor by the municipal assembly was then adopted for 
the first time (Harris 1948, 17–18). Later it became possible for mayors to be appointed by the 
minister of the interior or the prefect, although election by the local council is the norm (Harris 
1948, 192). Special Provincial Administrations received their budgets from central government, but 
had limited executive competencies. Provincial assemblies were directly elected, but could not 
exercise legislative authority autonomously, because decisions were subject to the approval of the 
governor. Thus local governments were designed as the ‘local administrations’ of central 
government (Göymen 2004, 31; Bayraktar and Massicard 2012, 11). This ‘tutelage system’ 
engenders constant political conflict,57 because advocates of political decentralization consider only 
its abolition can enable effective local authority. Local authorities were empowered at the 
municipality level, if at all, rather than at intermediate levels, which were politically neutralized 
(Bayraktar and Massicard 2012, 19).  
In the 1980s, Regional Development Administrations (RDADs) were established for the 
development of the south-eastern Anatolia areas. Although having some competences with regard 
to local and regional issues, they were never intended to evolve as entities of regional authority. In 
2006 a new law was introduced which established 26 RDAGs according to the Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics in the European Union (NUTS).  
Actors trying to change the territorial structure of Turkey are confronted with a political system 
equipped with various veto players. With a constitutional change in 2007, the political system may 
                                                 
57 For a more precise description of the tutelage system and its reform under the Erdogan cabinets, see Coşkun and 
Uzun 2005, 161; Tortop et al. 2006, 129–30. 
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be described as semi-presidential. Since then, the president has been directly elected (Özbudun 
2011, 75), with the first election held in 2014. Although the president is not authorized, before or 
since 2007, to act alone in executive matters, he is a major veto player able to delay or prevent 
policy change. The effective head of the executive branch, the Council of Ministers, is the prime 
minister. The president and the Council of Ministers are legally supervised by the Constitutional 
Court.58 Since 1961 Turkey has employed a proportional representation system using the D’Hondt 
method. Proportional representation is not very rewarding to regionally concentrated minorities; 
moreover, since 1983 a 10 per cent electoral threshold has further excluded small and minority 
parties.  
The territorial concentration of Kurdish voters provides the basis for autonomy claims. 
However, a considerable number of Kurdish voters are located in the metropolitan cities of 
Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin. In 1995 around 40 per cent of HADEP voters were located outside 
the south-eastern provinces, and this share has changed little subsequently. In 2015 around 38 per 
cent of HDP voters came from the western and metropolitan provinces of Turkey (see Figure 2). 
Overall, without these voters none of the Kurdish parties would be able to pass the 10 per cent 
electoral threshold.  
                                                 
58 Before the first Erdogan cabinet, the National Security Council (NSC), representing the military class of Turkey, was 
also an important veto player. Its ‘recommendations’ were binding acts with ‘priority consideration’ (Özbudun 2011, 
82). However, in 2004 its influence was diminished to advisory functions (Keyder 2004). 
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Figure 16: Territorial Voter Distribution of Kurdish Parties 
 
Note: The share of the overall vote for Kurdish parties is calculated by dividing the sum of regional votes by the 
absolute number of national votes for the respective party (in this case the HADEP in 1995 and the HDP in 2015). 
The average percentages of votes are calculated as the mean of the vote share for Kurdish parties within the specific 
province between 1991 and 2015.  
 
The provinces with strong Kurdish population shares are electorally relevant for the national 
mainstream parties as well. The Islamic parties as well as centre-left parties usually receive between 
30 and 40 percent of their national votes from these regions. From the electoral vulnerability 
perspective, the accommodation of Kurdish regions would be straightforward, because this would 
probably tip the balance towards the accommodating national party in national elections. But the 
vulnerability as well as the congruence argument fails to work in the Turkish context even though 
the electoral setup is much closer to the theoretical expectations than in countries for which these 
theories were developed.59 Despite the electoral relevance of the Kurdish provinces for the national 
                                                 
59 For example, Scotland never provided more than 10 percent of the vote for Labour or the Conservatives after the 
Second World War. 
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mainstream parties, stable majorities in these areas are not very likely. In 2015, the Kurdish party 
(HDP) dominated most of them, having for example majorities of up to 85 percent of the vote in 
provinces like Sirnak. Compared to other autonomous regions, asymmetric decentralization in 
Turkey would sooner or later empower the minority parties and the Kurdish parties are 
ideologically very distant to the national governments in Turkey (see Figure 1).  
 
4.2.3 A Qualitative Analysis of Party Preferences and the Framing of Territorial Tensions 
Our quantitative overview of the Turkish party system has visualized the enormous ideological 
differences between national and Kurdish parties (see upper part of Figure 1) as well as the 
changing intensity of Kurdish autonomy claims (see lower part of Figure 1). These findings are 
confirmed by our qualitative analysis of primary documents relating to economic and cultural 
positions. What remains hidden in the quantitative analysis are the substantive claims on the 
territorial dimension. Hence we pursue a comparative analysis of Kurdish demands and the 
response of specific national parties. Additionally, we highlight the framing of territorial proposals 
by Kurdish as well as the national parties. The framing is of genuine concern here, because our 
argument rests on the assumption that whether autonomy claims are embedded in Marxist rhetoric 
or in terms of efficient public goods provision makes a difference.  
 
4.2.4 Kurdish Autonomy Claims 1987 - 2015 
The timeline of Kurdish autonomy demands (see lower part of Figure 1) highlights that with two 
exceptions the intensity in which regional autonomy is claimed has always been very high and is 
still increasing. The exceptions are periods when Kurdish political representatives were part of 
broader alliances and territorial issues were accordingly toned down.     
Before 1990, only the Kurdish representatives within the SHP were considered to partially 
represent Kurdish claims in the Turkish parliament and their influence on the territorial agenda of 
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the SHP was limited. Autonomy claims were not part of the government agenda at that time. In 
1990 Kurdish parliamentarians split off from the SHP to found the HEP. Although the HEP was 
banned three years later, all pro-Kurdish parties have followed in its footsteps and ‘the circle of 
formation–closure–formation’ ensured a consistent representation of the Kurdish people by 
different partisan movements afterwards (Watts 2010, 69). None of the succeeding parties 
fundamentally revised the agenda of the HEP. Furthermore, the leading individuals were mainly 
the same, despite juridical interventions such as imprisonment and political restrictions (Watts 
2010, 70). Kurdish partisan representation is on an abstract level, therefore, characterized by 
programmatic and personal continuity. Claims to social justice, human rights, interventionist and 
redistributive demands reflect the Kurdish left-wing economic discourse of the 1990s, mirroring 
the Marxist origin of the Kurdish movements (Watts 2010). A simple categorization as ‘ethnic 
party’ would be misleading and does not reflect the relations of the HEP and its successors to the 
Turkish left (Watts 2010, 73).  
In 1990 the HEP issued its first policy statement as an independent party. In contrast to the 
SHP, its statements bear a strong anti-capitalistic appeal (HEP 1990, 1ff, 10).60 They also criticize 
the post-1982 constitutional and legal regulations, in particular passages related to ‘the Kurdish 
question’ (HEP 1990, 17ff.). The HEP formulates precise demands for decentralization, primarily 
transfer of competencies such as education and the abolishment of the tutelage system (HEP 1990, 
24–5, 55, 59). However, these claims are embedded in a broader critique of the Turkish centralist 
culture (HEP 1990, 9). The ‘Kurdish question’ is framed as a democratic deficit, a lack of cultural 
pluralism and of minority protection (HEP 1990, 17–19; Schüler 1998, 95–102). 
The HEP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1993. It was succeeded by the DEP. That 
too was banned by the Constitutional Court, in June 1994, for threatening the integrity of Turkey 
and succeeded by the HADEP. The HADEP era was the most violent in the conflict between the 
                                                 
60 Party documents are listed in the Online Appendix (Table F).  
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Turkish government and the Kurdish movements. The south-eastern provinces had been governed 
under a state of emergency since 1987 and the conflict caused approximately 30.000 casualties 
during the 1990s (SIPRI 2010, 67, 74).  
In 1994 the HADEP largely retained the programmatic orientation of the HEP. They presented 
themselves as the party of the exploited, blaming authoritarian and centralist governance by the 
Turkish elites (HADEP 1994, 5). A solution was presented: more decentralized and ‘federal’ 
institutions,61 including regional parliaments and increasing competencies for local governments 
(HADEP 1994, 10). The HADEP identified obstructive elements of the constitution and 
demanded the abolition of the tutelage system and the 10 per cent electoral threshold (HADEP 
1994, 10, 9). Again, the military conflict was framed as a democratization problem, by highlighting 
minority rights and blaming cultural assimilation (HADEP 1994, 8, 6). However, the HADEP 
extended their cultural pluralist position beyond the claim of regional self-determination to a 
general plea for a multicultural Turkey (HADEP 1994, 11–12). The party was banned in March 
2003.  
When Kurdish parliamentarians were part of the SHP, autonomy claims were rarely voiced. 
This changed when the HEP identified major obstacles to Kurdish political self-determination: the 
tutelage system and centralized education. Consequently, they demanded the first be abolished and 
the second decentralized. In the HADEP period ideological differences increased, mainly on the 
cultural dimension. The framing of political self-determination focused on minority rights and 
multiculturalism. The HEP’s autonomy claims were not only pursued but also intensified. The 
demand to, de facto, federalize Turkey led to the dissolution of HADEP by the Constitutional 
Court.  
                                                 
61 The term federalism is never used in Turkish discourse, probably because such a claim would violate the Turkish 
constitution. Often, the claims of Kurdish actors simply describe a federal system in other words; we therefore use this 
term synonymously.  
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In 1997 the DEHAP was founded, renewing official Kurdish representation after the banning of 
the HADEP. The DEHAP shifted attention to the role of Turkish citizenship and demanded 
further democratization and more rights for cultural and ethnic minorities in general (DEHAP 
2003, 17). Economically, the DEHAP programme of 2003 broke with the anti-capitalist appeal of 
its predecessors, envisaging coalition with more moderate left-wing groups. In 2004 the DEHAP 
and the SHP set up a joint list for the local elections (Watts 2010, 71). Symbolic of this shift, the 
small-business sector was now presented as a major addressee of DEHAP policy proposals 
(DEHAP 2003, 41). The stance of the Kurdish parties had always been based on cultural pluralism, 
but this was now significantly strengthened, in particular with regard to gender equality (DEHAP 
2003, 54, 77) and LGBT rights (DEHAP 2003, 66). The economic moderation of the DEHAP was 
accompanied by very few and only modest claims on the territorial dimension.  
The DEHAP merged with the DTH to form the DTP in 2005. While sharpening its culturally 
pluralist profile, economically the DTP returned to anti-capitalist views (DTP 2005, 7). It criticized 
the neo-liberal politics of retrenchment and proposed interventionist measures (DTP 2005, 54–5, 
56–7, 59ff.). It attacked the Turkish system as highly centralist, in contrast to its proposed network 
of civil society groups, labelled ‘democratic confederalism’ (DTP 2005, 7).62 Thus the moderate 
claims of the DEHAP in the early 2000s were replaced with more interventionist positions, while 
proposals to empower regions resembled the idea of federalism, although the DTP never used the 
word. 
In 2009 the closure–formation–closure circle was activated again: the DTP was banned by the 
Constitutional Court for threatening the indivisible unity of the Turkish state and succeeded by the 
BDP. The BDP signalled programmatic continuity with its general policy statements in 2009 and 
its manifesto in 2011. This time, the economic model set against the ‘centralized and capitalist 
                                                 
62 The pillar of this political order is participatory democracy based on local authority, with reference to ecology and 
feminism (Yarkin 2015).  
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Turkish system’ was called ‘participatory economy’. Its demands – a maximum 35-hour working 
week, suspension of privatizations and the reconstruction of the Turkish agricultural sector – 
indicated a left-wing economic agenda (BDP 2011).  
With its reference to the ‘democratic autonomy’ model, the BDP also invented a new label for 
its territorial ambitions. The model entails dividing the country into 20 to 25 autonomous regions, 
structured by their socio-economic capacities (BDP 2011).63 The major planks of the policy are 
administrative regional structures and constitutionally guaranteed self-rule authority with elected 
regional parliaments. The central state would retain residual powers, such as foreign affairs, external 
security and finance. The BDP demanded shared competencies in internal security and justice. The 
regional legislative actors envisaged would have the competence to determine other official 
languages besides Turkish. Regional schools should explicitly ensure the provision of teaching in 
additional and region-specific languages. Regional parliaments would have the right to raise taxes. 
At the same time, additional population- and development-based transfers from the central 
government, comparable to a fiscal equalization scheme, would take place. In effect, the BDP 
proposed a federal system for Turkey, with significant and effective regional self-rule alongside 
shared rule. 
Despite the strong decentralization claims of the BDP, the party was not banned, mainly 
because a 2010 constitutional amendment had raised the threshold for doing so. However, 
thousands of party members were arrested (Satana 2012, 184). Consequently, the BDP did not 
contest the next national election. It ran parallel to the HDP in the 2014 municipal elections, mostly 
in the Kurdish-dominated south-east, while the HDP contested elections in the rest of the country. 
The HDP was founded in 2012 out of numerous left-wing movements, in order to pass the 10 per 
cent electoral threshold and ensure Kurdish partisan representation nationally.  
                                                 
63 The following examples of BDP proposals are quoted from the 2011 manifesto, which is unpaginated.  
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The HDP programme for the June 2015 election borrowed several aspects from the preceding 
BDP and DTP platforms but included some new features. The participatory elements are framed 
in terms of individual sovereignty, this time labelled ‘radical democracy’ (HDP 2015a, 3). Its central 
concept is ‘democratic autonomy’, proposed for the entire country, but with a specific focus on 
decentralized new regions and regional parliaments (HDP 2015, 1, 11). The HDP explicitly 
mentions the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ECLS). As an initiative of the Council 
of Europe, the ECLS has sought since 1985 to establish municipal political, financial and 
administrative self-government. Turkey signed the Charter in 1992, but with reservations to certain 
paragraphs and articles.64 The HDP seeks to abolish these reservations to increase the autonomy 
of the municipalities (11). 
What was called the ‘participatory economy’ in the BDP programme is replaced with a new 
label. Under the heading of ‘confidence economy’,65 the HDP continues the narrative of a 
participatory and socially embedded economy. Production is to be based on values such as 
egalitarianism, participation, ecology and gender equality (HDP 2015b, 16ff). Proposals for a 
minimum wage, free supply of basic services and ending privatization reflect the HDP’s 
interventionist stance (HDP 2015a, 27ff). Culturally, the 2015 agenda is probably the most liberal 
in Turkish history. It demands the equal treatment of religions and explicitly mentions 
discrimination against the Alevi (HDP 2015a, 19; HDP 2015b, 15). It supports multiculturalism 
and multilingual education (HDP 2015a, 45, HDP 2015b, 15–16). Both women’s rights (2015a, 7, 
20–2, 40-1; 2015b, 3ff, 23) and LGBT rights (HDP 2015a, 26; HDP 2015b, 29) are highly salient 
issues. 
                                                 
64 Some reservations are caused by discrepancies in the 1982 Turkish Constitution. Reservations are articulated towards 
articles 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Some scholars argue that with the reform of the local level in the mid-2000s the ECLS 
was implemented de facto (Sadioğlu and Ömürgönülşen 2014; Sobaci 2015, 9). However, the degree of fiscal autonomy 
and national interference in local governance remain under debate.  
65 In the November 2015 election the HDP changed the term again, to ‘confident life economy’ (HDP 2015b, 16ff.).   
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After the 2015 elections tensions between Kurdish actors and the re-elected AKP government rose 
again. The HDP supported the 14-point declaration of a Kurdish think-tank (DTK) which 
explicitly proposed regional self-government (Bianet 2016). In Turkish discourse this represented 
another shift, using terminology previously banned from the territorial debate. The AKP response 
was hostile and at the end of 2015 many Kurdish mayors and the HDP chairman were prosecuted 
(Hurriyet 2016), while many south-eastern cities descended into violent conflict (Human Rights 
Watch 2015).  
Kurdish claims to political self-determination have always been framed in economic and cultural 
terms. The labels – confident life economy, participatory economy – change, but they offer the 
voter a comprehensive approach combining interventionist and locally organized economic 
structures with multicultural elements and a firm idea of effective political self-determination. Over 
time, the demands become more precise, continuously trying to shift the boundaries of the Turkish 
discourse towards accepting the language of federalism. In comparison to other countries, this 
might be not very radical, but given the background of the Turkish principle of a unitary state and 
nationalism, it is perceived as a serious threat to the unity of the Turkish nation.  
 
4.2.5 National Neglect of Kurdish Autonomy Claims and Parallel Development of a Discourse on Symmetric 
Local Autonomy 
The main actors on the national level in the late 1980s and early 1990s were the ANAP and the 
DYP. The ANAP formed the first government after military rule. It had to integrate party members 
from very heterogeneous backgrounds but converged on economic positions favourable to 
privatization and marketization, alongside a strong belief in technological progress (Keleş 1992, 
10–12). Culturally, the ANAP combined conservative with liberal ideas into a highly original 
position of cultural ‘checks and balances’ (Schüler 1998, 38–45). In its manifesto the ANAP 
dedicated about 3 per cent of emphasis to decentralization issues. Most of the statements 
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emphasize advocacy for increased competencies on the municipality level and are framed in terms 
of efficient public goods provision (ANAP 1991). The ANAP’s behaviour in government is also 
instructive. In 1984, it nullified an order originating from the military regime in 1983 which would 
have created regions with directly elected governors equipped with considerable authority and 
resources. The ANAP perceived the division of territory in the absence of a settlement of the 
Kurdish question as very risky (Bayraktar and Massicard 2012, 26). On the other hand, they also 
made several attempts to moderately increase the authority of municipalities and some laws passed 
the assembly.66 
The other major national actor struggling with the ANAP for electoral predominance was the 
DYP. Economically, the DYP held moderate views of a mixed economy (karma ekonomisi), but after 
1987 adopted market-liberal positions closer to the ANAP (Schüler 1998, 50–1). Culturally, the 
DYP was a conservative party whose positions closely resemble those of the ANAP. A strong 
emphasis on nationalism alongside the notion of re-democratization characterizes the stance of the 
DYP in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, the DYP does not mention territorial issues 
in their official statements in the late 1980s.  
In 1991 the Turkish prime minister of the DYP–SHP coalition government, Suleyman Demirel, 
acknowledged the ‘Kurdish reality’ in a speech in Diyarbakir. This speech was seen by some as a 
turning point from the policy of denial to acknowledgement of the Kurdish problem (Beriker-
Atiyas 1997, 452). This seems to be a misinterpretation, as the Kurdish problem remained framed 
as a terrorism issue (Satana 2011, 172–3). Only two years later, extending cultural rights was seen 
as a concession to terrorism by Demirel (Beriker-Atiyas 1997, 442).  
The centre-right DYP was a market-liberal party, while conservatism, nationalism and law and 
order issues characterized its cultural agenda (Schüler 1998, 49). Despite the 1991 Demirel speech, 
                                                 
66 The most important of these laws is that establishing the metropolitan municipalities (law 3030, 1984). Another 
important law on ‘urban planning’ increased autonomy on local debt and the right to establish municipal corporations. 
The ANAP government increased the revenues of local governments and decreased administrative tutelage. 
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it remained silent about Kurdish autonomy claims and decentralization in general. The only 
statement related to the territorial dimension is a brief passage in favour of a unitary state (DYP 
1991). The ANAP dedicated several passages of its party manifesto to specific aspects of 
decentralization. Although it said nothing in response to specific Kurdish demands, it signalled 
commitment to strengthening local government, framed in terms of efficient provision of local 
services and local responsiveness (ANAP 1991, 22, 83–9). The SHP, which had made votes for the 
HEP possible by introducing a special list, also emphasized its advocacy of local governance and 
argued for provincial governments and the abolition of the tutelage system to increase political 
participation (SHP 1991).  
The DYP was the pivotal player in Turkish politics at that time. Since it was the defender of the 
unitary state, there was no serious attempt to change the territorial distribution of authority between 
1991 and 1996. The same is true with regard to the attitudes of national parties towards the Kurdish 
question. Officially, policy proposals on political decentralization largely ignored the Kurdish issue. 
Much more important than the neglect of Kurdish claims was the intensifying Islamic political 
tradition, which gave rise to the AKP. The AKP’s predecessors, such as the RP, developed no 
specific position on decentralization in their early phase. What made local authority important for 
them was the simple fact of local success. After the local elections in 1994 the RP came into power 
in most of Turkey’s large cities (Dogan 2007, 81). Many later AKP leaders were recruited and 
trained as mayors in this period.67  
The success of the RP at the municipality level was reflected in its manifesto for the 1995 
national election, which included proposals for more authority and more financial means for the 
local level (RP 1995, 26–7). It depicted the centralist tradition of Turkey as oppressive and 
exploitative (RP 1995, 26). Again, these statements were entirely disconnected from Kurdish 
                                                 
67 The most prominent example is Tayyip Erdogan, mayor of Istanbul 1994–1998. Overall, the role of local politicians 
at the national level grew, so that the local level became a launching pad for the decentralization agenda and local 
government reform in Turkey (Sadioğlu 2012).  
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claims. The Kurdish question was embedded in a more cultural perspective. The RP emphasized 
Islam as the unifying factor for Turkish and Kurdish citizens. The increasing salience of the local 
authority debate also changed the agenda of the DYP. In the early 1990s it had defended the unitary 
state; in 1995 it joined the discourse of strengthening local authority, framed as a quest for 
efficiency and political participation (DYP 1995, 50–2). 
The other two parties with parliamentary representation in 1995 placed more emphasis on 
decentralization issues. The ANAP made local authority a major topic within their manifesto. More 
local authority was proposed to increase efficiency, raise participation and provide local entities 
with genuine authority over specific policy areas (ANAP 1995, 8–15).68 It also proposed reducing 
tutelage (15). After 1994, several bills to increase local authority were tabled, but none of them was 
successful. One reason was that governments in this period were rather short-lived. For example, 
the coalition headed by Mesut Yilmaz (ANAP) proposed a bill which contained the transfer of 
authority, increased revenues and diminished national supervision of the municipality level, but the 
government fell before the reform could be completed. The RP supported the bill, but considered 
it not bold enough (Bayraktar and Massicard 2012, 27).  
The national election of 1999 produced a new coalition government. The MHP set up a cabinet 
with the DSP. Even though the MHP presented itself as the defender of national unity and 
integrity, it also signalled its willingness to extend local autonomy, advocating relaxing central 
administrative tutelage and granting more autonomy in the provision of local public services (MHP 
1999, 45, 48). The DSP also signalled its moderate commitment to more local autonomy. It framed 
this both as a matter of efficiency and as a means to more responsiveness (DSP 1999, 100). General 
support for more fiscal as well as political local autonomy was emphasized (DSP 1999, 75).  
The FP, predecessor of the RP, referred to its political responsibilities in many municipalities 
and presented itself as advocate of decentralization (FP 1999, 10–17), framing it in terms of 
                                                 
68 These were the regulation of water, environment, agriculture, construction and education (ANAP 1995, 15–16). 
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successful management and more efficient public goods provision on the local level. Central 
government was presented as a major obstacle – too bureaucratic and too restrictive of fiscal 
resources (FP 1999, 11, 12). The FP was banned by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for violating 
the secularist base of the Turkish constitution. 
Instead of responding to Kurdish claims, national parties in the 1990s developed a separate 
discourse. In 1991 the SHP, former home of many HEP politicians, had suggested abolishing the 
tutelage system – a major and ongoing demand of the Kurdish parties. However, in the mid-1990s 
local authority became a contested issue for almost every national party, regardless of Kurdish 
claims. Decentralization became an issue in Turkish politics because of the mobilization strategy 
of Islamic movements and parties. The RP, as the predecessor of the AKP, positioned itself as the 
‘outsider’, rallying against the central elites (Bayraktar and Massicard 2012, 27). This local 
mobilization approach had consequences, as other national parties signalled their willingness to 
diminish tutelage and to increase administrative autonomy on the local level. It also had policy 
implications, namely minor reforms of local regulatory competencies. All these proposals and 
policies were framed in terms of efficiency and totally disconnected from the ‘Kurdish problem’, 
which was regarded as an issue of terrorism or regional backwardness (Satana 2012, 173). 
In the early 2000s the national counterparts of the Kurdish parties were the AKP and the CHP, 
the only two parties which passed the 10 per cent electoral threshold. The AKP is the successor 
party of the RP. The first two Erdogan governments (2003–7, 2007–11) made decentralization 
reform a priority (Yilmaz and Dincer 2003). The 2002 AKP manifesto adopted a very specific 
stance on decentralization. It proposed changing the tutelage system into a system of legal 
supervision (AKP 2002). For example, mayors should be dismissed only if courts confirm the 
necessity (AKP 2002). Increased local authority is mainly regarded as promoting efficiency in public 
services, but is also framed within principles of participatory and pluralist democracy (AKP 2002). 
Another element of the manifesto is the demand for the reorganization of metropolitan and non-
metropolitan municipalities (AKP 2002).  
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Since 2002 the AKP has governed alone. Its manifesto statements are mirrored in its government 
programme, entailing a paradigm shift – strong advocacy of local authority and also the 
empowerment of provinces. Draft legislation aimed to create ‘a public administration that provides 
public services in a participatory, transparent, accountable, fair, fast, high-quality, efficient and 
effective manner’ (Kösecik and Sağbaş 2005, 128). It also intended to restructure the ‘provincial 
administrations; to transfer competencies and powers of the ministries in the provinces and special 
provincial administrations’ (Bayraktar and Massicard 2012, 28). The territorial structure of Turkey 
would have changed significantly. However, various interest groups and political actors sharply 
criticized the decentralization plans for risking the unity of the state. The proposed laws were 
watered down, and many of the remaining provisions were vetoed by the president or the 
Constitutional Court (see Table G in the Appendix Part C). The reforms strengthened the 
municipality level, but primarily metropolitan municipalities. 
After its partly successful decentralization attempts, the AKP signalled continued willingness to 
further empower municipalities. Depicting itself as the one party protecting Turkey from too much 
centralism, its manifesto focuses on its successful reforms with few proposals for further 
decentralization (AKP 2007). The main task is identified as reinforcing fiscal capabilities at the local 
level (AKP 2007). After its re-election, however, the AKP in government drafted further bills to 
change the structure of the metropolitan municipalities and the revenues of municipalities in 
general.69  
The CHP, traditionally the defender of state unity, placed less emphasis on decentralization, but 
nevertheless made some proposals to increase administrative decentralization (CHP 2002, 19–20) 
                                                 
69 In 2008 the Law on Metropolitan District Municipalities (No. 5747) and a law on the regulation of local government 
revenue (No. 5779) were passed.  
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and introduce ‘soft regionalization’ through economic development programmes (CHP 2002, 51).70 
In the later part of the decade, it moved towards a more sceptical stance on decentralization.  
CHP resistance to the AKP’s decentralization agenda has to be seen against the background of the 
party’s history. In contrast to AKP constituencies, CHP voters strongly identify with the trinity of 
Turkish nationalism, secularism and the unitary state. The latter two principles were challenged by 
the Islamic AKP and hence its decentralization agenda generated strong opposition. President 
Ahmet Sezer, as well as the majority of the Constitutional Court judges, vetoed several AKP 
legislative proposals on the grounds of the constitutional principle of ‘unitary administration’. At 
the same time, the AKP’s decentralization agenda mainly served its own purposes, since the shift 
of authority to the municipalities essentially empowered its own party members.71 In the local 
election of 2004, the AKP received around 40 per cent of the vote and gained mayors in 1.952 out 
of 3.499 districts. It also held the mayoralty in 12 out of 16 metropolitan municipalities. Although 
all local authorities were strengthened, this holds true in particular for the metropolitan 
municipalities (Bayraktar and Massicard 2012, 46–7).  
In the 2011 national election campaign, the AKP turned to a more conservative stance on 
decentralization. However, it clearly positioned itself as the major advocate of further 
decentralization and made vague commitments to increasing local responsibilities (AKP 2011). In 
contrast, the CHP signalled hesitant commitment to decentralization, while stressing the 
importance of a unitary state (CHP 2011). Additionally, it proposed more administrative 
competencies to be shared between the centre and the local levels to increase effectiveness (CHP 
2011). As usual, the MHP remained silent on these issues (MHP 2011).  
                                                 
70 ‘Soft regionalization’ is a concept from Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014) and refers to economic empowerment 
rather than increased self-rule authority. Some authors argue that the AKP later adopted that approach with the 
formation of development agencies (Sadioglu and Dede 2011). 
71 However, the reform process was also supported by many local politicians and administrators from other parties 
(see Sadioğlu and Ömürgönülşen 2014). 
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In the two electoral campaigns of 2015, the AKP continued to advocate its decentralization agenda, 
asserting ‘a clear need for a new constitution based on decentralization and democratic checks and 
balances; and it will provide a democratic base representing different groups and preventing all 
kinds of tutelage’ (AKP 2015a, 34, 40; AKP 2015b, 33). These statements read as a clear 
commitment to political decentralization. The AKP additionally promised increased resources for 
local government, partly based on increasing locally raised revenue (AKP 2015a, 57, 60, 177, 289–
99) and signalled its commitment to the ECLS (AKP 2015a, 61, 301; AKP 2015b, 49). There is 
also a noticeable shift to highlighting democracy as the major rationale of decentralization (AKP 
2015a, 66).  
Education had not previously fallen within the decentralization agenda of the AKP, but in 2015 
the AKP brought forward specific proposals for education. Primary schools were to be under local 
authority with school-based budget management, universities to have more autonomy and local 
governments to be represented in the management of technical and vocational schools (AKP 
2015a, 81, 83, 86, 89). To improve the capabilities of local governments in the field of culture and 
arts, existing cultural institutions (libraries, museums, etc.) were to be devolved (AKP 2015a, 126). 
Finally, the AKP intended to strengthen the Regional Development Agencies (AKP 2015a, 301).  
The CHP fundamentally revised its hesitant approach towards local authority in its 2015 
manifestos, becoming the strongest advocate of decentralization compared to the AKP and MHP 
(CHP 2015a; CHP 2015b). It proposed to empower local governments in several respects, 
including autonomy of financial transfers and authority over urban planning (CHP 2015b, 148, 
155). Generally, it demanded more financial means for the municipalities and assistance in debt-
related issues (CHP 2015b, 162). It further proposed transferring competence to the provincial 
banks (İller Bankası) (CHP 2015b, 162). Like the AKP, the CHP emphasized the necessity to endow 
educational facilities with more autonomy (CHP 2015b 130, 132). Finally, it called for a 
restructuring of the RDAGs (CHP 2015b 165).  
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Even the MHP joined the camp of the decentralization advocates. However, its position in 2015 
was much more a stance on efficient service provision, remaining very sceptical towards the 
transfer of political authority. Its position was reflected by its support for a policy wherein strategic 
functions remain centralized, while operational functions are decentralized (MHP 2015a, 81).  
As in the preceding decade, debates in the 2010s about decentralization and the Kurdish 
problem remained separated most of the time. It is worth noting, however, that both the AKP and 
the CHP proposed that a new constitution should include a definition of citizenship independent 
of any ethnic or religious identity (AKP 2015a, 37; CHP 2015b, 29). Both parties refer to a 
democratic solution of the conflict (AKP 2015a, 27; 2015b, 23; CHP, 2015a, 14; 2015b, 20). The 
CHP even for the first time links the issue of decentralization and the Kurdish problem (CHP 
2015a, 43). Even though the CHP’s new position on decentralization is a major ideological shift 
on the territorial dimension towards HDP claims, there is still a considerable distance between 
them. The core demands of political self-determination and regionally based authority alongside 
local self-government remain unthinkable for the major national parties. The only references to 
regions in the AKP and CHP manifestos are in connection with restructuring Regional 
Development Agencies (CHP 2015a, 165; AKP 2015a, 301).  
The AKP’s accession to national power changed the political constellation significantly. With 
single-party governments between 2002 and 2016, it stabilized the political system considerably. 
These majority victories derived from a local mobilization strategy. Using its majority position, the 
AKP not only established new elites, but also disempowered the military and exchanged parts of 
the judicial elite. Additionally, two AKP presidents provided government with considerable 
political leeway. This political room to manoeuvre was used to challenge the secularist base of the 
Turkish constitution. 
 
The Kurdish parties, in turn, hold very interventionist positions on the economic dimension 
and increasingly emphasize liberal cultural views which are unique in the Turkish political 
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landscape. The ideological differences between the AKP and the Kurdish parties are therefore 
considerable. Although both the AKP and the HDP before the 2015 elections signalled very high 
willingness to decentralize further, in effect they aim at different goals. The AKP frames 
decentralization mainly as a means to efficient services, advocates privatization and strongly 
supports metropolitan municipalities, whereas for the HDP local and regional authority is basically 
a means to political and cultural self-determination. Over time, the CHP has moved to a more 
liberal position on the cultural dimension and increasingly also holds economically interventionist 
positions. This growing ideological similarity to the Kurdish parties also translates into 
accommodating views of local political self-determination. For the first time in the party’s history, 
the manifesto for the June 2015 national election contains no reference to the unity of the state, 
while the November 2015 manifesto has a special chapter on the ‘Kurdish Question’.  
The AKP as the most effective agent of decentralization has considerably slowed down its 
efforts after successfully stabilizing its national electoral performance. In fact, many observers see 
recent reforms of metropolitan municipalities which led to shifts of competencies to ministries in 
Ankara as a re-centralization of the Turkish system (Bayraktar 2013; Ömürgönülşen and Sadioğlu, 
2014). The earlier decentralization reforms of the AKP followed an electoral insulation rationale. 
The empowerment of Kurdish municipalities was a side-effect which helped to provide electoral 
majorities for the AKP in this region. However, this electoral advancement only lasted for a short 
period. In the local elections of 2009 and 2014 the Kurdish parties increasingly gained majorities. 
Many of the Kurdish mayors faced legal difficulties in 2015.  
The ‘Kurdish problem’ remains a question of identity recognition for the Kurdish side and an 
issue of regional development or terrorism for the national side, although Kurdish and national 
actors achieved convergence over many minor issues of decentralization. The degree of tutelage 
has been decreased, municipalities have gained much more authority and metropolitan 
municipalities now have far-reaching competencies. Notwithstanding recent reforms by the AKP 
government which may be interpreted as re-centralization, in the election campaigns of 2015 the 
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national actors have started talking seriously about the decentralization of education which would 
concede a major demand of Kurdish politicians.  
Our findings from the qualitative analysis of party documents confirm the evidence from the 
quantitative overview. The ideological positions of national parties and minority challengers 
indicate at no point between 1987 and 2015 a constellation where we would expect serious 
discussion about autonomy shifts to the Kurdish minority. National actors either articulate Kurdish 
regional authority as a threat to the Turkish unitary state or ignore the Kurdish claims outright. 
However, the development of the discourse on local authority demonstrates that under specific 
circumstances decentralization has become acceptable in Turkey. Interestingly, the Islamic parties, 
by presenting themselves as outsiders of the system, successfully established electoral strongholds 
on the local level which helped them to consolidate and train their own class of politicians. 
 
4.2.6 Conclusion 
Why are national governments in some cases willing to transfer authority to national minorities but 
not in others? This article presents a theory that is more encompassing than previous approaches 
in that it is able to explain not just cases where asymmetric decentralization occurs but also negative 
cases where the conditions for reform are given and existing theories would predict authority 
transfer but nothing happens. Our theory of ideological authority argues that what distinguishes 
positive from negative outcomes of asymmetric decentralization demands is the ideological 
distance between the national government and minority elites. Based on a game-theoretical model 
we show that taking ideology into account changes the actors’ calculations of costs and benefits 
which should systematically affect the probability that asymmetric authority solutions occur.  
We choose the case of Turkey for a test of our theory. In Turkey, the centre is economically 
and symbolically impelled to maintain the territorial unity of the state and the Kurdish claims are 
highly credible at the same time. The game-theoretical model in the introduction of this special 
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issue (Mueller et al. 2016) would thus predict a concession of the centre to the Kurdish demands. 
Our case study points to a constellation where ideological distance outweighs the relevance of 
credibility and dependency as factors that drive the explanatory model of Mueller at al. (2016). 
Kurdish minorities have consistently mobilized for regional autonomy but national elites either 
declared this to be a threat to the unitary state or outright ignored Kurdish claims. In our two–step 
empirical strategy we first quantitatively analyse Turkish party manifestos for the period of 1987 to 
2015 to map their preferences on the economic, cultural and territorial dimension. We complement 
the CMP/MARPOR dataset where data on parties or on specific documents are missing.  
Our findings from this first step confirm that the ideological distance between national 
governments and Kurdish parties varies over time but is generally very large. In the second step 
we add detailed information on substantive claims of Turkish parties on the territorial dimension 
by qualitatively coding party documents. This helps us to identify the intensity with which Kurdish 
parties claim regional autonomy, the way state-wide parties react and the strategies in which 
territorial issues are framed. Three findings stand out. (1) The intensity of Kurdish autonomy claims 
strongly corresponds with the ideological distance between the national governments and Kurdish 
elites. In the two periods where Kurdish representatives were part of broader alliances, ideological 
distance, especially on the economic dimension, decreased and the intensity of Kurdish claims for 
territorial authority transfers declined to a considerable extent. (2) Whereas Kurdish parties frame 
decentralization issues in terms of national identity and, increasingly, of radical democracy, state-
wide parties see decentralization as instrumental for effective public goods provision. (3) Since the 
early 2000s a symmetric decentralization discourse has emerged that was inspired by an AKP 
interest in establishing local strongholds to train their own class of politicians. Since then a national 
consensus has begun to emerge on the advantages of administrative decentralization. This 




4.3 A General Theory of Ideological Authority Insulation72 
4.3.1 Why accommodate minorities? 
 
While the “nationalization” of voter behaviour was one of the most significant trends in the 
twentieth century (Caramani 2004), territorially based ethnic identities were, nonetheless, 
constantly emphasized and mobilized (Olzak 1983; Gurr 1995). Indeed, numerous indicators point 
to a twenty-first century reversal of the nationalization trend (Hopkin 2009). The unitary state has 
been questioned across the world, presenting major challenges for state-wide governments (Meguid 
2005; Alonso 2012; Walter 2006). Nationalist aspirations for self-determination often culminate in 
violent conflict (Cordell and Wolf 2016, 3; Walter 2009); since the end of the 1990s most armed 
conflicts have involved autonomist claims (Benedikter 2009, 9).  
Concessions via autonomy or asymmetric decentralization have been a familiar, albeit rarely 
implemented, mechanism of statecraft for at least the past two centuries to accommodate the 
demands of territorially based ethnic groups.73 In fact, states have increasingly shifted to more 
decentralization, regional self-government or at least local self-administration (Hooghe et al. 2016). 
Nonetheless, many governments continue to resist any substantial transfer of authority, often 
paying a considerable death toll. Why are parties that form the state-wide government willing to 
accommodate certain claims of ethnic or national minorities, but refuse others? Many believe that 
the complexity of actor strategies involved in these arrangements precludes any attempt at 
generalization.  
                                                 
72 This chapter is an article co-authored with André Kaiser and currently in a state of revise and resubmit at the European 
Journal of Political Research.  
73 Accommodation via autonomy is the predominant terminology in the conflict literature whereas comparative politics 
scholars talk about asymmetric decentralization. The meaning of both terms converges: the transfer of authority 
granted by a state-wide government to a territorially bounded sub-national unit in order to increase the political 
autonomy of the actors in that area in contrast to other sub-national units whose autonomy remains lower. 
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Explanations for decentralization in general were long dominated by functionalist adaptation 
arguments, such as democratization or efficient public goods provision (Oates 1993; Bardhan 
2002). Alternatively, conflict studies are predominantly organized around the “greed and grievance” 
dichotomy (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) with a focus on the demand side, namely, the minority’s 
incentives for rebellion.74 Few have considered the role of state-wide75 governments, which are de 
jure in charge of territorial reform. In case they did, they have stressed the strategic constraints of 
state-wide governments in order to provide accommodation. Some explained the hesitation of 
governments to accommodate by their intention to prevent precedents, later taken up by other 
minorities in the same territory (Walter 2006; Toft 2005). Furthermore, the accommodated 
minorities might be empowered by autonomy to raise further claims in the future, in particular 
when powerful kin states are involved (Grigoryan 2012). These arguments explain the hesitation 
of state-wide actors to accommodate in order to avoid triggering further challenges in the future. 
There are also theoretical arguments why the centre has incentives to concede. Lacina (2014) points 
to the potential presence of minority representatives in the centre and argues that such 
representation increases the likelihood of accommodation. Cunningham (2011) argues that the 
accommodation of divided movements can flush out separatists from autonomists and radicals 
from moderates. In these examples from conflict studies governments react rather mechanically to 
external conditions. They are portrayed as reactive agents whose preferences are informed by the 
representation or geographical distribution of minorities, kin states and resources. However, those 
factors are predominantly constant and arguments starting from them face difficulties to explain 
why political parties in the same country have such different stances towards the territorial 
distribution of authority and why accommodation takes place in one moment and not in another.  
                                                 
74 See Lacina (2014, 3) for a list of qualitative studies and Dixon (2009) or Hegre and Sambanis (2006) for an overview 
of the findings in quantitative studies. 
75 In order to distinguish state-wide parties and governments from regionalist movements and parties, we prefer the 
term state-wide to national (in some cases we use ‘national’ to reflect the usage of the relevant literature). 
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In contrast, the territorial politics literature has shown that different parties have usually different 
views about the territorial distribution of authority and also the very same party can change its 
positions over time (Toubeau and Wagner 2015; Alonso 2012). The explanation of these partisan 
preferences on the territorial dimension has received growing attention (O’Neill 2003, 2005; 
Bednar 2004; Meguid 2009; Alonso 2012; Toubeau and Wagner 2015). State-wide parties have 
come to be identified as the pivotal players in the game of distributing authority over different 
levels of territoriality (Hopkin 2009; Amat and Falcó-Gimeno 2013; Tobeau and Wagner 2015, 
2016). However, comparable to the dominant paradigm in conflict studies, the literature on 
territorial party politics has predominantly analysed party constellations as a constraint for state-
wide parties which may be pressurized to strategically offer authority to territorially concentrated 
minorities (Heller 2002; Meguid 2009; Alonso 2012).  
We show in this article that a crucial strategic rationale of state-wide parties is still overlooked - 
ideological proximity between the claimants and the providers of authority. Accordingly, we depart 
from the conventional reading of autonomy accommodation in three ways. First, we argue that for 
state-wide parties territorial party competition is embedded in the dominant ideological conflict on 
the state-wide level. Political conflicts are rarely exclusively territorial or exclusively focussed on 
the state-market dimension, but rather reinforced by the interdependence between them (Rokkan 
1999, 309). For the second half of the twentieth century the dominant ideological conflict was that 
between market supporters and market sceptics (Manow and van Kersbergen 2009). Accordingly, 
we argue that state-wide parties empower regional allies who share their ideological convictions 
and deny power to ideological enemies. Empowered and ideologically aligned regional elites can 
prove valuable allies in the future. Furthermore, asymmetric decentralization creates potential veto 
players should the state-wide opposition party come to power; it creates offices and trains 
personnel for ideological allies; and it stabilizes electoral support, because newly empowered allies 
become founding fathers of minority regions with a lasting electoral premium. The strategic 
rationales of state-wide parties are embedded in the dominant ideological conflict of their time. 
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However, this does not necessarily hold for separatist or autonomist parties on the sub-state level. 
Their primary conflict dimension remains territorial. However, their territorial stance is 
complemented by a position on the state-market dimension. Only in constellations, where the sub-
national claimants and state-wide parties in government strike a similar tone on the state-market 
dimension, state-wide parties are willing to accommodate their claim. This is what we define as 
ideological proximity between state-wide parties in government and sub-national claimants of 
authority. 
Second, to the predominant interpretation of a demand-driven process we add a supply-side 
argument. Valid regional claims do not only generate pressure, but open up a window of 
opportunity for state-wide parties to insulate authority and change the territorial power structure 
to their own benefit. 
Third, we depart from the interpretation of regionalist parties as niche parties focusing on 
territoriality as a single core issue (for a similar argument see Basile 2015). We assume that 
regionalist or ethnic mobilizers also take a stance towards issues on the dominant state-wide 
ideological dimension. For example, Kurdish mobilization changed from outright Marxist to “New 
Left” during the 2000s (blinded for review 2016b). Tamil autonomy demands in Sri Lanka are also 
strongly framed by a Marxist rhetoric (de Silva 1997). Convergència i Unió, the leading Catalan 
party until very recently, was centre-right on socio-economic issues (Heller 2002); while the Scottish 
National Party has gradually moved to centre-left positions (Newell 1998). Combining our three 
modifications of the conventional reading of minority accommodation, we end up with a very 
parsimonious argument. The relationship between regional demand for authority and state-wide 
response is moderated by ideological proximity. The rationale which informs the state-wide party’s 
willingness to accommodate is ideological authority insulation.  
To deliver support for this argument, the article proceeds as follow. We outline a theory of 
ideological authority insulation, building on existing approaches to territorial preference formation. 
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Next, we specify the conditions under which ideological proximity leads to reforms of 
accommodation. As a final step, we inform our case selection and test the theory quantitatively 
explaining reform in 11 countries from 1945 to 2015.  
We have compiled a new dataset with roughly 4300 cases, including electoral data, party 
positions and regional “centres of gravity”. Carrying out a careful analysis with rare event panel 
regression models as well as robustness checks, we find that the relationship between autonomy 
claims and their accommodation is systematically moderated by ideological proximity. Not one 
single decentralization reform in our dataset occurs when ideological distance is large. However, 
not every constellation of ideological proximity leads to shifts of authority. Successful ideological 
authority insulation depends on opportunity structures and contextual factors, the most important 
being the state-wide government operating with a low number of parties in cabinet and with a 
sufficient majority. Furthermore, our findings suggest that concepts from the ethnic conflict 
literature, developed and usually tested in less democratic contexts, can add much to the 
understanding of territorial tensions in established democracies. For example, the involvement of 
secessionist claims reduces the willingness of the centre to shift authority and divided movements 
have a higher likelihood to receive accommodation. However, in our models, none of these 
findings from conflict studies is as substantial as ideological proximity.  
Our theory and findings add to the literature on conflict settlement in heterogeneous societies 
(Weller and Nobbs 2011; McGarry 2012). Where ideological distance between claimant minorities 
and state-wide governments is large, accommodation is very unlikely to be a viable option. 
Moreover, the theory of ideological authority insulation speaks to scholars of party competition in 
multilevel systems. Different conflict dimensions can be subsumed or blurred (Elias et al. 2015); 
however, our results suggest that superimposition76 should be added to the toolbox of research on 
                                                 
76 We define superimposition as a situation where one conflict dimension is determined by the ideological proximity 
on another.  
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party politics in cases where one conflict dimension determines the behaviour on another. Finally, 
demonstrating that parties are willing to shift authority without empowering their own partisan 
organization on another level of territoriality is an important observation for the conceptualization 
of territorial alignment processes. Partisan and ideological alignment fall apart in many countries 
with strong regionalist parties or multiparty systems. Overall, we observe that authority is stored in 
regions dominated by ideological allies, concentrating power for an ideological conflict on the state-
wide level. This finding undermines the functionalist perspective on federalism. Rather than 
decentralization admitting different preferences for public good provision, the migration of 
authority is motivated by the desire to strengthen those with similar preferences.  
4.3.2 Partisan Rationales  
Changing the distribution of territorial authority can only occur if state-wide governments accept 
it as relevant to their agenda and, ultimately, agree to reform. We therefore regard parties in the 
state-wide government as the pivotal players in institutional shifts on the territorial dimension (see 
also Hopkin 2009; Amat and Falcó-Gimeno 2013). Here we depart from the conflict literature 
because it cannot explain partisan differences. Simply spoken, why do Conservatives in the United 
Kingdom refuse accommodation of Scottish claims whereas the Labour Party initiated a transfer 
of power in 1997? The claimants, like the Scottish, usually envisage a form of institutionalized 
asymmetric authority which underlines their distinctiveness (Stepan 2001). State-wide governments 
are confronted by these demands. But these are also opportunities to transfer authority to specific 
regions only.77 Autonomy claims are articulated because minorities have strong reservations about 
the location of authority at the centre (Zuber 2011). Little studied, however, is the fact that the very 
same state-wide elites may adopt different strategies towards different regions of the same country. 
Lacina (2014) argues that the integration of minorities in the centre explains why some Indian 
                                                 
77 Authority transfer to the sub-national level is, however, just one response; other options range from symmetric 




regions received more and other regions less authority in the 1950s. However, minority 
representation at the centre varies over parties. Kurdish politicians have close ties to the political 
left in Turkey and many Scottish MPs are traditionally aligned with Labour. These are just two 
examples where representation at  the centre is endogenous to ideological positions of actors on 
that level.78  
In order to explain differences in the willingness of state-wide actors to accommodate authority 
claims, we need to examine party preferences on the territorial dimension (de Winter et al. 2006; 
Toubeau and Wagner 2015, 2016; Massetti and Schakel 2016). But these preferences do not show 
very systematic patterns. Nor are they strongly related to an overall left‒right dimension (Swenden 
and Maddens 2009; Toubeau and Wagner 2015). There is no evidence for any correlation between 
general left and right positions and decentralization reforms (Spina 2013). Verge (2013) therefore 
proposes to further differentiate ideology into an economic and a cultural dimension. Cultural 
liberalism is more generously disposed towards political self-determination, whereas economic 
liberalism is more in favour of a decentralized economy (see also Toubeau and Wagner 2015). 
Hence, from a perspective of ideological consistency, most parties have cross-cutting motives for 
decentralization.  
However, as long as the signalled preferences are erratically distributed over time and party families, 
they cannot be considered an explanation of partisan rationales. We simply do not yet know why 
parties signal willingness at a certain point in time and not at others. In particular, we do not know 
why preferences vary for different regions within the same state. The literature proposes several 
concepts to make sense of the erratic nature of signalled preferences towards territoriality by state-
wide mainstream parties. We categorize them into two major arguments.  
                                                 
78 The illustrative case of Bombay in Lacina’s study also shows that left-wing mobilization was appeased by the socialist 
Prime Minister Nehru against the initial support of another proposal (2014, 722-23).  
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4.3.2.1 Electoral vulnerability 
The electoral vulnerability concept starts from the assumption that state-wide parties are willing to 
decentralize in order to prevent losses in a particular region at state-wide elections (Heller 2002; 
Hopkin 2003, 232; Meguid 2009, 33; Alonso 2012). This argument is often illustrated with reference 
to Scotland. In 1997, the UK Labour Party (LP) accommodated Scottish demands for autonomy 
because it needed the votes of Scottish National Party (SNP) supporters at state-wide elections, 
trading off LP voters who might turn to the SNP at regional elections. Yet, though this argument 
is widely touted, there is only one instance in British electoral history where the electoral strength 
of the SNP could have changed the majority constellation between the Conservatives and Labour 
at the state-wide level. If electoral vulnerability was indeed the LP’s rationale, the strategy was an 
outright failure. In 1992 the LP had won 49 House of Commons seats in Scotland; in 2015 it won 
one.  
The vulnerability argument presupposes a sufficient number of regionalist voters willing to 
switch their allegiance to the accommodating state-wide party. Consequently, it focuses exclusively 
on the asymmetric calculi of state-wide parties, taking no account of regional parties’ positions. 
Evidence for the argument rests on the cases of Spain and the UK (Meguid 2009; Alonso 2012). A 
slightly different argument starts from the role of regional parties that may support state-wide 
governments or are willing to enter coalition governments in exchange for authority shifts towards 
the regional level (Heller 2002; Elias and Tronconi 2011).  
4.3.2.2 Intra-party insulation 
The relative stability of majorities at different territorial levels is argued to be an important factor 
in explaining decentralization (O'Neill 2003, 2005; Falleti 2005, 2010). Parties may be less sure of 
gaining state-wide than regional offices, because majorities may be more volatile on the state-wide 
level, more secure on the regional level. In this case, decentralization is about the insulation of 
resources and positions from competitors (O’Neill 2005, 207). This argument assumes the 
calculation of partisan rationales over time. Political actors transfer authority to the level where 
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they expect the most stable electoral majorities in the long term. The insulation argument entails 
another important aspect. State-wide and sub-national electoral stability are observed 
simultaneously. O’Neill assumes that the state-wide level prevails over the sub-national level (2003, 
1075). Only when state-wide electoral volatility and regional electoral stability exist can we expect 
state-wide governments to decentralize. In cases of state-wide electoral stability, she assumes re-
centralization. Evidence for the insulation argument rests on the analysis of symmetric 
decentralization in five presidential systems in Latin America (2003, 2005). This argument has never 
been applied to asymmetric decentralization or the accommodation of minorities.  
4.3.3 Implications of the partisan rationales 
The concepts of insulation and vulnerability employ different causal mechanisms and lead to 
different expectations about territorial reform. The insulation argument implies the perceived 
stability of electoral support over time and across different levels. Authority is insulated in areas 
which are electoral strongholds, irrespective of how relevant they are in terms of overall vote share 
(O’Neill 2003). The electoral vulnerability argument, in contrast, sees authority transferred to the 
sub-national level with the aim of securing state-wide majorities (Alonso 2012) or policies (Heller 
2002; Elias and Tronconi 2011). The trade-off between sub-national and state-wide voters requires 
the electoral importance of the sub-national entity to make the deal pay off.  
However, a comparative perspective points to the fact that authority rarely migrates to territorial 
entities whose voters can make a pronounced difference at federal elections, suggesting electoral 
vulnerability concerns are the exception rather than the rule. Meanwhile, a closer look at 
decentralization reforms reveals that authority rarely migrates to territorial entities with majorities 
of the same party; instead it shifts to regionalist parties with distinct partisan organizations. Thus, 
the intra-party insulation argument falls down. We therefore require a theory of decentralization 
which transcends both intra-partisan rationales and regional electoral importance.  
236 
 
4.3.4 The Theory of Ideological Authority Insulation  
We argue that party competition over territoriality is embedded in the dominant ideological conflict 
at the state-wide level. Political conflicts are neither exclusively territorial nor exclusively state-
market, but rather reinforced by the interdependence between them (Rokkan 1999, 309). State-
wide governments are necessarily engaged in the fundamental conflicts of the day, the content of 
which changes over time. Martin (1978) highlights how both centre‒periphery and class conflicts 
are reinforced by and assimilated into the religious‒secular divide where it appears. He suggests 
that the religious divide overlaps with distinctions between secular, urban, industrial centres and a 
more religious, rural and agricultural periphery (Martin 1978, 40).  
Interwar Spain demonstrates the interweaving of territorial and religious politics. Basque 
nationalism had a clerical bent and accordingly was opposed by anti-clerical Republicans in Madrid 
(Edles 1999, 325). In contrast, Catalan nationalism was progressive, anti-clerical and republican. 
Consequently, under the military rule of Primo de Rivera the Catalan drive for self-determination 
was repressed. But the Republican victory in 1931 soon led to a negotiated autonomy statute and 
during the Second Republic Catalonia significantly extended its political authority. Numerous other 
examples illustrate how stances on territoriality are integrated into the dominant conflict dimension.  
In the majority of democracies in the late twentieth century, the struggle between market 
supporters and market sceptics became the new dominant conflict.79  But how would regionally 
insulated authority help against state-wide competitors? One argument is that political control is 
consolidated by replacing or sidelining other elites (Boone 2003, 356; Aalen and Muriaas 2015). 
Authority shifts may lead to the establishment of new institutions and new positions which can be 
                                                 
79 Although some have previously suggested that ideological proximity might be relevant in decentralization processes 
(Garman et al. 2001; Maddens and Libbrecht 2009; Toubeau and Massetti 2013; Toubeau and Wagner 2015), they have 
not specified why and which ideological dimension matters where and when. Moreover, the ideological proximity 




staffed with ideological allies. Ideologically aligned territories equipped with authority can serve as 
a point of reference in state-wide political discourses. Policies can be tested and show-cased to 
support the ideologically aligned parties at the centre. Endowed with co-decision rights, allies on 
the sub-national level are empowered as veto players for competing state-wide parties who may 
win government in the future.  
Shared rule is a powerful safeguard for self-rule competences and also an important factor 
influencing state-wide legislation (Mueller 2013). It is rational to increase or establish shared rule, 
for two reasons. First, shared rule often entails safeguard clauses and locks in self-rule authority. 
In unitary states this is often the only insurance against future state-wide governments who might 
rescind authority. Second, to empower ideological allies with shared rule competences is an 
effective means to impede future state-wide governments of a different ideological stripe. Thus, 
for the party which shifts authority to sub-national levels, the empowerment of ideological allies 
may come with considerable long-term gains (see blinded for review 2016b for a game-theoretical 
framing of this argument). Finally, in many cases, decentralization stabilizes regional political elites 
and offices, because regional political actors associated with the reform will be seen as “founding 
fathers” of minority nations. Their parties are usually evaluated with a premium in the regional 
elections to come. Insulated regional authority thus serves as a lasting power base ready to be 
activated against regional and state-wide competitors.  
The effects of ideological proximity are enhanced by congruence. If the same party governs on 
several territorial levels simultaneously, internal party pressure facilitates authority shifts (Elias and 
Tronconi 2011, 518‒20; Léon 2014; Petersohn et al. 2015, 629). The congruence mechanism 
intensifies internal party pressure, without the sources of different party actors’ internal bargaining 
power being explicit. Electoral strength in a certain area or electoral importance for the state-wide 
level may empower particular sub-national party branches. Decentralization is likely where sub-
national interests within political parties prevail over national ones (Willis et al. 1999, 18). There is 
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evidence from Belgium, the UK, Canada, Spain and Italy to support this argument (Elias and 
Tronconi 2011; Petersohn et al. 2015). 
Ideological similarity allows for authority transfers to areas dominated by other partisan actors, 
thus explaining various decentralization reforms where the intra-party rationales of insulation, 
electoral vulnerability and congruence are lacking (for example: the Faroe Islands, Greenland, 
Autonomous Regions in Nicaragua, Basque Countries, Catalonia, Scotland or Wales, to name just 
a few). To summarize, our theoretical argument entails a baseline expectation which is successively 
specified under one condition. Our basic argument is captured in Hypothesis 1:  
H1: The likelihood that state-wide government parties will accommodate a minority with more authority increases 
with higher ideological proximity between the state-wide government and a region.  
The insulation argument might be applied to ideologically proximate regions without minority 
demand as well. However, we think that only visible demand of minorities justifies the asymmetric 
transfer of authority with regard to the claims of the other conventional regions. 
H2: The likelihood that state-wide government parties will accommodate a minority with more authority increases 
with higher ideological proximity between the state-wide government and a region under the condition of visible 
minority demand.  
This second hypothesis might appear obvious or trivial but once we accept that accommodation is 
a conscious choice of state-wide actors to alter territorial structures to their benefit, we need to 
check whether state-wide actors might also empower areas without demand. 
4.3.5 Our Universe of Cases, Case Selection and Data 
Asymmetric shifts of authority are negotiated in dyads of state-wide cabinets and regional 
claimants. The authority insulation argument assumes partisans’ commitment to programmatic 
signals which we predominantly observe in democracies. Accordingly, democracy is an additional 
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scope condition for the test of our argument.80 We measure democracy using the Polity IV index 
and select cases with values equal to or higher than six (Marshall et al. 2014). We assume that 
regional claims are territorially concentrated and articulated. We therefore narrow the scope of our 
universe of cases to countries with at least one region articulating authority demand between 1945 
and 2015. For the identification of articulated and spatially concentrated regional demand, we take 
advantage of two indices from the Minorities at Risk Dataset (Gurr 1999). All in all, our universe 
of cases comprises around 10,000 region‒cabinet relationships in 34 countries over different time 
periods (see Appendix Part C, Table C, for a detailed description). From this universe we select 
239 regions and 228 national cabinets in 11 countries between 1945 and 2015, resulting in a sample 
of 4297 region‒cabinet cases.  
The statistical analysis is based on regions of the following countries: Canada, Denmark, France, 
Italy, Nicaragua, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. The selection of these 
11 out of 34 countries mirrors our ability to gather sub-national electoral and partisan ideological 
positions. It is important to note that this is not a representative sample but still a more rigorous 
test than all existing single or comparative case studies with similar research questions. The panel 
structure of the data and the inclusion of regions without experience of reform and even of those 
without articulated demand for authority leads to a sample with around 95 per cent of negative 
cases. This is deliberate, as most existing studies are biased towards positive cases, i.e., where 
accommodation occurs (selection on the dependent variable). We include regions from countries 
such as Turkey, Switzerland and France where regional demand exists but, over the whole time 
period, minority accommodation fails to materialize.81  
                                                 
80 We assume our argument to hold outside democracies in cases where ideological linkages exist, but the measurement 
of these linkages exceeds our capabilities for this study.  
81 One might argue for the inclusion of Belgium. Although we coded Belgium, we excluded it from the analysis. All 




To put the argument to a systematic test, it is necessary to develop a comparable measurement of 
our central independent variable. To measure ideological proximity, we need two components. The 
first is the ideological position of the dominant party in state-wide government. We measure this 
using blinded for review procedure, which provides party positions on a market dimension which are 
comparable over time and space and have the highest validity of comparable measurement 
procedures.82 We prefer the market dimension because it is the most important conflict dimension 
in almost every party system within our time period, and it is the only one which is comparable 
over a wide array of countries and time points (blinded for review).  
The second component is the ideological position of a region. It is important to focus on an overall 
regional ideological position and not the individual positions of regional parties or movements. In 
cases where authority is insulated at sub-national tiers, these newly empowered areas will be 
governed by locally dominant majorities. Of course, regionalist parties may be part of these 
majorities, but often there are several regionalist parties campaigning for authority with very 
different political positions, or regionalist parties may represent only a small fraction of voters 
(Cunningham 2011; Massetti and Schakel 2013).  
We measure the ideological orientation of a region by calculating “ideological centres of 
gravity”. Ideally, centres of gravity capture the ideological position of the median voter of a region. 
However, we lack individual survey data for many regions in different countries over time. For this 
reason, we use party positions on the market dimension and weight them by voter support within 
a region. In order to be as precise as data availability allows, we use all parties with sizable voter 
support in a region. On average, we capture 92.8 per cent of valid votes in the 239 regions between 
1945 and 2015. Blinded for review measurement of party positions is based on CMP/Marpor data 
(Volkens et al. 2015). As these are limited and rarely cover small parties or those with strong 
regionally concentrated support, we qualitatively complement the measurement of party positions 
                                                 
82 See online appendix, Table H, for a comparison with other party position measurements.  
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of those parties.83 Regional centres of gravity are normally distributed and those regions with voters 
supporting autonomist parties are slightly to the left of those who have no electorally mobilized 
support for more authority (see Figure 1).   
Figure 17: Regional centres of gravity 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculation.  
Finally, ideological proximity is measured by subtracting the position of a state-wide party from the 
ideological centre of gravity of a region, calculating the absolute value, subtracting 1 and multiplying 
it by -1. As both measures are standardized, 1 signifies identical positions of regions and the 
dominant state-wide party, 0 is the theoretical maximum distance. 0 is a very unlikely value because 
dominant state-wide parties rarely hold extreme values between interventionism and market 
liberalism and neither do regional centres of gravity (see Appendix Part D, Figure A).  
Our theory proposes that ideological proximity increases the likelihood of asymmetric reforms 
under the condition of regional claims. Demand is specified as the general existence of claimant 
                                                 
83 In countries where comparable party positions based on regional manifestos exist, these positions closely resemble 
the national position of the same party (see online appendix, Table G). The party positions in Nicaragua are measured 
by using the average party placements of several surveys (Coppedge 1997; Alcántara 2001, 2005; Wiesehomeier and 
Benoit 2007).  
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minorities (Gurr 1999; n=2077). Parties demanding authority are qualitatively determined. Our 
coding is in line with that of other authors (Massetti and Schakel 2016; Toubeau and Wagner 2016; 
see Appendix Part D, Table F). An alternative specification would be to use valid votes for 
regionalist parties in a region. But this measure has a major drawback. Electorally mobilized 
regional demand represents the commitment of voters to authority shifts. However, often demand 
cannot be expressed by voters as there are no regional parliaments. This case is better captured by 
the general demand within a region. 
The occurrence of accommodation through an authority transfer distinguishes positive from 
negative cases (dependent variable). Central authorities can devolve power to one or more regions 
and can give different (asymmetric) degrees of autonomy to each region (McGarry 2005). We 
measure asymmetric reforms by using the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2016). Regional 
authority is disaggregated into two domains (self-rule and shared rule) and these are operationalized 
in ten dimensions (Hooghe et al. 2016, 29‒30). We are only interested in cases where authority 
shifts lead to asymmetric authority distribution on the sub-national level. We assign positive cases 
when authority is transferred only to a subset of regions within a country.84  
To ensure the temporal matching of reforms and cabinets, we carefully assign authority changes 
to specific cabinets, drawing on the qualitative description of the coding decisions made by Hooghe 
et al. (2016, country profiles). Establishing a precise timeline is not always possible. For instance, 
in the case of Spain, the different asymmetric reforms which occurred are based on the constitution 
of 1978; however, majorities had to approve specific reforms with concrete laws and not every 
territorial arrangement envisaged in the constitution was implemented. We define the time point 
of a reform as the date when the legislature approves a bill which grants an authority transfer (see 
Appendix Part D, Tables D and E, for an overview of positive cases and their respective laws). 
                                                 
84 However, a subset of regions can also be differently empowered to re-symmetrize subnational authority, as we 
notably observe in Italy in the 1970s and in Spain in the 1980s. These cases are not considered here because they de 




The Regional Authority Index has a discrete distribution ranging empirically from 0 to 27. 
However, we doubt that differences on that scale are linear expressions of more or less authority. 
For example, we find a major decentralization reform in Italy which scores +1, but in fact entailed 
the transfer of more than 100 policy areas (see Amoretti 2002). The policy scope is only roughly 
categorized in the coding scheme and ceiling effects can easily occur. In contrast, achieving a 
regional parliament comes with an increase of +4 in the Authority Index. Consequently, we 
transform the Regional Authority Index into a binary variable of reform and non-reform.85  
4.3.6 Alternative partisan rationales 
As discussed in the theoretical section, there are plausible alternative partisan rationales. We take 
advantage of our dataset and complement the analysis with an evaluation of these rationales. We 
measure the electoral vulnerability of a region for individual parties as the relative share of votes 
received from one region at state-wide elections. 0 means none of the votes originates from a 
specific region, whereas 1 means that the entire electoral support of a party is concentrated in a 
specific region.  
Another rationale is congruence. Majorities of the dominant state-wide party in government within 
specific regions should increase the likelihood of asymmetric reforms. We assign congruence for 
constellations where the dominant state-wide party in government is the strongest party within a 
region. We regard congruence as a special case of ideological proximity. In cases of congruence we 
simply cannot distinguish between ideological proximity and an intra-party calculus. We therefore 
use congruence as a control variable for a hard test of our ideological insulation argument. In case 
ideological insulation plays out as a systematic factor even when we control for congruence, we 
leverage the opportunity to discriminate between intra-partisan and ideological considerations.  
                                                 
85 In the robustness section of the online appendix we also test different specifications of the dependent variable. We 




The stability of regional support over time might increase the transfer of authority. O’Neill’s (2003, 
2005) argument is based on intra-party bargains and, hence, we cumulate the congruence variable 
over three successive electoral periods. We interrupt cumulating when the main state-wide 
competitor has a majority at the regional level. Stable electoral support on the state-wide level is measured 
by counting consecutive state-wide majorities leading to cabinet formation.  
The degree of market liberalism (or, as some would name it, the position on a left- right dimension) of 
the dominant party in government might influence the willingness to accommodate since left 
parties have a higher sympathy for the political self-determination of minorities (Toubeau and 
Wagner 2013; Verge 2013).  
4.3.7 Structural incentives to accommodate 
From the literature on ethnic conflicts we integrate five structural factors which should influence 
the general willingness of governments to accommodate minority claims. We count the number of 
other claiming minorities in a country in order to capture the anticipated prospects of claims in other 
areas (Walter 2006, Toft 2005). We identify regions with at least one faction of the minorities 
demanding secession in comparison to those claiming autonomy only (Massetti and Schakel 2013). We 
distinguish between divided and unitary minority mobilization with a dummy being 1 in regions where 
more than one minority party exists (Cunningham 2011). Finally, we distinguish between minorities 
with kin states and those without (Grigoryan 2015; Ganguly 1998). The level of regional authority can 
have an effect on the government’s decisions for reform. Higher levels of regional authority can 
either indicate no further need for reform or can cause dynamics of outbidding with rising demand 
for more (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Mitchell et al. 2009). We measure the level of authority with 
the lagged level of the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2016).  
4.3.8 Opportunity structures for state-wide governments 
Decentralization reforms are demanding tasks for state-wide parties. The opportunity structures to 
implement envisaged reforms entail many factors, such as position of the constitutional court, seat share 
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of cabinets, the duration of a cabinet or the number of parties in government, the age of democracy or the size 
of the electorate on the regional level.  
We measure majority requirements with the seat share of cabinets within a parliament and the 
complexity of decision making with the number of parties in cabinet.86 A constellation with a low 
likelihood of reform is a cabinet responsible for an accommodative shift of authority in the 
legislative period before. We code this constellation with a dummy indicating previous reform.87   
 
4.3.9 Identification  
Asymmetric decentralization reforms are rare. In our baseline sample (which includes many cases 
without regional authority demand) only 53 reforms occur in around 4300 cases.88 We will account 
for the distribution of the dependent variable with rare event regression (King and Zeng 2001). 
Simulation studies have shown that estimates of the rare events estimator using the penalized 
maximum likelihood estimation are the least biased estimates with positive cases lower 200 (Leitgöb 
2013).89  
We start modelling with a penalized maximum likelihood estimation entailing only the main 
independent and dependent variable (Model 1). Afterwards we condition on the control variables 
(Model 2) and add congruence (Model 3). Congruence is a subset of ideological proximity and the 
inclusion in the model is a rigorous test of the effect of ideological proximity. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the estimates, we depict the conditional marginal effects of ideological proximity 
(Figure 2). The idea that authority insulation is a viable strategy under the condition of visible 
                                                 
86 Most data on cabinets are based on Döring and Manow (2016).  
87 See Table A in the appendix for a description of every variable and Table B for an overview of distributions and the 
overlap over cases of high and low ideological proximity.  
88 49 reforms are captured by the Regional Authority Index and 4 are included based on case knowledge (see online 
appendix, Tables D and E, for positive cases).  
89 We use a Stata package of Firthlogit to calculate penalized maximum likelihood estimates (Coveney 2015). We 
calculate the same models with panel logit regressions as a more established estimation procedure (Model 5). 
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minority demand is assessed in two ways. First, we estimate the models on sub-samples including 
only regions with demand (Models 4 and 5) and, second, we calculate non-linear interaction effects 
between proximity and demand (Xu et al. 2017). We take recent advice on the interpretation of 
interaction effects into account. Models with interactions include all constitutive terms, we check 
the substantial impact of both variables on each other and we assess the common support of the 
argument by looking at the underlying distribution of negative and positive cases (Berry et al. 2012; 
Figure 2). The analysis of common support is crucial in our case, because the ideological proximity 
variable is skewed to the right and marginal effects for cases with low proximity are based on very 
few observations. In the robustness section we evaluate the sensitivity of our results for different 
specification choices, inclusion of controls and country-specific effects.  
4.3.10 Results  
Model 1 in Table 1 indicates the general average effect of ideological proximity on asymmetric 
authority transfers. The positive and significant effect (5.86***) is in line with Hypothesis 1. The 
effect is stronger and still significant in Model 2, where we integrate the whole battery of controls. 
The effect holds even in a model where we integrate congruence as a special case of ideological 








Notes: PMLL (Penalized maximum likelihood logit estimator), PL (Panel logit estimator). Missings in models 2 to 5 
are predominantly caused by the lagged level of regional authority (first dyad).  
 
A look into the positive cases in our dataset reveals that regional demand is virtually a necessary 
condition. There is only one case where a minor transfer of authority occurred without a request 
being observed (Yukon in the late 1960s).90 The effect remains once we narrow our sample to 
regions with demand for autonomy (Model 4). In Model 5 we demonstrate a positive and significant 
                                                 
90 In the early 1970s a forceful movement started to demand authority for the First Nations in Yukon. An 
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effect with a more conventional logit maximum likelihood estimator. We show in the Appendix 
Part D that the effect is stable across several estimators and independent of the inclusion of specific 
controls (Table I and J). The substantial effect of ideological proximity is visualized in Figure 2 via 
three different techniques.  
Figure 2 depicts the marginal effect of proximity for different values of ideological proximity 
(left-hand side). Being ideologically similar increases the likelihood of an accommodative reform 
of around 10%. In odds-ratios, the likelihood of accommodation under ideological proximity is 
around 1700 times higher than a reform under a maximum of an ideological distance (odds ratio 
interpretation). Furthermore, we model the marginal effect of claiming minorities for different 
attributes of ideological proximity (Figure 2, middle) and the marginal effect of ideological 
proximity under the condition of regional demand and no regional demand for authority (right-
hand side). The assessment of both directions allows us to infer that the significant interaction 
effect is substantially driven by ideological proximity.  
The lower part of the middle graph in Figure 2 illustrates the underlying density of observations 
and further separates negative (light grey) from positive cases (dark grey). Obviously, inference 
based on the left-hand side of the interaction effect has very low support and mainly rests on 
interpolation. 
We distinguish between five bins (quintiles). In constellations with proximity higher than 0.9, 
the marginal effects become significantly stronger. Empirically, an ideological proximity of 0.9 
distinguishes, on average, the difference between centre-left and centre-right parties, the major 
competitors in modern party systems. We complete the picture by looking at the marginal effect 
of ideological proximity in states of regional demand and non-demand. In states of non-demand 
there is no significant effect of ideological proximity; in states of regional demand we observe a 
strong and significantly different positive effect of ideological authority. The requirement of 
sufficient cases for specific constellations in the case of interactive effects (common support) is 
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given in this case, because demand and non-demand cases are more equally observed in situations 
of ideological proximity and distance.  
Figure 18: Interaction of regional demand and ideological proximity 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the inverse probability margins (model 4, left hand graph). The middle and right hand 
graph depicts marginal effects of non-linear interactions of ideological proximity and minority claim using the Stata 
package Interflex (Xu et al. 2017).  
 
 
4.3.11 Robustness of the ideological proximity effect 
Not a single one of the 35-plus robustness models renders the ideology effects insignificant. 
However, we put those models under scrutiny where the coefficients are either systematically lower 
or higher than the average. The effect decreases when the UK is taken out of the sample. Authority 
shifts to Scotland and Wales are often analysed in terms of the vulnerability argument. However, 
our results indicate rather that both are textbook cases of ideological authority insulation. There 
was ideological near-identity between the Labour government and the centres of gravity of Wales 
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and Scotland in 1997, whereas the Conservative Party was far to the right of the mean voter of 
both regions. Hence excluding the UK reduces the effect of ideological proximity.  
The exclusion of Nicaragua, on the other hand, increases the average effect of ideology. This is 
due to the polarization of Nicaraguan politics in times of decentralization. The governing FSLN 
was ideologically much closer to the minorities in the eastern regions of Nicaragua than its political 
competitor. However, the distance between the centre of gravity and the very left-wing FSLN was 
still high in comparison to Western European distances.  
Our theoretical argument, which is in essence an actor-based explanation, in combination with 
the empirical evidence gives us a strong case to infer that asymmetric shifts of authority are very 
unlikely in cases of ideological distance. Nonetheless, what we cannot simply infer is that 
ideological proximity necessarily leads to asymmetric decentralization. In many cases, ideological 
proximity exists, but reforms are absent. In the following part we point to several conditions which 
influence the likelihood of ideological proximity leading to reform.  
The effect of ideological proximity holds even in specifications with different measurements of 
the dependent variable. A continuous measure of regional authority shifts can be estimated in panel 
Poisson regressions, basically assuming a count model with changing authority units and zero 
inflation. A disaggregation of self- and shared rule depicts no significant differences (see Table K 
in the Appendix Part D).  
4.3.12 Opportunity and structural incentives  
The coefficients of the opportunity structures have the expected directions. More parties in 
government reduce the likelihood for strategic consensus and significantly decrease the chances of 
accommodation although this effect is only significant in the full-sample regressions including 
regions without demand for authority. In contrast, sufficient majorities increase the likelihood for 
accommodation. Previous reforms of the same government do not have consistent effects.  
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Structural incentives as developed in conflict studies on non-democratic contexts also yield 
interesting results. With one exception, we observe the prohibitive factors to work in democracies 
the same way they have prevented the accommodation of minorities in more authoritarian contexts. 
A plurality of parties asking for political self-determination increases the likelihood of 
accommodation as Cunningham has shown (2011). It would be interesting to study which of the 
different mechanisms proposed by Cunningham drive these findings in democracies. Secessionist 
claims reduce state-wide governments’ willingness to transfer authority. This finding is consistent 
with our insulation argument, because ideological allies in a seceding territory do not provide the 
same gains in future as those within the same electoral arena.  
Our results confirm that kin states negatively affect the willingness to accommodate minorities. 
For example, Italian governments feared the irredentist potential of South Tyrolians and decided 
to integrate the South Tyrolian minority into Trentino until 1992 despite international contracts 
guaranteeing South Tyrol autonomy already in 1946.  
The level of regional authority has a consistent negative effect across all models. There might 
be evidence for outbidding after accommodation, but our results demonstrate that radicalized 
demand does not necessarily result in further concessions. The inconsistent effects of the age of 
democracy across models do not support the functionalist argument of democracy being an 
adaption path to decentralization.  
One of the established findings in the conflict literature seems not to travel well to 
accommodation games in democracies. Other demanding ethnicities in a given territory should 
prevent central actors from accommodation because they fear to set a precedent for even more 
demand elsewhere (Walter 2006). We do not find a negative effect of other concentrated minorities 
in a country. A brief inspection of the accommodation cases in democracies indicates why. 
Following the reputation building argument of Walter (2006), governments in the UK, Italy, 
Belgium or Spain would have strong reason to avoid accommodation in order to prevent autonomy 
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precedents. Contrary to that expectation the majority of claiming minorities in these countries 
received a significant share of authority.  
4.3.13 Alternative partisan rationales 
Interventionist parties are assumed to be more willing to accommodate demanding minorities and 
to encourage political self-determination in comparison to market-liberal ones (as suggested by 
Verge 2013). However, we find no significant differences between market liberal and 
interventionist state-wide governments. Neither does electoral importance nor does stability of 
regional support exert a significant effect. The size of the regional electorate could exert a positive 
effect on the willingness to accommodation if we assume that partisan bonds are rather flexible. 
We do not find empirical support in our sample for an effect of the size of the electorate. As 
assumed by O’Neill (2003), enduring and good performance of sub-national party branches at the 
regional level might increase the chances of accommodation. We do not find evidence for this 
argument as well. However, the O’Neill argument is tied to an intra-party calculus but in many 
established democracies ethnic minorities create their own parties. In these cases, multi-level 
linkages are better described by ideological proximity than by intra-partisan alignments.  
Comparing the evidence for the arguments from the conflict literature and the partisan 
rationales from the comparative politics literature, we come to a surprising conclusion. Strategic 
constellations observed by scholars of ethnic conflict travel well to multi-level bargains over 
authority in established democracies. At the same time, the strategic rationales developed by 
scholars in comparative politics, often based on (comparative) case studies in Europe, do not 
systematically explain the accommodation of minorities in the very same universe of cases they are 
derived from. Nonetheless, we regard the factors brought forward by conflict studies as structural 
constants which shape the general attitude of state-wide governments but cannot explain why and 
when accommodation takes place. These structural incentives seem to be superimposed by the 




Why are parties that form the state-wide government willing to accommodate the claims of ethnic 
or national minorities? A number of actor-centred approaches start from the electoral and 
organizational incentives of state-wide government parties. We reconstruct two different causal 
arguments from this literature: electoral vulnerability and intra-party insulation. These concepts 
present plausible ideas but, as we show, cannot systematically explain the transfer of authority.  
Alternatively, ethnic conflict studies have brought forward several structural conditions which 
facilitate or impede the willingness of state-wide governments to accommodate. Our evidence 
supports the effectiveness of those conditions under electoral competition in democracies. 
However, these conditions cannot explain the different and varying positions of parties towards 
accommodation. 
Against this, we present authority transfer from the state-wide to the regional level as not only 
a concession to claimant minorities and an instrument of pacification, but a conscious choice of 
rational state-wide parties. Our theory of ideological authority insulation predicts that power is 
shifted to places dominated by ideological allies. In contrast, regional minorities rarely receive 
resources for political self-determination when their ideological positions on the state-market 
dimension diverge from those of the centre.  
Our core assumption is that the strategies and ideologies of sub-national parties closely interact 
with those of state-wide parties. However, it is not the territorial dimension that structures this 
interaction but, in the time period covered here, the state‒market dimension which distinguishes 
the political left from the political right. Thus, territoriality becomes a second-order conflict which 
has the potential to kick-start decentralization debate, and which is superimposed on decisions over 
decentralization reforms. Research on multidimensional party competition has recently been 
enriched by the concepts of blurring and subsumption (Elias et al. 2015). Our findings suggest that 
superimposition should be added to the toolbox of party researchers. 
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Using a new dataset, which includes the territorial distributions of voters and the ideological 
positions of state-wide and regional parties, we model different partisan rationales according to 
existing theories and contrast these with a model that captures our theory of ideological authority 
insulation. The various statistical models show very robust evidence that ideological authority 
insulation provides a systematic explanation of asymmetric decentralization reforms. Our findings 
also illustrate specific opportunity structures on the state-wide level which facilitate the transfer of 
authority: namely governments with a low number of parties and sufficient majorities in parliament. 
Furthermore, conditions like the existence of kin states, uniform mobilization, or factions with 
secessionist claims impede the willingness of state-wide governments as shown before by scholars 
of ethnic conflict.  
The theory of ideological authority insulation and our empirical findings have implications 
for research beyond territorial politics. Scholars working on conflict resolution in heterogeneous 
societies should be aware that decentralized authority is very likely to fail as an accommodation 
strategy if ideological distance between political elites in regions with national or ethnic minorities 
and the centre is large.  
Finally, a number of questions arise from our findings that may inform future research. 
Our analysis focuses on the post-Second World War period. In earlier times as well as in times of 
de-alignment issues other than the market‒state dimension may have been superimposed on 
territorial conflict. From another perspective, the generalizability of our findings may exceed the 
limits of the chosen scope conditions in three ways. First, ideological authority insulation may also 
work across countries. Many cases suggest that accommodation via authority transfers is often 
affected by the support and non-support of international ideological allies – data limitations prevent 
us from considering this in our quantitative analysis. Second, not only rulers in democratic 
countries but also authoritarian regimes may use an insulation strategy. Third, authority insulation 
may work not only in cases of decentralization, but in processes of internationalization as well. 
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Transfers and withdrawal of authority to international institutions such as the European Union 
may follow similar rationales.  
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The main motivation of the thesis was to systematically assess a pressing issue which is the rising 
political indifference based on a widespread believe, within and outside the scientific world, that 
government ideology has faded to make a difference. In order to avoid an assessment of very 
peculiar political constellations, I selected an ideological dimension which I, and many others, think 
is a historical constant in the ideological division of political actors, the ideology of market 
liberalism. Market liberalism is not only dedicated to various promises on the policy level, for 
example deregulating the economy, reducing the generosity of the welfare state, decreasing public 
expenditures or levelling and minimizing corporate and individual tax burdens, market liberalism 
is usually also attached to the very fundamental pledge of wealth. The causal chain from 
government ideology of market liberalism over socio-economic policies to more aggregated 
measures of wealth appears picture perfect for a general assessment of the impact of government 
ideology in a world of highly entrenched economic activities.  
As political debates about socio-economic issues are predominantly questions of the degree of 
trust in market mechanisms or alternative forms of regulated interactions, it was highly surprising 
to me, that the ideology of market liberalism, capturing exactly that divide, is missing in every 
textbook of modern ideologies. In order to rectify that unfortunate omission, I dedicate myself in 
Part I to a conceptual clarification of the ideology of market liberalism. The definition takes 
advantage of the morphological approach to ideologies brought forward by Michael Freeden (1996) 
and distinguishes philosophical, scholarly and more ubiquitous forms of discourses, usually used 
by political parties and their voters. It is shown that market liberalism has a philosophical core of 
elegant clarity which in turn gives rise to a comparably stable meaning of that ideology over time 
and space. Additionally, it gives rise to a denotational anchorage allowing to create a measurement 
of market liberalism which in contrast to other ideological dimensions is very likely to be 
comparable. Part II of this thesis engages with this promise and proves that in comparison to an 
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overall left and right dimension this is indeed the case, although the high standards of comparability 
or equivalence, common in disciplines like psychology, are far from being met.  
Transferring the insights from the partisan measurement part to the measurement of 
government ideology clarifies that many applied approaches using government ideology in 
systematic comparisons can benefit from the manifold recent advances in the party ideology 
measurement community. As demonstrated on the partisan level, a core problem leading to the 
sobering accumulation of non-partisan findings is indeed a problematic handling of government 
ideology in comparative studies. Comparing conventional approaches with my own proposal 
demonstrates clearly that inferences on the impact of government ideology are strongly influenced 
by the selection of the government ideology indicator. The beforehand developed index of market 
liberalism systematically reveals a strong impact of government ideology across many policy areas 
where market liberals claim to make a difference (for example regulation, the generosity of the 
welfare state, tax regimes or public spending). In contrast, binary distinctions of left and right are 
very likely to produce null-findings across the same board of policy indicators. Alternative 
continuous indicators of government ideology have similar tendencies or at least show substantially 
weaker effects.  
This inference is generated in Part III of this thesis and based on macro-level statistics which is, 
for good reason, regarded as highly problematic in terms of robustness and endogeneity problems. 
In order to limit the reservations against such approaches, I lay out a generalized procedure for the 
selection and non-selection of control variables which is very often rather arbitrary and with great 
influence on the average effect under scrutiny. The procedure is based on the back-door criteria 
for causal identification as proposed by Judea Pearl (2009). The procedure provides a certain clarity 
and systematic for the inclusion of controls but hints at an additional aspect of the endogeneity 
problem of causal analyses in the social sciences. Variables can have multiple characters at once. 
For example, they can partly be a confounders and partly be a mediator at the same time. This 
hybrid character of variables can only be detected on theoretical grounds and challenge causals 
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identification. However, knowing about such problems can help to localize average effects being 
closer to the upper or lower bound of the “true” effect.   
The results on the policy level indicate a fairly systematic picture. The influence of the 
government ideology of market liberalism on many policies further translate into a changing 
amount and distribution of wealth. Path models can precisely model the chain from ideology over 
policies to more aggregated outcomes such as growth and inequality. The results of these path 
models demonstrate that market liberal governments reduce the amount of wealth and augment 
the degree of income inequality in the short term. Whereas the growth inducing policy chains of 
market liberal governments are offset by growth depressing policy chains, market liberals seem to 
consequently enforce policies where the top income earners prosper relatively to the other income 
groups. The ladder finding also survives an assessment of long-term implications of market liberal 
rule. In contrast, the growth effect of market liberal governments turns positive in the medium-
term (until around 13 years after the market liberal legacy) and fades to systematically matter 
thereafter.  
However, a closer assessment of the growth relevant aspect such as productivity or multi-factor 
productivity indicates that market liberal governments fulfil their pledge of wealth in an unexpected 
way. Long-term growth induced by market liberal governments is not about rising productivity but 
about the amount of economic activity. Accordingly, one of the core normative benchmarks of 
market liberals, namely efficiency defined as an improved input-output ratio, is not improved by 
market liberal governments. What is improved in the long-term is the amount of economic activity. 
This increased economic activity comes with substantial distributional consequences. Economic 
inequality, measured by the income share of the top earners, substantially increases during and after 
market liberal rule. Summarizing the impact of market liberal governments on highly relevant policy 
areas such as regulation, the welfare state and taxation as well as on higher aggregated outcomes 
such as economic growth and the distribution of incomes, it is no exaggeration to state that the 
government ideology of market liberalism substantially matters.  
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This holds also true for governments which at first glance appear blurring their position on the 
market dimension. Namely, populist radical right parties mobilizing voters predominantly via 
activating cultural fears. Together with Dennis Spies and Alexandre Afonso we show the highly 
selective but also systematic approach of the radical right towards socio-economic policies (Chapter 
3.4, see also Röth et al. 2017). In fact, the shape of the economy and the modern welfare state will 
be highly dependent on the socio-economic preferences of populist radical right parties as many 
countries face difficulties to arrive at stable parliamentary majorities without these parties.  
Part IV of the thesis focusses on the intersection of government ideology and territorial politics. 
Not only policies are increasingly determined on sub- or supranational levels, the degree of 
authority of these levels can be seen as a consequence of the attempt to insulate authority in 
territorial levels with ideologically proximate and politically stable majorities. So far, André Kaiser 
and I have demonstrated that this argument holds for the asymmetric accommodation of 
concentrated national minorities within democratic societies (Chapter 4.1 and Chapter 4.3; see also 
Röth et al. 2017; Röth and Kaiser 2016). In case the argument holds more generally, we can expect 
a constant reconfiguration of the distribution of authority between different government levels, 
following a partisan logic where ideological concerns superimpose genuine territorial concerns. 
Accordingly, supporters of the European Union or decentralization will turn into antagonists once 
ideological majorities on these levels changes. The degree of market liberalism has shown to be a 
useful indicator for ideological distances on that matter. The reason is, differences on a cultural 
dimension were argued to be hardly comparable on the state-wide level already. Comparability 
concerns multiply once we enter the world of a multi-level analysis of ideologies. Authoritarian 
values and nationalism, traditional morals or multiculturalism, all these core issues of cultural 
ideological differences turn into terrible differences in terms of meaning once multiple nationalities 
within one state are addressed. This is not about denying the importance of ideological differences 
on the cultural dimension, it is just about acknowledging how far away the social sciences are in 
terms of adequately using these differences in comparative studies. To focus on the ideology of 
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market liberalism is thereby first and foremost an attempt to improve comparability in order to 
assess the impact of government ideology on policies and higher aggregated outcomes of economic 
performance. The ideological dimension of market liberalism is, admittedly, a most-likely case to 
achieve both ends.  
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Appendix Part A – Part  II 
Table A. Selection of issues/indicators from the Manifesto Data Base 


















Favorable mentions of the free market and free 
market capitalism as an economic model 




Need for efficiency and economy in government 
and administration 
+ 73 25.6 3.20% 9.90% 3939 
Incentives (402) 
Favorable mentions of supply-side-oriented 
economic policies (assistance to business rather 
than consumers) 
+ 74.3 12.6 2.50% 7.40% 3939 
Economic 
Orthodoxy (414) 
Need for economically healthy government policy 
making. Retrenchment in crisis 
+ 66.8 8.8 2.30% 7.10% 3939 
Welfare State 
Limitation (505) 
Limiting state expenditure on social services or 
social security; favorable mentions of the social 
subsidiary principle (i.e., private care before state 
care) 
+ 27.4 2.6 0.50% 1.40% 3939 
Market 
Regulation (403) 
Support for policies designed to create a fair and 
open economic market 
- 69 13.2 2.00% 5.90% 3939 
Economic 
Planning (404) 
Favorable mentions of long-standing economic 
planning by  government 





Favorable mentions of demand- side-oriented 
economic policies (assistance to consumers 
rather than business); emphasis on increasing 
private demand 
- 21.5 1.1 0.30% 0.80% 3939 
Welfare State 
Expansion (504) 
Favorable mentions of need to introduce, 
maintain or expand any public social service or social 
security scheme 




General policies in favor of protecting the 
environment, fighting climate change, and other 
“green” policies 
- 69.5 26 3.70% 10.30% 3939 
Labor Groups 
Positive (701) 
Favorable references to all labor groups, the 
working class, and the unemployed ; support for 
trade unions and calls for employees to be well 
treated, including more jobs, good working 
conditions, fair wages, pension provision, etc. 
- 72.5 12.6 2.50% 7.90% 3939 
Equality Positive 
(503) 
Concept of social justice and the need for fair 
treatment of all people 
- 85.6 20.9 4.10% 12.90% 3939 
Controlled 
Economy (412) 
Support for direct government control of economy - 42.2 3.7 0.90% 2.70% 3939 
Nationalization 
(413) 
Favorable mentions of government ownership of 
industries, either partial or complete. May also 
include favorable mentions of government 
ownership of land 
- 30.9 2.3 0.50% 1.50% 3939 
Marxist Analysis 
(415) 
Positive references to Marxist ideology and specific 
use of Marxist‒Leninist terminology  
- 5.3 0.5 0.20% 0.50% 3939 
Note: Phrasing of the content as in the codebook of the Marpor data (Volkens et al. 2015). Author’s italics 
emphasize the positional framing.   
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Table B: Aggregation scheme for the issues of the CMP/Marpor data 
Description: The Marpor data provide specific issues for Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. 
However, these issues are more precise than the traditional issue categories and they are used instead of the 
traditional issue categories for the Western European countries. However, they were introduced in Version 
1 of the coding instructions and were gradually abandoned in most of the countries as the issues could also 
be coded into the three-digit main categories. Currently, the share of these categories is not included in the 
main categories. If analysts use observations from CEE countries for which the CEE codes were used, in 
order to compare them to manifestos without CEE codes they should aggregate such CEE codes into the 
main categories. Using the conceptual derivation of issues, I regrouped them slightly differently from the 









Table C. Relation of salience to position  
Description: The relationship between salience and position for every specific issue category is tested via 
multivariate fractional polynomial analysis (MFP). Fractional polynomial models are useful when one 
suspects relationships to be non-linear. FP as introduced by Royston & Altman (1994) and modified by 
Royston & Sauerbrei (2008) combines backward elimination with a systematic search for “suitable” 
transformation to represent the influence of each covariate on the outcome. MFP constructs a fractional 
polynomial transformation for each covariate at every step of “retrofitting” while fixing the current 
functional forms of the other covariates. The algorithm terminates when no more covariates are excluded 
and the functional forms of the continuous covariates no longer change. Covariates are the differently 
transformed issue categories and the benchmark positions serve as the dependent variable (compare Table 





























































Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS MFP MFP 
Relation 





R² of the 14 
Indicators 
from Table A  
0.25 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.66 0.68 
0.69 (variable 
specific powers) 
0.012*** for every 
indicator at 
minimum 
Note: The R² of the simple fixed-effects OLS models on the benchmark party positions is shown. The number of 
observations is 917 in every model. The best-fitting polynomials are calculated with fractional polynomial analysis 




Table D: Benchmark positions and matching of the different placements91 
Description: The Morgan Expert Survey was the first expert survey asking for a continuous placement of 
party positions in several countries (Morgan 1976) and was very influential for the development of expert 
surveys in general. The survey is not publicly accessible, but exists on microfilm and can be obtained on 
request from the author. Morgan deals at great length with the efficiency of different aggregation procedures 
with small-n samples. He used three different approaches: the midmean (25% truncated), a Winsorized 
mean, and the sample mean. He argued strongly for the midmean as the most efficient estimator for this 
sample size under censored parent distributions. He also used a rescaling technique to standardize the 
placements. The placement of every expert was first standardized to a 0‒100 scale before applying the 
aggregation procedures. While the rescaling changed the lower end of the distribution only slightly (because 
many communist parties were placed close to zero), it biased the results on the market liberal side of the 
dimension. Many parties received higher values than intended by the experts. Another drawback is that the 
party positions represent average values for the whole period from 1945 to 1975.  
However, this is the only existing source covering party positions before 1975. I rescaled these data 
to 0‒1 distribution and merged them with the economic dimension of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHESS, Bakker et al. 2015). The wording of the CHESS dimension is: “Parties on the economic left want 
government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced 
economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a 
leaner welfare state.” (Bakker et al. 2015). I included the CHESS Candidate Survey to increase the number 
of CEE countries (Bakker et al. 2014). Manifesto data and CHESS diverge in the time point of investigation. 
I used the following rule for matches: Parties either match exactly (same year) or diverge at maximum of 
two years. Temporal divergence is only accepted where the manifesto data predate expert placements, 
because otherwise programmatic changes would not have informed the expert placements.  
 
Variable Concept n Min Max Mean Std. Source 
Benchmark Market liberalism placements different two 
expert surveys 
1135 0 1 0.52 0.27 
Morgan (1976); Bakker et 
al. (2015) 
  
                                                 
91 The party positions of Franzmann & Kaiser (2006), Lowe et al. (2011), Elff (2013), and König et al. (2013), are 
merged to the manifesto data. Exact matches are ensured by using electoral data and party ID. I am very grateful to 




Table E: Overview of model fit for principal component analysis and the generalized structural equation models with different specifications 
Model Nr. 1 2 3 4 5  6  
Estimation FA PCA SEM SEM GSEM  
GSEM 
(multilevel)  
         












 Log. Dimension 
based 
 
Weight Component Component Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Family Link Coefficient  
Pro market        Family Link 
P303 0.15 0.14 1.39*** 0.14*** 0.22*** Gaussian 0.44*** Gaussian 
P401 0.56 0.45 1*** (c) 1*** (c) 1*** (c) Gaussian 1*** (c) Gaussian 
P402 0.22 0.20 1.44*** 0.24*** 0.30*** Gaussian 0.40*** Gaussian 
P414 0.37 0.33 1.26*** 0.46*** 0.57*** Gaussian 0.73*** Gaussian 
P505 0.35 0.31 0.89*** 0.38*** 0.90*** Negative binomial 1.07*** Negative binomial 
Interventionist         
P403 -0.20 -0.18 1.64*** -0.25*** -0.29*** Gaussian -0.23*** Gaussian 
P404 -0.22 -0.20 1.32*** -0.22*** -0.50*** Poisson -0.51*** Poisson 
P409 -0.07 -0.07 0.84*** -0.04*** 0.26*** Negative binomial -0.23*** Negative binomial 
P412 -0.22 -0.20 1.05*** -0.18*** -0.53*** Poisson -0.88*** Poisson 
P413 -0.36 -0.31 0.98*** -0.30*** -0.98*** Negative binomial -1.44*** Negative binomial 
P415 -0.24 -0.22 0.20*** -0.10*** -2.66*** Negative binomial -2.97*** Negative binomial 
P501 -0.06 -0.05 1.55*** -0.13*** -0.10*** Gaussian 0.01 Gaussian 
P503 -0.36 -0.32 0.97*** -0.48*** -0.52*** Gaussian -0.53*** Gaussian 
P504 -0.21 -0.18 0.89*** -0.28*** -0.29*** Gaussian -0.25*** Gaussian 
P701 -0.42 -0.36 1.31*** -0.58*** -0.64*** Gaussian -0.61*** Gaussian 
Eigenvalue 1.32 2.18 - - -  -  
AIC - - 60,148.55 16,8076.2 15,3041.9  15,0000.5  
BIC - - 60,432.76 16,8359.6 15,3312.7  15,0365.7  
Iterations - - 7 8 6  6  
n 4013 4013 4088 4013 4013  4013  
Correlation with 
Benchmark 
0.83 0.83 0.05 0.80 0.84  0.72  
Note: Party positions predicted with empirical Bayesian means in the GSEM models, based on the components in the PCA and the FA calculations. P401 is 
constrained to 1 (c) in order to make coefficients across different models comparable. Due to different distributions of the variables, family links and distributional 




Table F. Evaluating counterfactual decisions on indicator transformation and position estimation 
Description: The table summarizes the results of a counterfactual evaluation of competing issue transformation and modeling choices. The first column describes 
the variation of the indicator selection. Three competing approaches, beside the author’s, are simulated. Selected issues marked as insignificant are those which fail to 
reach the significant level of 95 percent in the GSEM models using the best specification available for the specific selection. Second, the basis of salience in combination 
with the salience‒position relationship results in seven different ways of using salience. Third, indicators can be used unweighted, or weighted by PCA or GSEM 
factor loadings or coefficients respectively. Validity is measured by correlations between the estimated positions and the benchmark positions (see Table D). Average 
within-country validity is assigned in parentheses after the “best model” (see also Tables G‒I). The Franzmann & Kaiser (2006) approach is based on time- and 
country-specific models. For every temporal period where the issue selection changes, a new model is specified. For example, the positions in the PCA based models 
are calculated by using 52 different specifications. 
 






p403 p412 p413 p504 p415 
p404 p409 p501 p503 p701 
p303 p401 p402 p414 p505 
 
(author) 




p403 p404 p406 p408 p409 
p410 p411 p412 p413 p401 
p402 p407 p414 
 
Bartolini & Mair (1990) 
Context-specific 
 
Franzmann & Kaiser (2006) 




weights (3) Validity Validity Validity Validity 
Simple addition           Entire salience Actor-specific salience 
1 Binary Linear equal 0.67 0.67 0.52 - - 
2 Absolute salience Linear equal 0.31 0.43 0.14 - - 
3 Document-based salience Linear equal 0.69 0.67 0.52 0.56 0.62 
4 Dimension-based salience Linear equal 0.75 0.76 0.67 0.61 0.64 
5 Log. absolute salience Logarithmic equal 0.61 0.70 0.42 - - 
6 Log. source-based salience Logarithmic equal 0.77 0.78 0.61 0.61 0.66 
7 Log. dimension-based Logarithmic equal 0.79 0.78 0.69 0.62 0.66 
     Best Model 0.79 0.78 0.69 0.62 0.66 
Principal component models   n 917 917 905 912 855 
1 Binary Linear pca based 0.73 0.71 0.70 - - 
2 Absolute salience Linear pca based 0.42 0.36 0.37 - - 
3 Document -based salience Linear pca based 0.59 0.18 0.44 0.69 0.72 
4 Dimension-based salience Linear pca based 0.72 0.78 0.61 0.50 0.59 
5 Log. absolute salience Logarithmic pca based 0.69 0.67 0.64 - - 
6 Log. source-based salience Logarithmic pca based 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.53 0.69 
7 Log. dimension-based Logarithmic pca based 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.53 0.65 
     Best Model 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.69 0.72 
Latent structural equation models   n 917 917 905 912 855 
3 Document -based salience Linear gsem based 0.64 0.27 0.40 0.64 0.64 
4 Dimension-based salience Linear gsem based 0.55 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.56 
6 Log. source-based salience Logarithmic  gsem based 0.78 0.80 0.41 0.70 0.78 
7 Log. dimension-based Logarithmic gsem based 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.76 
8 Log. dimension-based Individual family links gsem based  0.84 0.78 0.73 - - 
    
Best Model 











   n 917 917 917 902 760 
   Number of countries 27 27 27 23 23 
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Figure A. Indicator weights with different estimation techniques 
Description: Figure A illustrates the different indicator weights derived from different measurement 
techniques: namely, a response model without specific family links, which equals an ordinary structural 
equation model (SEM), a principal component analysis (PCA) and a factor analysis (FA).92 All four models 
converge in the sense that they place market-skeptic statements as negative related to a market dimension 
and allot pro-market statements a positive relation. The standard approach of aggregating different issue 
categories without weighting is rejected by all four approaches. Most of the indicator weights are very similar 
across the different techniques. However, there are major differences in at least four issues. Marxism, 
nationalization, controlled economy, and negative notions toward welfare spending differ systematically. 
They all receive lower weights with factor analytical approaches in comparison to the item response models. 
Free market is constrained to 0.5 in the structural equation model to make the scales comparable with the 






                                                 
92 All models are based on the same observed indicators, which are dimension-based and logarithmized.  
















fa pca sem gsem
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Table G: Within-country validity without weighting 
Description: This table illustrates the simulation of different measurement approaches using simple aggregation of 
the indicators without weighting. The results of these procedures are correlated with the benchmark expert placements 
(compare Table D). The saliency‒position relationship is specified as logarithmized dimension-based salience, because 
these models outperform the other specification in almost every case.  
                       
Country Freq. Perc. East Author n Elff n 
Bartolini 
& Mair n 
Franzmann 
& Kaiser n 
Austria93 14 1.49 0 0.79 14 0.58 14 0.76 14 0.73 14 
Belgium 50 5.32 0 0.92 50 0.86 50 0.85 50 . . 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 0.74 1 . . . . . . . . 
Bulgaria 18 1.91 1 0.61 18 0.49 18 0.49 18 0.23 18 
Croatia 4 0.43 1 . . . . . . . . 
Czech Republic 24 2.55 1 0.84 24 0.86 24 0.77 24 0.88 24 
Denmark 83 8.83 0 0.90 83 0.83 80 0.77 81 0.82 83 
Estonia 13 1.38 1 0.88 13 0.86 13 0.85 13 0.84 10 
Finland 68 7.23 0 0.78 68 0.83 65 0.81 68 0.72 68 
France 58 6.17 0 0.89 58 0.88 57 0.70 57 0.88 58 
Germany 28 2.98 0 0.94 28 0.91 28 0.94 28 0.95 28 
Greece 33 3.51 0 0.78 33 0.84 31 0.41 31 0.66 8 
Hungary 18 1.91 1 0.85 18 0.69 18 0.68 18 0.03 13 
Iceland 22 2.34 0 0.90 22 0.84 22 0.84 22 0.91 22 
Ireland 24 2.55 0 0.90 24 0.77 24 0.75 24 0.90 24 
Israel 28 2.98 1 0.94 28 0.97 27 0.95 28 0.87 28 
Italy94 60 6.38 0 0.74 60 0.78 59 0.68 60 0.75 60 
Lithuania 22 2.34 1 0.86 22 0.67 22 0.58 22 0.61 22 
Luxembourg 18 1.91 0 0.72 18 0.70 18 0.13 18 0.48 18 
Macedonia 4 0.43 1 . . . . . . . . 
Montenegro 4 0.43 1 . . . . . . . . 
Netherlands 91 9.68 0 0.88 91 0.66 91 0.63 91 0.85 78 
Norway 29 3.09 0 0.86 29 0.89 29 0.84 29 0.87 29 
Poland 17 1.81 1 0.64 17 0.67 17 0.65 17 0.67 17 
Portugal 21 2.23 0 0.91 21 0.90 21 0.85 21 0.89 21 
Romania 10 1.06 1 0.68 10 0.76 10 0.80 10 -0.05 10 
Serbia 4 0.43 1 . . . . . . . . 
Slovakia 28 2.98 1 0.76 28 0.75 28 0.76 28 0.80 28 
Slovenia 17 1.81 1 0.58 17 0.23 16 0.17 17 -0.15 17 
Spain 41 4.36 0 0.80 41 0.79 41 0.59 41 0.78 41 
Sweden 55 5.85 0 0.83 55 0.85 55 0.81 55 0.84 55 
Turkey 8 0.85 1 0.94 8 0.91 8 0.92 8 . . 
United Kingdom 19 2.02 0 0.70 19 0.44 19 0.45 19 0.63 15 
  940 100 Overall 0.81 917 0.76 905 0.69 912 0.67 809 
      West 0.84 714 0.78 704 0.69 709 0.79 622 
     East 0.78 203 0.71 201 0.69 203 0.47 187 
 
  
                                                 
93 This comparatively low correlation In Austria was produced by the coding of several ÖVP manifestos, where 
proposed tax reductions were designated as “controlled economy,” thereby moving the ÖVP significantly to the left 
of the expert placements.  
94 Low correlations in Italy are due to the difficulty of a party concept in its mixed electoral system. Alliances dominate 
the election of direct candidates, whereas parties compete over lists. Manifesto-based and expert placements do not 
always describe exactly the same thing.   
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Table H: Within-country validity with PCA-based weighting  
Description: This table illustrates the simulation of different measurement approaches using PCA as a confirmatory 
approach for a latent dimension and the component as weights for the different issues. The results of these procedures 
are correlated with the benchmark expert placements (compare Table D). The saliency‒position relationship is 
specified as logarithmized dimension-based salience, because these models outperform the other specification in 
almost every case. 
Country Freq. Perc. East Author n Elff n 
Bartolini 
& Mair n 
Franzmann 
& Kaiser n 
Austria95 14 1.49 0 0.78 14 0.52 14 0.62 14 0.78 14 
Belgium 50 5.32 0 0.89 50 0.87 50 0.86 50 .  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 7 0.74 1 .  .  .  .  
Bulgaria 18 1.91 1 0.61 18 0.55 18 0.60 18 0.27 18 
Croatia 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Czech Republic 24 2.55 1 0.83 24 0.88 24 0.85 24 0.72 24 
Denmark 83 8.83 0 0.92 83 0.84 80 0.83 81 0.90 83 
Estonia 13 1.38 1 0.90 13 0.87 13 0.88 13 0.60 10 
Finland 68 7.23 0 0.89 68 0.86 65 0.87 68 0.78 68 
France 58 6.17 0 0.87 58 0.90 57 0.86 57 0.80 58 
Germany 28 2.98 0 0.95 28 0.92 28 0.93 28 0.93 28 
Greece 33 3.51 0 0.88 33 0.85 31 0.80 31 0.84 8 
Hungary 18 1.91 1 0.85 18 0.70 18 0.74 18 0.51 13 
Iceland 22 2.34 0 0.90 22 0.91 22 0.90 22 -0.37 22 
Ireland 24 2.55 0 0.88 24 0.78 24 0.81 24 0.77 24 
Israel 28 2.98 1 0.98 28 0.98 27 0.95 28 0.95 28 
Italy96 60 6.38 0 0.76 60 0.83 59 0.83 60 0.74 60 
Lithuania 22 2.34 1 0.79 22 0.65 22 0.73 22 0.59 22 
Luxembourg 18 1.91 0 0.83 18 0.55 18 0.55 18 0.96 18 
Macedonia 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Montenegro 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Netherlands 91 9.68 0 0.86 91 0.63 91 0.67 91 0.87 78 
Norway 29 3.09 0 0.92 29 0.90 29 0.89 29 0.82 29 
Poland 17 1.81 1 0.71 17 0.71 17 0.74 17 0.70 17 
Portugal 21 2.23 0 0.93 21 0.91 21 0.89 21 0.80 21 
Romania 10 1.06 1 0.71 10 0.75 10 0.79 10 0.03 10 
Serbia 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Slovakia 28 2.98 1 0.80 28 0.76 28 0.80 28 0.87 28 
Slovenia 17 1.81 1 0.54 17 0.32 16 0.26 17 0.33 17 
Spain 41 4.36 0 0.79 41 0.78 41 0.71 41 0.73 41 
Sweden 55 5.85 0 0.87 55 0.85 55 0.86 55 0.89 55 
Turkey 8 0.85 1 0.91 8 0.90 8 0.89 8 .  
United 
Kingdom 19 2.02 0 0.77 19 0.55 19 0.45 19 0.67 15 
  940 100 Overall 0.83 917 0.77 905 0.77 912 0.67 809 
      West 0.86 714 0.79 704 0.78 709 0.74 622 
      East 0.79 203 0.73 201 0.75 203 0.56 187 
 
  
                                                 
95 This comparatively low correlation In Austria was produced by the coding of several ÖVP manifestos, where 
proposed tax reductions were designated as “controlled economy,” thereby moving the ÖVP significantly to the left 
of the expert placements. 
96 Low correlations in Italy are due to the difficulty of a party concept in its mixed electoral system. Alliances dominate 
the election of direct candidates, whereas parties compete over lists. Manifesto-based and expert placements do not 
always describe exactly the same thing.   
274 
 
Table I: Within-country validity with GSEM-based weighting  
Description: This table illustrates the simulation of different measurement approaches using generalized structural 
equation modeling as a confirmatory approach for a latent dimension and the component as weights for the different 
issues. The results of these procedures are correlated with the benchmark expert placements (compare Table D). The 
saliency‒position relationship is specified as logarithmized dimension-based salience, because these models 
outperform the other specification in almost every case. For every temporal period where Franzmann & Kaiser (2006) 
identify a new issue selection, a new model is specified. The Franzmann & Kaiser positions are calculated by using 104 
different GSEM specifications (54 with actor-specific salience and 54 with entire salience measures).  
Country Freq. Perc. East Author n Elff n 
Bartolini 
& Mair n 
Franzmann 
& Kaiser n 
Austria97 14 1.49 0 0.79 14 0.47 14 0.50 14 0.75 14 
Belgium 50 5.32 0 0.91 50 0.85 50 0.84 50 .  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 7 0.74 1 .  .  .  .  
Bulgaria 18 1.91 1 0.65 18 0.58 18 0.60 18 .  
Croatia 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Czech 
Republic 24 2.55 1 0.80 24 0.87 24 0.88 24 0.86 24 
Denmark 83 8.83 0 0.91 83 0.85 83 0.83 83 0.91 83 
Estonia 13 1.38 1 0.94 13 0.86 13 0.85 13 .  
Finland 68 7.23 0 0.90 68 0.85 68 0.86 68 0.77 68 
France 58 6.17 0 0.86 58 0.91 58 0.89 58 0.81 58 
Germany 28 2.98 0 0.95 28 0.90 28 0.90 28 0.93 28 
Greece 33 3.51 0 0.91 33 0.74 33 0.73 33 0.94 8 
Hungary 18 1.91 1 0.87 18 0.65 18 0.69 18 0.53 13 
Iceland 22 2.34 0 0.87 22 0.94 22 0.95 22 0.85 22 
Ireland 24 2.55 0 0.91 24 0.80 24 0.81 24 0.79 24 
Israel 28 2.98 1 0.94 28 0.95 28 0.90 28 0.83 28 
Italy98 60 6.38 0 0.75 60 0.85 60 0.85 60 0.74 60 
Lithuania 22 2.34 1 0.79 22 0.64 22 0.68 22 0.70 22 
Luxembourg 18 1.91 0 0.87 18 0.53 18 0.60 18 0.94 18 
Macedonia 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Montenegro 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Netherlands 91 9.68 0 0.87 91 0.60 91 0.61 91 0.78 78 
Norway 29 3.09 0 0.93 29 0.91 29 0.92 29 .  
Poland 17 1.81 1 0.70 17 0.73 17 0.74 17 0.71 17 
Portugal 21 2.23 0 0.93 21 0.90 21 0.89 21 0.85 21 
Romania 10 1.06 1 0.60 10 0.71 10 0.75 10 -0.05 10 
Serbia 4 0.43 1 .  .  .  .  
Slovakia 28 2.98 1 0.89 28 0.75 28 0.77 28 0.90 28 
Slovenia 17 1.81 1 0.72 17 0.38 17 0.37 17 .  
Spain 41 4.36 0 0.80 41 0.76 41 0.71 41 0.74 41 
Sweden 55 5.85 0 0.87 55 0.85 55 0.86 55 0.91 55 
Turkey 8 0.85 1 0.92 8 0.88 8 0.86 8 .  
United 
Kingdom 19 2.02 0 0.79 19 0.62 19 0.53 19 0.61 15 
  940 100 Overall 0.85 917 0.76 917 0.76 917 0.76 735 
      West 0.87 714 0.78 714 0.78 714 0.82 593 
     East 0.80 203 0.73 203 0.74 203 0.64 142 
                                                 
97 This comparatively low correlation In Austria was produced by the coding of several ÖVP manifestos, where 
proposed tax reductions were designated as “controlled economy,” thereby moving the ÖVP significantly to the left 
of the expert placements. 
98 Low correlations in Italy are due to the difficulty of a party concept in its mixed electoral system. Alliances dominate 
the election of direct candidates, whereas parties compete over lists. Manifesto-based and expert placements do not 
always describe exactly the same thing.   
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Table J: Measurement of the Cultural Dimension  
To map the cultural dimension we use CMP/MARPOR data (Volkens et al. 2015). The following issue categories are 
selected and confirmed via general structural equation modelling. The coefficients are significant at least at the 1 per 
cent level (except law and order + and multiculturalism -) and the magnitude of the coefficients is illustrated in Table 
J. Following Chapter 2, we use transformed salience measures of the pre-coded issue categories. The given salience 
measures are transformed into dimension-based saliencies (using the sum of emphases on a deductively defined 
dimension as the new base) and logarithmized to capture the marginal decreasing signalling capacity of repeated 
emphasis. The model contains all parties from the dataset. Only observations based on original manifestos or policy 
statements are included (progtype==1).  
 
Concept  Variable  Coefficient p-value Specified Link 
Multiculturalism + Per607 2.7 (constraint) 0.000 Poisson 
Democracy + Per202 1.29 0.000 Logit 
Political Authority + Per305 -1.31 0.000 Logit 
National Way of Life + Per601 -1.94 0.000 Logit 
National Way of Life - Per602 9.00 0.000 Poisson 
Traditional Morality + Per603 -1.06 0.000 Logit 
Traditional Morality - Per604 5.66 0.000 Poisson 
Law and Order + Per605 0.07 0.650 Logit 
Civic Mindedness + Per606 -0.31 0.017 Logit 
Multiculturalism - Per608 0.10 0.183 Logit 
Underprivileged Minority Groups + Per705 2.01 0.000 Poisson 
Non-economic Demographic Groups Per 706 1.67 0.000 Logit 
Note: Fixed-effects model converges after 5 and full model after 9 Iterations. Model fit indicators are not comparable 





Replication Procedure Chapter II 
Every model in the paper is calculated with Stata 13 and is based on the same data-set which is provided by the author. 
The counterfactual analysis of the different approaches are distinguished in separate do-files but relevant results are 
automatically transferred into the provided excel file. Thereby, the replicated results in the excel file should exactly 
mirror the model results in the different tables in the paper.  
Replication material on request:  
1) Dataset: final_dataset.dta 
2) Do-file 1: authors_approach.do 
3) Do-file 2: elf_approach.do 
4) Do-file 3: bartolini_approach.do 
5) Do-file 4: franzmann_approach.do 
6) Result sheet: results.xls 
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mean Std. min Max n Description & source 
Top 10% Income 
Share 
31.31 7.39 8.39 61.45 998 
Pre-tax national income share held by a given 
percentile group. Pre-tax national income is the 
sum of all pre-tax personal income flows accruing 
to the owners of the production factors, labor and 
capital, before taking into account the operation of 
the tax/transfer system, but after taking into 
account the operation of pension system. The 
central difference between personal factor income 
and pre-tax income is the treatment of pensions, 
which are counted on a contribution basis by 
factor income and on a distribution basis by pre-
tax income. The population is comprised of 
individuals over age 20. The base unit is the 
individual (rather than the household). This is 
equivalent to assuming no sharing of resources 
within couples (WWID  2018). 
Top 1% Income 
Share 
9.44 3.67 3.97 22.45 841 See top 10% income share. 
Top 10% - Top 1% 
Income share 
23.58 2.98 14.45 32.98 839 See top 10% income share. 
Marginal top income 
taxes 
50.98 14.94 6.56 96.3 1274 
Data for various countries are taken from (TPC 
2018) and OECD Tax Database (2018a).  
Additional data on Austria, Belgium, United States 
and Germany are added by the author. 
Value added tax 13.85 8.81 0 25.5 1296 
Own compilation. Various sources (detailed list of 
sources on demand). 
Coporate tax 35.82 14.74 7 94 1115 
Own compilation. Various sources (detailed list of 
sources on demand). 
Average Income Tax 
at 67% of the 
average wage 
34.30 9.23 13 51.4 524 OECD Tax Database (2018a). 
Average Income Tax  
at 167% of the 
average wage 
42.75 8.70 22 62.6 524 OECD Tax Database (2018a). 
Regulation 3.96 1.44 0.79 6 1075 
The OECD indicators of regulation in energy, 
transport and communications (ETCR) summarise 
regulatory provisions in seven sectors: telecoms, 
electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, 
and road freight. The ETCR indicators have been 
estimated in a long-time series and are therefore 
well suited for time-series analysis. The ETCR time 
series was updated, revised and now cover 34 
OECD countries and a set of non-OECD 
countries for 2013. Users of the data must be 
aware that they may no longer fully reflect the 
current situation in fast reforming countries. Not 
all data are available for all countries for all years 
(OECD 2018b) 
Public Spending 42.75 8.17 20.62 68.62 1374 
Total outlays (disbursements) of general 
government as a percentage of GDP. Data taken 
from Armingeon et al. (2017) and complemented 






mean Std. min Max n Description & source 
Employment 
protection (regular 
and fixed term) 
2.16 0.86 0.26 5 724 
The OECD indicators of employment protection 
legislation measure the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of 
workers and the procedures involved in hiring 
workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency 
contracts (OECD 2018d). 
 
Change in labour 
productivity 
2.16 2.51 -10.95 21.79 1246 
GDP per hour worked is a measure of labour 
productivity. It measures how efficiently labour 
input is combined with other factors of 
production and used in the production process. 
Labour input is defined as total hours worked of 
all persons engaged in production. Labour 
productivity only partially reflects the productivity 
of labour in terms of the personal capacities of 
workers or the intensity of their effort. The ratio 
between the output measure and the labour input 
depends to a large degree on the presence and/or 
use of other inputs (e.g. capital, intermediate 
inputs, technical, organisational and efficiency 
change, economies of scale). This indicator is 
measured in USD (constant prices 2010 and 




0.87 1.58 -6.6 7.6 473 
Multifactor productivity (MFP) reflects the 
overall efficiency with which labour and capital 
inputs are used together in the production 
process. Changes in MFP reflect the effects of 
changes in management practices, brand names, 
organizational change, general knowledge, 
network effects, spillovers from production 
factors, adjustment costs, economies of scale, the 
effects of imperfect competition and 
measurement errors. Growth in MFP is measured 
as a residual, i.e. that part of GDP growth that 
cannot be explained by changes in labour and 
capital inputs. In simple terms therefore, if labour 
and capital inputs remained unchanged between 
two periods, any changes in output would reflect 
changes in MFP. This indicator is measured as an 
index and in annual growth rates (OECD 2018f). 






structures mean Std. min max n Description & source 
Days government 
per year 
316.30 75.36 8 365 1899 
Own calculation based on cabinet start and 
end dates. 
Number of cabinet 
parties 
2.18 1.31 1 8 1899 
Own calculation based on cabinet 
composition. Cabinet composition partly 
based on Döring and Manow (2016). 
Seat share of 
government 
60.41 16.75 11.2 100 1923 
Own calculation based on election results 
and cabinet composition. Care taker 
governments are excluded. 
Level of democracy 9.83 0.64 6 10 574 Based on Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2016). 
Electoral 
fractionalization 
0.73 0.10 0.42 0.92 1607 
Index of electoral fractionalization of the 
party system according to the formula 
proposed by Rae (1968). Data taken from 
Armingeon et al. (2017). 
Turnout 76.28 14.43 35 97.2 1606 Data taken from Armingeon et al. (2017). 
 
Economic 
constraints mean Std. min max n Description & source 
Working days under 
strike 
1805.12 5181.04 0 66413.8 1312 Data taken from Armingeon et al. (2017).  
Union density 40.15 20.01 6.53 99.07 1332 
Net union membership as a proportion 
wage and salary earners in employment 
Taken from Visser (2015) 
Per capita GDP 
(logarithmized) 
14062.88 6720.02 1211 39115 1892 World Bank (2018a) 
Stock market 
capitalization 
49 45.15 0 265 1323 
Market capitalization of listed domestic 
companies (% of GDP) (World Bank 
2018b) 
Currency crisis 0.01 0.12 0 1 1923 
An annual depreciation versus the US dollar 
(or the relevant anchor currency) of 15% or 
more (Reinhardt et al. 2010). 
Banking crisis 0.02 0.13 0 1 1923 
Type I systemic crisis or Type II financial 
distress (see Reinhardt et al. (2010). 
GDP growth 2.90 3.35 -21.26 26.26 1540 
GDP growth in percentage of GDP (World 
Bank 2018c). 
International 
constraints mean Std. min max n Description & source 
Member of the 
European Monetary 
Union 
0.13 0.33 0 1 1923 Own compilation. 
EU member 0.40 0.49 0 1 1923 Taken from Armingeon et al. (2017). 
Capital openness 0.73 0.32 0 1 1260 
Index for the degree of openness in capital 
account transactions. Taken from 
Armingeon et al. (2017). 
Openness of the 
economy 
80.35 53.10 8.93 374 1578 
Openness of the economy, measured as 
total trade (sum of import and export) asa 
percentage of GDP, in current prices. 
Taken from Armingeon et al. (2017). 
Former communist 
country 
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Appendix Part C – Chapter 3.4 
Section A – Indicators and Balance of Data and other Complementary Regression Models 
Table A: Structural Equation Model of the Regulative Dimension 
The regulation of financial markets (financialmarketstand) is captured by the index developed by Abiad and 
Mody (2005) covering six policy fields. The privatization of infrastructure (reprovstand) consists of seven 
indicators tapping the regulation in energy, transport and communications (OECD, 2011). Labor market 
regulation (labormarketstand) measures the strictness of regulation of individual dismissal of employees on 
indefinite and on fixed-term contracts with eight items (OECD 2013). Variables are standardized before 
estimation. 
 
Structural equation model 
 
Number of obs. = 697 
Estimation method = mlmv     
Log likelihood  = 45.465851 
    
     
Measurement    Coefficient OIM std. Err.  z P>|z| 
financialmarketstand <- L1 1.00 (constrained)   
 
_cons 0.73 0.01 65.63 0.00 
regprovstand <-  L1 1.09 0.11 9.59 0.00 
_cons 0.35 0.01 30.54 0.00 
labormarketstand <- L1 0.50 0.06 8.96 0.00 
_cons 0.44 0.01 36.34 0.00 
var(e.financialmarketstand) 0.03 0.01    
var(e.regprovstand) 0.01 0.01    
var(e.labormarketstand) 0.04 0.00    
var(L1) 0.05 0.01     
     
Fit Statistics 
    
Rmsea 0.00 
   
CFI 1.00 
   
TLI 1.00 
   
CD 0.85 
   
 






Figure A: Development of Liberalization Indicators 
 
The regulation of financial markets (financialmarketstand) is captured by the index developed by Abiad and 
Mody (2005) covering six policy fields. The privatization of infrastructure (reprovstand) consists of seven 
indicators tapping the regulation in energy, transport and communications (OECD, 2011). Labor market 
regulation (labormarketstand) measures the strictness of regulation of individual dismissal of employees on 
indefinite and on fixed-term contracts with eight items (OECD 2013). For social spending compare 
Armingeon et al. (2012). Liberalization is measured as an additive index of labor market liberalization, 
privatization and financial liberalization. 
 
































1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Average degree of liberalization
Average level of social spending
Average degree of labour market liberalization
Average degree of privatization
Average level of financial market liberalization
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Table B: Overview of the Balance 
The distribution below are based the entropy balancing procedure proposed by Hainmüller & XU (2011). 
Note that the lagged level of public debt and the logarithmized GDP per capita index failed to balance. For 
a description of the variables and their sources please compare the descriptive part in the article.  
 
Treated units: 46 (cabinets with formal or informal  PRRP participation),  total of weights: 46 
Control units: 567, total of weights: 46 
Convergence after 13 Iteration 










Market Liberalism of Gov. 0.68 0.00 0.08 0.49 0.03 0.6 
 
Government Duration 22.67 147.50 0.52 26.91 345.30 2.22 
 Lagged Unemployment 5.05 4.54 1.19 6.21 15.46 0.68 
 
Δ Public Debt 1.08 25.43 1.12 0.95 23.29 1.01 
 
Government seats 0.52 0.04 0.54 0.54 0.02 0.40 
 
Lagged Share of Union 
Membership 43.82 453.6 0.43 43.46 391.8 0.22 
 Immigration Rate 3.77 7.14 0.65 2.25 12.78 1.03 
 
Δ Unemployment 0.36 0.92 1.84 0.10 0.86 1.00 
 
Lagged level of Deindustrialization 0.70 0.02 -0.11 0.61 0.01 0.04 
 
Lagged Level of Liberalization 0.74 0.02 -1.24 0.52 0.04 0.04 
 
Δ GDP 1.31 4.90 -1.26 2.61 5.94 -0.50 
 
Δ Population Share >65 0.15 0.03 1.28 0.13 0.03 -0.57 
 
Δ Population Share <15 -0.10 0.02 -0.38 -0.22 0.06 0.57 
 Lagged Level of Open Economy 80.22 428.8 -0.03 81.99 2181.00 2.10 
 
Δ Open Economy 1.72 29.86 -0.36 1.06 31.84 0.11 
 
       









 Market Liberalism of Gov. 0.69 0.00 0.09 0.69 0.02 0.46 
 
Government Duration 22.67 147.90 0.52 22.67 162.80 0.98 
 
Lagged Unemployment 5.05 4.54 1.19 5.05 6.75 -0.19 
 
Δ Public Debt 1.08 25.43 1.12 1.08 19.25 1.08 
 
Government seats 0.52 0.04 0.54 0.52 0.04 -0.44 
 
Lagged Share of Union Membership 43.82 453.60 0.43 43.82 461.40 0.39 
 
Immigration Rate 3.77 7.14 0.65 3.77 21.25 0.92 
 
Δ Unemployment 0.36 0.92 1.84 0.36 0.72 1.18 
 
Lagged level of Deindustrialization 0.70 0.00 -0.11 0.70 0.01 0.30 
 
Lagged Level of Liberalization 0.74 0.02 -1.24 0.74 0.04 -1.34 
 
Δ GDP 1.31 4.89 -1.26 1.31 5.11 -0.44 
 
Δ Population Share >65 0.15 0.03 1.28 0.15 0.03 0.11 
 Δ Population Share <15 -0.10 0.02 0.38 -0.10 0.03 0.56 
 Lagged Level of Open Economy 80.22 428.80 -0.03 80.21 1195.00 2.02 
 Δ Open Economy 1.72 29.86 -0.36 1.72 22.52 1.03 
Note: Own calculation.   
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Hypothesis involved H1 H1 
PRRP gov. support 0.08 -0.48** 
PRRP* Gov. duration - 0.69** 
Market liberalism of government 





Gov. duration (in months) -2.05* -1.82* 
Gov. seat share -0.16 -0.33 
l. union density 1.00*** 0.86*** 
Δ unemployment 5.41*** 5.40*** 
l. unemployment -1.61 -1.14 
De-industrialization -1,72* -2.61*** 
l. debt 0.01*** 0.01*** 
Δ debt 1.04 1.27* 
Δ GDP 0.54 0.66 
Ln GDP -1.06 -1.47 
Δ pop >65 1.48* 1.35* 
Δ pop <15 3.68** 4.33*** 
l. Level Social Spending (2a-2b) -0.10*** -0.11*** 
Migration rate -2.97 -4.45** 
l. Globalization 0.34 1.19 
Δ Globalization 1.29 0.84 
EMU-Integration -0.34 -0.24 
Cons. 1.31 4.33* 
R² 0.51 0.55 
Number of countries 17 17 
Time frame  1970-2010 1970-2010 
n 235 235 
 Positive cases 19 19 
Robustness (Online Appendix) Figure B Figure B 
Notes: * < 0.90; **<0.95; ***<0.99 levels of confidence. All coefficients are standardized by beta weights and 




Section B – Robustness 
Figure B: Subsample regression: Average marginal effects (AME) on redistribution conditional on government 
duration  
 






































































Welfare Spending (sample: PRRP)
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Figure C: Subsample regression: Average marginal effects (AME) on deregulation conditional on government 
duration 




























Gov. duration (0=short, 1=medium, 2=long)
PRRP support Market liberal government













Gov. duration (0=short, 1=medium, 2=long)
PRRP support Market liberal government
Liberalization (sample: PRRP countries only)
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Section C:  Case Selection 
Table E shows potential cases for the qualitative part. As a case is defined as one cabinet, those cabinets 
with PRRP inclusion are listed first. Additionally, the values of the dependent variables are pictured. Finally, 
potential cases for comparison without PRRP government participation are illustrated in the last column. 
Cabinets with PRRP inclusion and the comparison cases are calculated by using coarsened exact matching 
(CEM; Iacus et al. 2012; see table F).  
Table D: Potential comparisons after CEM 
Cabinet 
 Year Δ Social 
Spending 
Δ Deregulation Δ Generosity Potential Comparison after CEM 
Balkenende I 2003 0.34 2.39 0.20 
Lubbers I (1984); Kok I (1995-1996); Balkenende 
II (2004-2006); Rasmussen F II (2007, Denmark) 
Berlusconi I 1994 0.23 1.49 -0.30 
Amato I (1992); Craxi II (1987) Berlusconi II 2001-2004 -0.20 6.81 -0.20 
Berlusconi III 2005 0.07 9.19 0.10 
Schuessel I 2000-2002 -0.12 4.63 0.30 
Klima I (1997-1999); Schluter I+II (1983+1987, 
Denmark); Rasmussen F II (2005-2006, Denmark); 
Kohl II (1986, Germany); Van Agt I (1978-1980, 
Netherlands); Willoch I+II (1982-1983, Norway)   
Schuessel III 2003-2004 0.28 0.93 0.10 
Klima I (1997-1999); Schluter I+II (1983+1987, 
Denmark); Rasmussen F II (2005-2006, Denmark); 
Kohl II (1986, Germany); Van Agt I (1978-1980, 
Netherlands); Willoch I+II (1982-1983, Norway)   Schuessel IV 2005-2006 -0.34 3.54 0.20 
Bundesrat 1999 2000-2002 -0.45 2.44 0.00 
Bundesrat (1979, 1987, 1995) and different cabinets 
from seven other countries. 
Bundesrat 1999 2003 0.71 0.00 0.20 
Bundesrat (1979); Reinfeldt I (2008); Falldin III 
(1981); Socrates I (2008); Schroeder II (2003); Fillon 
II (2008) 
Bundesrat 2003 2004-2007 -0.07 0.61 0.00 Bundesrat (1979, 1987, 1995) and different cabinets 
from seven other countries. Bundesrat 2008 2009-2010 1.15 . -0.30 
Note: The criteria where defined as having a CEM match in the same country. Matches fulfilling this criteria are in 
bold letters.  
Coarsened exact matching does not converge on solution using variables with their original distributions. 
As many of them are continuous an exact match is very unlikely. The coarsening procedure entails a manual 
categorization of some variables based on their distribution. The CEM procedure matches 21 positive cases 
(cabinets with PRRP inclusion) with 86 cabinets without PRRP inclusion. From 670 cases 586 remain 
unmatched. The following Table shows the coarsened variables, their thresholds, the univariate imbalance 
(scott break method) and the mean distance:  
 
Table E: Matching Results 
Variable Manual thresholds 
Univariate Imbalance 
(L1) Mean distance 
Market liberalism of government (0 0.4 0.55 0.7 1) .42529 .02546 
Lagged level of debt (0 90 120 160) .37063 6.0528 
Lagged level of industrialization (0 0.5 0.8 1) .2607 .03579 
Delta Unemployment (-4 -1 1 3 8) .3111 .04548 
Growth GDP (-10 -5 0 4 7 20) .19106 .05173 
Lagged Open Economy (0 10 50 100 200) .40334 14.411 





Appendix Part D – Chapter 4.2 
 
Table A:  Party Names and Abbreviations 
Party Abbreviation Party Name (English) 
Party Name 
(Turkish/Kurdish) 
AKP Justice and Development Party Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi 
ANAP Motherland Party Anavatan Partisi 
BDP Peace and Democracy Party Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi 
CHP Republican People´s Party  Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
DEHAP Democratic People´s Party Demokratik Halk Partisi 
DEP Democracy Party Demokrasi Partisi 
DSP Democratic Left Party Demokratik Sol Parti 
DTH Democratic Society Movement Demokratik Toplum Hareketi 
DTK Democratic Society Congress Demokratik Toplum Kongresi 
DTP Democratic Society Party Demokratik Toplum Partisi 
DYP True Path Party Dogru Yol Partisi 
FP Virtue Party  Fazilet Partisi 
HADEP People´s Democracy Party  Halkin Demokrasi Partisi 
HDP Peoples´ Democratic Party  Halklarin Demokratik Partisi 
HEP People´s Labor Party Halkin Emek Partisi 
MHP Nationalist Movement Party99 Milliyetci Hareket Partisi 
RP Welfare Party Refah Partisi 
SHP Social Democratic Populist Party  Sosyaldemokrat Halkci Parti 
 
 
Table B:  Data Availability in the Pre-coded MARPOR Dataset 




1987 ANAP SHP DYP 89.1 100 
1991 DYP ANAP SHP 71.8 84.8 
1995 RP DYP ANAP 51.3 77.2 
1999 DSP MHP FP 55.6 68.4 
2002 AKP CHP  53.7 98.4 
2007 AKP CHP MHP 81.9 92.9 
2011 AKP CHP MHP 88.8 93.6 
2015 (a) AKP CHP MHP 82.2 85.4 
2015 (b) AKP CHP  MHP 85.7 89.3 
Note: Party documents in italics are available and pre-coded. Bold ones coded by the authors.  
 
  
                                                 
99 MARPOR uses the names Nationalist Action Party or National Action Party  
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Measurement of the Economic Dimension 
To map the economic dimension we use CMP/MARPOR data (Volkens et al. 2015). The following issue 
categories are selected and confirmed via general structural equation modelling. The coefficients are 
significant at least at the 1 per cent level (except environmental protection) and the magnitude of the 
coefficients is illustrated in Table C. Following Röth (2016), we use transformed salience measures of the 
pre-coded issue categories. The given salience measures are transformed into dimension-based saliencies 
(using the sum of emphases on a deductively defined dimension as the new base) and logarithmized to 
capture the marginal decreasing signalling capacity of repeated emphasis. The model contains all parties 
from the dataset, including the Turkish parties, to estimate the positions (n=3374). Eight observations are 
added by manual coding of the Kurdish parties (HEP 1991; HADEP 1994, 1999; DEHAP 2002; DTP 2007; 
BDP 2011; HDP 2015a, 2015b). Only observations based on original manifestos or policy statements are 
included (progtype==1).  
Table C: Measurement Results of the Economic Dimension 
Concept  Variable  Coefficient P Specified Link 
Free Market Economy Per401 1 (constraint) 0.000 Logit 
Economic Orthodoxy Per414 0.74 0.000 Logit 
Incentives Per402 0.42 0.000 Logit 
Regulation Per403 -0.24 0.000 Logit 
Controlled Economy Per412 -0.81 0.000 Poisson 
Nationalization Per413 -1.15 0.000 Poisson 
Welfare State + Per504 -0.24 0.000 Logit 
Marxist Analysis Per415 -4.63 0.000 Poisson 
Administrative Efficiency Per303 0.39 0.000 Logit 
Welfare State - Per505 1.27 0.000 Poisson 
Economic Planning Per404 -0.59 0.000 Poisson 
Keynesian Demand Management Per409 -0.40 0.000 Poisson 
Environmental Protection Per501 0.04 0.302 Logit 
Equality + Per503 -0.49 0.000 Logit 
Labor Groups + Per701 -0.65 0.000 Logit 
Note: Fixed-effects model converges after 5 and full model after 8 iterations. Model fit indicators are hard to compare 





Measurement of the Cultural Dimension  
To map the cultural dimension we use CMP/MARPOR data (Volkens et al. 2015). The following issue 
categories are selected and confirmed via general structural equation modelling. The coefficients are 
significant at least at the 1 per cent level (except law and order + and multiculturalism -) and the magnitude 
of the coefficients is illustrated in Table D. Following Röth (2016), we use transformed salience measures 
of the pre-coded issue categories. The given salience measures are transformed into dimension-based 
saliencies (using the sum of emphases on a deductively defined dimension as the new base) and 
logarithmized to capture the marginal decreasing signaling capacity of repeated emphasis. The model 
contains all parties from the dataset, including the Turkish parties, to estimate the positions (n=3374). Eight 
observations are added by manual coding of the Kurdish parties (HEP 1991; HADEP 1994, 1999; DEHAP 
2002; DTP 2007; BDP 2011; HDP 2015a, 2015b). Only observations based on original manifestos or policy 
statements are included (progtype==1).  
Table D: Measurement Results of the Cultural Dimension 
Concept  Variable  Coefficient P Specified Link 
Multiculturalism + Per607 2.7 (constraint) 0.000 Poisson 
Democracy + Per202 1.29 0.000 Logit 
Political Authority + Per305 -1.31 0.000 Logit 
National Way of Life + Per601 -1.94 0.000 Logit 
National Way of Life - Per602 9.00 0.000 Poisson 
Traditional Morality + Per603 -1.06 0.000 Logit 
Traditional Morality - Per604 5.66 0.000 Poisson 
Law and Order + Per605 0.07 0.650 Logit 
Civic Mindedness + Per606 -0.31 0.017 Logit 
Multiculturalism - Per608 0.10 0.183 Logit 
Underprivileged Minority Groups + Per705 2.01 0.000 Poisson 
Non-economic Demographic Groups Per 706 1.67 0.000 Logit 
Note: Fixed-effects model converges after 5 and full model after 9 Iterations. Model fit indicators are hard to compare 
in gsem models (AIC = 131298.8 and BIC = 131499.5).  
 
Party Positions 
Latent positions on the two pre-defined dimensions are listed for all relevant Turkish parties. Using the 
MARPOR coding scheme, we coded additional party manifestos which are not included in the MARPOR 
dataset (Volkens et al. 2015). The point estimates of these parties are listed below in Table E.  
Table E: Ideological Positions (0-1 standardized) 




HEP 1991 .0005119 
 
.0566575 
HADEP 1994 .0269862 .0436626 
HADEP 1999 .0269862 .0436626 
DEHAP 2002 .1850552 .0091467 
DTP 2007 .1374982 .0672338 
BDP 2011 .0542666 .0212438 
HDP 2015a .1539023 .0214107 





Table F: Overview of the Party Documents Coded and Analysed 








20PARTI%20YAYINLARI&pdemirbas=199004408Archive of the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) 
HADEP (People´s 











PARTI%20YAYINLARI&pdemirbas=199600972Archive of the Grand National 

















200707129Archive of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM)  

























































































































                                                 
100 The homepage unfortunately does not provide any information about the date of the party programme. After 2014 
the BDP was transformed into the DBP (Democratic Regions Party). Thus official party documents are missing, so 









































































































































































































3030 1984 Agreement - - 
Came into 
force 
Law on basic 
principles and 



















 5272 07.12.2004 Agreement 
Nullification for 
procedural reason 
following appeal by the 





Municipality law 5393 03.07.2005 Agreement 
Nullification of some 
articles, including art. 14, 
giving municipal 
authorities the power to 
open kindergartens and 
granting them general 









5216 10.07.2004 Agreement   In force 










Law on special 
provincial 
Administrations 
5302 22.02.2005 Agreement 
Nullification of some 
articles including art. 10/h, 
on peaceful solution of 
problems with debts owed 
to the provinces, and art. 
15, on publication of the 
decisions of the provincial 







Law on Regional 
Development 
Agencies 
5449 25.01.2006 Agreement 
Nullification of some 
minor articles, but general 
agreement on the law – 
30.11.2007 
 In force 
Law on 
nullification of the 
municipal status of 
certain districts 
5747 22.05.2008 Agreement 
Nullification of some 
articles and of the closure 
of some municipalities – 
31.10.2008 
 In force 




5779 2008 Agreement   In force 
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Appendix Part D – Chapter 4.3 
 
Figure A: Distribution of ideological proximity  
 
Table A: Description of variables 
Variable Source 
Explanation and Coding Rules 
Asymmetric reform (0 1) Hooghe et al. (2016) See Tables C and D for an overview 
Ideological proximity (0-1) Own calculation Distance between Market Liberalism of Major Party in Government and the Centre 
of Gravity. 
Congruence over time (0-4) Own calculation Accumulation of Congruence over four successive periods. 
Congruence (0 1) Own calculation Congruence is 1 when the major government party has the highest vote 
share in a region. 
Electoral importance (0-1) Own calculation The share of votes from the total votes of the major government party from 
a region. 
Market liberalism of major party (0-1) blinded Degree of market liberalism of major government party. 
National electoral stability (0-3) Own calculation Accumulation of a party’s successive national electoral victories leading to 
government formation. 
Number of parties in government (0-9) Döring & Manow 
(2016) 
Number of parties in government. 
Government duration (in months) Own calculation Government duration in months. 
Seat share of government (0-100) Döring & Manow 
(2016) 
Government share of seats from the total number of parliamentary seats. 
Previous reform (0 1) Own calculation Cases where the same major government party implemented a reform in a 
previous cabinet period. 
Age of democracy (in years) Own calculation Years of uninterrupted periods with Polity IV values > 6. For example our 
values for Canada start with 45 in 1965, because Canada became an 
independent democracy in 1921. 
Level of regional authority (0-26.5) Hooghe et al. (2016) Level of regional authority (compare Hooghe et al. 2016) 
Population (in thousands) Own calculation We measure electorally relevant population as the voters on the roll. 
Centre of gravity (0-1)  We measure the ideological centre of gravity by weighting party positions 
with the regionally disaggregated relative vote share from national elections. 
Relative vote share is the vote share divided by the sum of all available vote 
shares. 
Coverage of voters (for centre of gravity) Own calculation The percentage of valid voters covered for the calculation of the centre of 
gravity. 
 
Number of regions (3-81) 
Own calculation Number of regions per year and country. 
Demanding secession (0 1) Own calculation 1 in cases where at least one of the regional movements or parties demands 
secession. 
Demanding others (0-11) Own calculation Number of authority claiming minorities in other parts of the same country. 
Kin state (0 1) Own calculation Existence of a bordering kin state. 
Divided claim Own calculation 1 in cases where several parties demand authority. 













Table B: Distribution and overlap of variables 
 
 All cases Cases with Ideological Proximity Cases with Ideological Distance 
 
     
 Treatment   Control  
 
Obs. Mean  Std. Min Max Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness 
Ideological proximity 4298 0.87 0.11 0 1.00 - - - - - - 
Number of parties in gov. 4289 2.25 1.47 0 9.00 2.12 1.88 1.06 2.54 2.77 1.39 
Duration of gov. (in month) 4298 25.52 16.79 0 72.00 25.45 276.30 0.36 25.54 294.50 0.43 
Seat share of gov.  4289 57.08 14.48 0 89.50 56.59 154.60 -0.76 57.88 334.90 -0.29 
Age of democracy 4294 41.29 38.34 0 164.00 35.22 1029.00 1.69 54.73 2158.00 1.01 
 Previous reform 4289 0.02 0.13 0 1 0.02 0.02 6.80 0.01 0.01 9.77 
Level of authority 4298 11.01 7.31 0 26.50 10.43 46.68 0.87 12.32 65.44 0.55 
Population 4281 29987.96 191465.00 2 2236161.00 22194.00 26400000000.00 9.06 48946.00 61100000000.00 5.60 
Demanding others 4298 1.94 3.18 0 11.00 2.41 11.83 1.10 0.92 4.85 2.55 
Secessionist claims 4298 0.12 0.33 0 1.00 0.11 0.10 2.45 0.13 0.12 2.15 
Kin states 4298 0.03 0.16 0 1.00 0.03 0.03 5.83 0.03 0.03 5.54 
Divided claims 4298 0.10 0.16 0 1.00 0.11 0.10 2.48 0.09 0.08 2.82 
Electoral stability (state-
wide) 
4298 1.11 1.13 0 3.00 1.29 1.35 0.36 0.70 0.91 1.22 
Electoral importance 4298 0.05 0.09 0 0.95 0.05 0.01 5.31 0.06 0.01 4.88 
Congruence 4298 0.16 0.46 0 4.00 0.17 0.18 7.28 0.15 0.30 6.37 
Market liberalism 4258 0.51 0.16 0 1.00 0.51 0.01 -0.87 0.52 0.05 -0.10 
Number of regions 4298 33.91 26.02 3 81.00 36.22 740.9 .842 27.63 452.9 1.718 
Note: Calculated with the Stata ebalance package (Hainmueller and Xu 2013). We assign ideological proximity for values higher than 0.85 (see distribution in Figure A above).   
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Australia No 1 Aborigines Northern Territory  1950-2010 Yes 90001 
Bangladesh No 2 Chittagong Hill Tribes Chittagong 1991-2007 No 77101 
Belgium No 3 Flemings, Walloons, Germans Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Communauté Française, Région 
Wallonne, Deutsche Gemeinschaft 
1982-2010 Yes . 
Canada Yes 4 Québécois, French Canadians, Indigenous People Quebec, Northwest Territories, Yukon, Nunavut 1950-2010 Yes 2001, 2003 
Croatia No 5 Serbs Serbian Republic of Krajina 2000-2010 No 34401 
Denmark Yes 6 Faroese, Inuit Faroe Islands, Kalaallit Nunaat/ Grønland 1950-2010 Yes . 
Finland No 7 Swedes  Åland, Kainuu 1950-2010 Yes . 
France Yes 8 Corsicans, Bretons, Basques Corsica 1950-2010 Yes 22004, 22003, 22002 
Georgia No 9 Abkhazians, Adzhars, Ossetians Abkhazia, Adjara, South Ossetia 2004-2010 Yes 37201, 37202, 37203 
Ghana No 10 Ewe, Ashanti Volta, Ashanti region 2001-2010 No 45202, 45201 
India No 11 Kashmiris, Nagas, Sikhs, Mizos, Bodos, Tripuras, 
Assamese 
Kashmir, Nagaland, Punjab, Mizoram, Bodoland, Tripura, 
Assam 
1950-2010 Yes 75007, 75009, 75012, 75013, 75016, 
75014, 75014 
Indonesia No 12 Acehnese, Papuans, East Timorese Aceh, Papua, Timor Timur,  1999-2010 Yes 85006, 85005, 85004 
Israel No 13 Palestinians Judea and Samaria or 'the Territories' 1950-2010 No 66603 
Italy Yes 14 South Tyroleans, Sardinians, Sicilians  Trentino‒Alto Adige/Südtirol, Sardinia, Sicily 1950-2010 Yes 32503, 32501 
Lithuania No 15 Poles Vilnius County 1991-2010 No 36801 































































































Mexico No 17 Zapotecas Oaxaca 1997-2010 No 7003 
Moldova No 18 Gagauz, Slavs Gagauz-Yeri (Gagauzia Aut.Rep.) 1993-2010 Yes 35901, 35902 
Namibia No 19 Basters, East Caprivians, San Bushmen Reheboth , Caprivi Oos (Liambezi), Bushmanland 1990-2010 ? 56503, 56504, 56501 
Nicaragua Yes 20 Indigenous people Región Autónoma del Norte, Región Autónoma del Sur 1990-2010 Yes 9302 
Pakistan No 21 Pashtuns, Sindhis, Baluchis Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh, Baluchistan 1988-1998 No 77005, 77006, 77002 
Philippines No 22 Moros, Igorots Mindanao, Cordillera Adm.Reg.(CAR) 1987-2010 Yes 84003, 84002 
Portugal  Yes 23 Azoreans, people from Madeira Madeira, Azores 1976-2014 Yes . 
Romania No 24 Magyars Transylvania 1996-2010 No 36002 
Senegal No 25 Diolas in Casamence Casamance Region 2000-2010 No 43301 
Serbia Yes 26 Various minorities Vojvodina 2006-2010 Yes . 
South Africa No 27 Zulus, Xhosa Kwa-Zulu Natal, Eastern Cape 1994-2010 No 56005 
South Korea No 28 Honamese Cholla (Honam) 1988-2010 No 73201 
Spain Yes 29 Catalans, Basques, Andalusians, Galicians  Catalonia, the Basque Country,Andalucía, Galicia, Ceuta, 
Melilla  
1978-2010 Yes 23002, 23001 
Switzerland Yes 30 Jurassians Canton of Jura 1950-2010 No 22501 
Thailand No 31 Malay Muslims South 1992-2005 No 80002 
Turkey Yes 32 Kurds OHAL Region 1983-2010 No 64005 
Ukraine No 33 Crimean Russians, Crimean Tatars Crimean Republic 1991-2010 Yes 36905, 36904 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes 34 Northern Ireland Catholics, Scots, Welsh Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales 1950-2010 Yes 20003, 20004 
Note: Spatially concentrated minorities with asymmetric claims are identified via two indices: “Separatism Index” values “2” or “3” and “Group Spatial Distribution” values higher 
than “0” (Gurr 1999, codebook, 7-8). A sufficient level of democracy is measured by Polity IV including cases with values equal or higher than six (Marshall et al. 2014). We exclude 
countries with democratic periods shorter than 10 years. “MAR code” refers to the ethnic group identifier of the Minorities at Risk dataset.   
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Andalusia 1 Spain Suarez II Ucd 6.5 Yes Yes 0.15 0 0.85 N.º 1/1981 
Azores 2 Portugal Soares I Ps 15.5 Yes Yes 0.02 0 0.94 N.º 318-B/1976 
Azores 3 Portugal Carneiro I Psd 1 Yes No 0.03 1 0.85 N.º 39/1980 
Azores 4 Portugal Guterres I Ps 3 Yes Yes 0.02 0 0.93 N.º 61/1998 
Catalonia 5 Spain Suarez I Ucd 9.5 Yes Yes 0.08 0 0.91 
C 1978, Art. 143; 150-151 
N.º 4/1979 
Ceuta 6 Spain Suarez I Ucd 11 Yes Yes 0.00 1 0.95 C 1978 
Ceuta 7 Spain Suarez II Ucd 4 Yes No 0.00 1 0.92 Directly elected councils 
Ceuta 8 Spain Gonzalez IV Psoe 6 Yes Yes 0.00 0 0.87 C 1978; N.º 1-2/1995 
Faroe Islands 9 Denmark Hedtoft I Sdp 25 Yes Yes 0.00 1 1.00 31.03.1948 Autonomy Statute 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 10 Italy Moro II Dc 7 Yes Yes 0.03 1 0.97 N.º 1/1963 
Galicia 11 Spain Suarez I Ucd 6.5 Yes Yes 0.10 1 0.99 C 1978, Art. 143; 150-151, 17N.º 6/1981 
Greenland 12 Denmark Jorgensen I Sdp 6 Yes No 0.00 0 0.94 1972 
Greenland 13 Denmark Jorgensen IV Sdp 13 Yes Yes 0.00 0 0.94 N.º 577/1978 
Madeira 14 Portugal Silva II Psd 2 Yes No 0.03 1 0.98 N.º 13/1991 
Madeira 15 Portugal Guterres I Ps 3 Yes Yes 0.02 0 0.93 N.º 13/1999 
Madeira 16 Portugal Barroso Psd 0 Yes Yes 0.03 1 0.94 N.º 1/2004 


































































































































Melilla 18 Spain Suarez I Ucd 11 Yes Yes 0.00 1 0.99 C 1978 
Melilla 19 Spain Suarez II Ucd 4 Yes No 0.00 0 0.93 Directly elected councils 
Melilla 21 Spain Gonzalez IV Psoe 6 Yes Yes 0.00 1 0.89 C 1978;N.º 1-2/1995 
Navarra 22 Spain Suarez I Ucd 4 Yes Yes 0.01 0 0.90 C 1978, Art. 143; 150-151, N.º 3/1979 
Navarra 22 Spain Gonzalez I Psoe 11.5 Yes No 0.01 1 0.93 N.º 13/1982, Art. 43, 45 
Northern Ireland 23 United Kingdom Blair I Labour 17.5 Yes Yes 0.01 0 0.86 N.º 47/1998 
Northern Ireland 24 United Kingdom Brown Labour 17.5 Yes Yes 0.00 0 0.99 N.º 53/2006 
Northwest Territories 25 Canada Pearson II Lp 5 Yes No 0.00 1 0.99 
1966, devolved authority over education, 
housing and social services 
Northwest Territories 26 Canada Trudeau P IV Lp 2 Yes No 0.00 0 0.89 1975 
Northwest Territories 27 Canada Mulroney I Pcp 7 Yes No 0.00 1 0.83 N.º 27/1985, Art 16 
Northwest Territories 28 Canada Chretien II Lp 2 Yes Yes 0.00 1 0.96 N.º 28/1993, Art 23; enacted in 1999 
Nunavut 29 Canada Chretien II Lp 17 Yes Yes 0.00 1 1.00 
01.04.1999 Nunavut Act completed; 
initial acts passed in 1993 
Basque Country 30 Spain Suarez I Ucd 12.5 Yes Yes 0.02 0 0.93 C 1978, Art. 143; 150-151N.º 3/1979 
Quebec 31 Canada Trudeau IV Lp 1 Yes No 0.32 1 0.99 
1978 Cullen-Couture Agreement 
(Immigration) 
Quebec 32 Canada Mulroney II Pcp 1 Yes No 0.22 1 0.83 Canada-Quebec Accord 1991, Art. 12 
Región Autónoma 
Atlantico Norte 33 Nicaragua Ortega I Fsln 11 Yes Yes 0.01 0 0.87 
Constitution 1987, N.º 28/1987 



































































































































Atlantico Norte 34 Nicaragua Chamorro Uno 1 Yes No    Amendments N.º 192/1995 
Región Autónoma 
Atlantico Norte 35 Nicaragua Geyer Plc 6 Yes Yes 0.03 1 0.60 
N.º 330/2002 and N.º 527/2005; Decree 
N.º 3584/2003 on Regulation of Law 28. 
Región Autónoma 
Atlantico Sur 36 Nicaragua Ortega I Fsln 11 Yes Yes 0.01 0 0.87 
Constitution 1987, N.º 28/1987 
Autonomy Statute 1990 
Región Autónoma 
Atlantico Sur 37 Nicaragua Chamorro Uno 1 Yes No    Amendments N.º 192/1995 
Región Autónoma 
Atlantico Sur 38 Nicaragua Geyer Plc 6 Yes Yes 0.03 1 0.60 
N.º 330/2002 and N.º 527/2005; Decree 
N.º 3584/2003 on Regulation of Law 28. 
Sardinia 39 Italy De Gasperi VI Dc 7 Yes Yes 0.02 1 0.98 1952 
Scotland 40 United Kingdom Blair I Labour 18.5 Yes Yes 0.10 1 0.88 N.º 38/1998; 46/1998 
Sicily 41 Italy De Gasperi VI Dc 7 Yes Yes 0.08 1 0.97 1952 
Trentino‒Alto Adige 40 Italy De Gasperi VI Dc 7 Yes Yes 0.02 1 0.95 1952 
Trentino‒Alto Adige101 42 Italy Colombo Dc 6 Yes No 0.02 0 0.96 N.º 1/1971 
Valle d’Aosta 43 Italy De Gasperi VI Dc 7 Yes Yes 0.00 1 0.98 1952 
Vojvodina 44 Serbia Cvetkovic Srs 12.5 Yes Yes 0.30 1 0.94 
Approval of the Omnibus Law from 
2002 on 30 November 2009 
Wales 45 United Kingdom Blair I Labour 13.5 Yes Yes 0.07 1 0.93 N.º 38/1998; 46/1998 
                                                 
101 Trentino‒Alto Adige was in fact disempowered and the provinces of Trentino and Südtirol received greater authority comparable to the autonomous regions (Alcock 2001; Law 


































































































































Yukon 46 Canada Trudeau II Lp 1 Yes No 0.00 0 0.98 1970 
Yukon 47 Canada Trudeau IV Lp 10 Yes No 0.00 0 0.97 
1978; control over budget and elected 
legislative assembly 
Yukon 48 Canada Chretien II Lp 4 Yes Yes 0.00 0 0.92 
N.º 28/1993; enacted in 1999; extensive 
new policy competences (not captured in 
RAI) 
Yukon 49 Canada Chretien III Lp 3 Yes Yes 0.00 0 0.93 N.º 7/2002 
Note: Data on cabinets are mainly based on Döring and Manow (2016). Decentralization statutes are taken mainly from the country profiles of the Regional AuthorityIindex 
(Hooghe et al. 2016).  
 


















































































































Azores 50 Portugal Socrates I Ps 12.03.2005 26.10.2009 0 0.02 0 1.00 N.º 2/2009 
Faroe Islands 51 Denmark Rasmussen F II Lp 18.02.2005 23.11.2005 0 0.00 0 0.96 N.º 578/2005 579/2005 
Greenland 52 Denmark Rasmussen L I Lp 04.05.2009 02.10.2011 0 0.00 0 0.83 N.º 473/2009 
South Tyrol 53 Italy Andreotti VII Dc 13.04.1991 28.06.1992 0 0.05 0 0.98 
22.04.1992, South Tyrol 
Autonomy Statute 
Note: Data on cabinets are mainly based on Döring and Manow (2016). Decentralization statutes are taken mainly from the country profiles of the Regional Authority Index 
(Hooghe et al. 2016).  
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Identifying regional authority demand 
We measure regional authority demand in the following way. The first is to identify those regions with 
specific authority demand in general. To do so, we focus on different means of articulation. These might be 
political parties claiming authority and being backed up by voter support. We use regional election results if 
available. Otherwise we use regionally disaggregated national election results. Often regional demand 
precedes the existence of regionalist parties because electoral institutions are stimulated by that demand. In 
these cases referendums are the typical starting point in democracies to reply to regionalist pressure and we 
code support for more autonomy as a general demand from the moment of the referendum until emerging 
party systems update our knowledge. Table F lists the parties we consider as regionalist and the referendums 
whose support rate we coded.  
Table F: Parties with regionalist authority demand 
Regionalist parties Countries 
Quebec 
BQ (Bloc Québécois), PNQ (Parti Nationaliste du Quebec) QLP (Quebec Liberal Party) RIN 
(Rassemblement pour l`Indépendence Nationale) RN (Ralliement Nationale) PQ (Party 
Québécois) UN (Union Nationale) E (Equality) AD (Action Démocratic) CAQ (Coalition 
Avenir Québec)   
We use cumulated vote shares in regional elections. 
Yukon 
TYP (The Yukon Party)  
Nunavut 
Referendum on the creation of the territory of Nunavut (5.11.1992; 69% approval). Nunavut 
does not presently recognize political parties.  
Northwest Territories 
NT does not presently recognize political parties. 
Canada 
Faroe Islands 
Referendum 1946 (48.7% in favour of secession). 
FF (Fólkaflokkurin), SSF (Sjálvstýrisflokkurin), TV (Tjóôveldi), M (Miðflokkurin), F 
(Framsókn), 
Greenland 
The Referendum on joining the ECM in 1972 was used to mobilize for Greenland’s autonomy 
(disapproval 70.8%). Referendum on Home Rule in 1979 (70.1% approval). Afterwards we use 
cumulated vote shares in regional elections. Autonomist parties: IA (Inuit Ataqatigiit), S 





ADA (Alsace d'Abord). 
 
Bretagne 
UDB (Union Democratique Bretonne) 
 
Corse 




South Tyrol and Trentino 
We use cumulated vote shares in regional elections. Since the regional election of 2003 we use 
Trentino and South Tyrol separately.  SVP (Südtiroler Volkspartei), TV (Trentiner 
Volkspartei), SFP (Soziale Fortschrittspartei Südtirols), SPS (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Südtirols), UATT (Unione Autonomista Trentino Tirolese), AI (Autonomia Integrale), SHB 
(Südtiroler Heimatverbund), df (Die Freiheitlichen), PATT (Partito Autonomista Trentino 
Tirolese), LN (Lega Nord), UfS (Union für Südtirol) 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 
We use cumulated vote shares in regional elections. SSk (Slovenska skupnost), AR (Autonomia 






LN (Lega Nord), LL (Lega Lombardia), LPL (Lega Padana Lombardia) 
Sardinia 
PSd'Az (Partido Sardo D'Azione), PSd’AzS (Partito Sardo d'Azione Socialista), LS (Lega 
Sarda), SN (Sardegna Natzione), ASP (Autonomist Sardist Party), RS (Riformatori Sardi), UDS 
(Unione Democratica Sarda), iRS (Indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna) 
Sicily 
MIS (Movimento Indipendentista Siciliano), UDN (Unione Democratica Nazionale), NS 
(Nuova Sicilia), WS (We Sicilians), SP (Sicilian Spring), AS (Alleanza Siciliana), Rita, United for 
Sicily, MpA (Movimento per le Autonomie), GS (Grande Sud), PdS (Partito dei Sicilliani) 
Valle D’Aosta 
UVA (Union Valdôtaine), LN (Lega Nord), Aosta Valley Regional Rally, RV (Rassemblement 
Valdôtain), UVP (Union Valdôtaine Progressiste), ADP (Autonomistes Démocrates 
Progressistes), PVdA (Pour la Vallée d'Aoste), Autonomistes, FA (Fédération Autonomiste), 
SA (Stella Alpina), AVA (Arcobaleno Valle d'Aosta), AV (Alé Vallée), RV (Renouveau 
Valdôtain) 
 
RAAS & RAAN 
We use cumulated seat shares for autonomist parties in regional elections. Yatama (Yapti Tasba 
Masraka Nanih Aslatakanka), M (Misurasata), PIM (Partido Indígena Multiétnico), MAAC 
(Authentic Costeno Movement), PAMUC (Multiethnic Party for Coast Unity), ADECO 
(Costeno Democratic Alliance) 
Madeira & Azores 
Nicaragua 
PSD (Partido Social Democrata, party branches on the Acores and Madeira), PS (Socialist 
Party, party branch on the Azores after 1990).  
 
Portugal 
LSDV (Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine), AVH (Savez vojvođanskih Mađara) 
 
Serbia 
[For regions in Spain we use cumulated vote shares of autonomist parties in regional elections].  
Andalusia 
PSA-PA (Partido Andalucista), PSOE-A (Partido Socialista Obrero Español de Andalucía), 
NA (Nación Andaluza), IU-A (Izquierda Unida de Andalucia, since 1994)  
Aragon 
CHA (Chunta Aragonesista), PAR (Partido Aragonés),  
Asturia 
ENA (Ensame Nacionalista Astur), PAS (Partíu Asturianista), AA (Andecha Astur), URAS 
(Asturian Renewal Union), U (Unidá), FAC (Foro Asturias) 
Canary Islands and Balearic Islands  
AIC (Coalición Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias), CC (Coalición Canaria), UM (Unió 
Mallorquina), CCN (Centro Canario), PSM (Partit Socialista de Mallorca (-EN)) 
Catalonia 
CiU (Convergéncia I Unió), ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), PSUC (Partit Socialista 
Unificat de Catalunya), PCC (Partit dels i les Comunistes de Catalunya), ICV (Iniciativa per 
Catalunya Verds), SI (Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència) 
Extremadura 
EU (Extremadura Unida), PREX (Partido Regionalista Extremeño), CE (Coalición Extremeña) 
Galicia 
PG (Partido Galeguista), BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Gallego), PsdeG-PSOE (Partido dos 
Socialistas de Galicia), EG (Esquerda Galega), CG (Coalición Galega), PSG-EG (Partido 
Socialista Galego-Esquerda Galega), UG (Unidade Galega)  
Rioja 
PR (Partido Riojano) 
Navarra 
UPN (Unión del Pueblo Navarro), HB-BA (Herri Batasuna-Heuskal Herritarrok-Batasuna), 
AMAIUR (Agrupaciones Electorales de Merindad), PNV (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco), UNAI (Unión Navarra de Izquierdas), EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra), CDN 
(Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra), EA (Eusko Alkartasuna), AR (Aralar), NA-BAI 





EMK (Euskadi Mugimendu Komunista), PNV (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco), HB-BA (Herri Batasuna-Heuskal Herritarrok-Batasuna), EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra), EH 
(Basque Citizens), EA (Eusko Alkartasuna), EHAK (Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi 
Komunista),  
Valencia  
UV (Unió Valenciana), BNV (Bloc Nacionalista Valencià). 
 
Jura and Tessin 




BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), DEHAP (Democratic People´s Party), HEP (People´s 
Labor Party), HADEP (People´s Democracy Party), DTP (Democratic Society Party), HDP 




Scottish Covenant 1950 (56.6% in favour of more autonomy); referendum of 1979 (51.6 % 
approval). After the 1997 reform we use cumulated seat shares for autonomist parties in 
regional elections.  
SG (Scottish Greens), SNP (Scottish National Party), SS (Scottish Socialist) 
Wales 
Referendum 1979 (20% approval); referendum in 1997 (50.3% approval). After the 1997 
referendum we use vote shares of PC in regional elections. 
PC (Plaid Cymru) 
Northern Ireland 
We use cumulated vote shares in regional election (from 1981 to 1999 we use disaggregated 
national election results).  
SF (Sinn Fein), SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party), NIP (Northern Ireland Labour), 











Correspondence of national and regional platforms in Spain 
We compare party positions of national and regional party manifestos. National party positions are based on 
manifesto data (Volkens et al. 2016) and are transformed into an economic and a cultural dimension following 
the procedure in Table D. In the cases of Spain, we use the regional manifesto data (Alonso et al. 2013). Regional 
manifesto data in Spain also transformed using the approach of Part II.  
Time points between regional elections and national elections differ. When the year of elections on the national 
and regional level coincide, correlations on the economic dimension are very high 0.88. The correlations 
marginally decrease if we include the closest match in terms of the election year (0.84). The same holds true for 
the similarities on the cultural dimension. The differences between regional and national party platforms are 
more pronounced on the cultural dimension (0.65 and 0.57). As these differences are common to both countries, 
we see the assumption confirmed that the cultural dimension is less suitable for inter-territorial comparisons or 
parties simply state very different priorities on the cultural dimension.  
Table G: Correspondence of national and regional platforms in Spain 
 
 Economic Dimension (regional) Cultural Dimension (regional) 
   
Country  Spain Spain 
Economic Dimension (national) 0.77 - 
Cultural Dimension (national) - 0.27 
Temporal match extended extended 
Regional source Alonso et al 2013 (structural equation 
model on regional manifestos) 
Alonso et al 2013 (structural equation 
model on regional manifestos) 










Dimension   
Economic 
Dimension  














Market Liberalism (blinded) 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.74 0.79 0.46 
Economic Dimension (Elff 2013) 0.76 0.77 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.33 
Economic (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006) 0.71 0.73 0.56 0.68 0.71 0.41 
Free Market (Lowe et al. 2011) 0.69 0.71 0.54 0.60 0.64 0.28 
Left Right (König et al. 2013) 0.73 0.75 0.49 0.83 0.84 0.75 
Left Right (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006) 0.76 0.79 0.36 0.84 0.88 0.62 
Rile (Laver and Budge 1992) 0.67 0.69 0.31 0.70 0.73 0.40 
Two-Level Model (country)  0.78 0.81 0.78 0.70 0.75 0.47 
n 519 468 51 284 234 50 
Note: The 51(50) observations for Eastern European parties are from Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Party positions for the correlations in this table are based on the published procedures of the 
different authors. As benchmark we use the economic dimension of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey with the rescaled values 
corrected with anchoring vignettes (Bakker et al. 2014a; 2014b) and the left‒right dimension without rescaling. 
  
Robustness  
Controls and countries 
The following table depict the change of the coefficient dependent on the exclusion of different controls or the 
exclusion of countries. We start from Model 4 as in the paper, regressing ideological proximity on reforms. The 
coefficient of ideological proximity in the baseline model is 7.45 and significant at the 99% level. A negative 
value indicates a reduction of the average effect through the exclusion of the respective control variable or the 
disintegration of a specific country.  Independent of model choice, the effect of ideological proximity remains 
always positive and significant. The control variables marginally change the average effect. The exception is a 
kin state. The exclusion of countries asserts stronger effects on the average effects of ideological proximity. In 
countries like Canada or Nicaragua we find weaker evidence for our hypothesis and hence, the exclusion of 
those countries increases the average effect. On the contrary, for regions in the UK, Denmark, Spain and Italy 






Table I: Exclusion of controls and countries 
Excluded variable 







Number of parties in gov. 7.45 7.05 *** -0.4 
Duration of gov. (in month) 7.45 7.71 *** 0.26 
Seat share of gov. 7.45 7.19 *** -0.26 
Previous Reform  7.45 7.24 *** -0.21 
Age of democracy 7.45 7.79 *** 0.34 
Level of authority 7.45 7.02 *** -0.43 
Population 7.45 6.96 *** -0.49 
Demanding others 7.45 7.62 *** 0.17 
Secessionist claims 7.45 7.37 *** -0.08 
Kin states 7.45 5.97 ** -1.48 
Divided claims 7.45 7.67 *** 0.22 
Electoral stability (state-wide) 7.45 7.49 *** 0.04 
Electoral importance 7.45 7.46 *** 0.01 
Congruence stability 7.45 7.46 *** 0.01 
Market liberalism 7.45 6.96 *** -0.49 
Excluded country     
Canada 7.45 12.81 *** 5.36 
Denmark 7.45 5.32 ** -2.13 
France 7.45 6.75 *** -0.7 
Italy 7.45 5.95 ** -1.5 
Nicaragua 7.45 9.28 *** 1.83 
Portugal 7.45 8.41 *** 0.96 
Serbia 7.45 9.7 *** 2.25 
Spain 7.45 6.23 ** -1.22 
Switzerland 7.45 7.41 *** -0.04 
Turkey 7.45 6.57 ** -0.88 
United Kingdom 7.45 4.45 * -3 






In this section we demonstrate the consistency of the results across different estimators. We believe, that a 
penalized maximum likelihood estimator is the most appropriate estimator because we deal with rare positive 
cases with an absolute amount below 200. However, more conventional models such as Panel Probit or Panel 
Logit estimators reveal similar significance levels although with lower substantial effect size. A praise-Winston 
transformation reveals similar effects as a simple OLS regression and the Durbin-Watson statistic is not 
significant. Hence, we can cautiously infer that the effects are not driven by heteroscedasticity.  
Table J: Alternative estimators 
 
 Simple OLS 
GLS (Praise-Winsten 
AR(1)) Panel Probit Panel Logit 
Coefficient of ideological proximity 0.17** 0.17** 3.40** 6.25** 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) - 1.74  - 
Note: All models entail the controls of Model 4 in the paper.  
 
Alternative dependent variables 
We argue for a binary dependent variable indicating accommodative reform or not. However, it is also 
interesting to test if more or less shifted authority can be related to ideological proximity. To test this, we use 
the change of the Regional Authority Index as the dependent variable. Due to the distribution of a quasi-
continuous dependent variable with zero inflation, we model the process as a zero-inflated count process using 
Panel Poisson regression to determine the shifted authority units. In fact, the results confirm that ideological 
proximity relates to more shifted authority units. Additionally, we split reforms either in a quasi-continuous or 
binary operationalization into a self-rule and shared-rule part. Again, the models show significant results and 
interestingly vary very little in significant level and magnitude.  













of regional shared- 
rule 
Binary change of 
regional self-rule 
Binary change of 
regional shared 
rule 




2.99** 4.96*** 4.69** 7.81*** 7.14*** 
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